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1

Case No. 20110428-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

StateofUtah,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Jamis M. Johnson,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant Johnson appeals an Order and Judgment revoking probation
following a conviction for one count of securities fraud. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2011).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Should Defendant's brief be disregarded because it is inadequate?

Standard of Review. "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.' Utah R. App. P.
24(j)." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 8,1 P.3d 1108.
2.

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation?

Standard of Review. This Court reviews jurisdictional questions as a matter of
law. See State v. Kragh, 2011 UT App 108, t 9,255 P.3d 685.
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3. Did the trial court clearly err when it found that Defendant had violated
probation by failing to report to Adult Probation and Parole and by committing a
federal crime?
Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews the " evidence of a probation
violation in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings," and substitutes its
own judgment "only if the evidence is so deficient as to render the court's action an
abuse of discretion." State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, \ 12, 997 P.2d 314 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. Section .77-18-1(11) & (12) (West 2007) is attached as
addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted Defendant of one count of securities fraud (R1451). On June
6,2007, Defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison (Rl677-80). The
sentence was suspended and Defendant was placed on probation for 36 months
based on certain conditions, including that he be supervised by Adult Probation &
Parole (AP&P), that he have no new violations of the law, and that he report to the
court whenever ordered to do so. Id. Defendant was also ordered to pay $125,000
in restitution, jointly and severally with his co-defendant, Paul Schwenke (R167780). Defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, but remanded

2
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for further proceedings to determine restitution. State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,
224 P.3d 720 (addendum B).
Defendant signed a probation agreement, in which he agreed to " [r]eport as
directed by the Department of Corrections/' to "[ojbey all state, federal and
municipal laws/' and to "report to the court whenever ordered to do so/' (R218485, addendum C).
Numerous probation progress/violation reports and orders to show cause
were subsequently filed. Relevant to this appeal, on October 10,2007, Defendant's
probation was revoked and reinstated for 36 months.1
Additional probation violation reports were filed, and hearings were held, but
apparently none of the conditions of probation were changed again until August 30,
2010. At an evidentiary hearing on August 30, 2010, the trial court found that
Defendant had violated his probation by not maintaining verifiable full-time,
employment (R2550:49; R2395-96; 2435-36). The court again revoked and reinstated
probation for 36 months with the additional condition that Defendant serve 60 days
in jail (R2435; R2550:52, addendum D). Defendant timely appealed that order
1

Defendant failed to provide the entire record on appeal Only volumes 10
and 11 of the court file in case no. 051700056 were sent to the Court of Appeals.
However, Defendant concedes that probation was revoked and reinstated for 36
months on October 10,2007 (Aplt. br. at 4). In addition, the court docket in case no.
051700056 shows when probation progress/violation reports were filed, and the
hearings that followed.
3
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(R2414). A certificate of probable cause and order of release was signed November
3, 2010 (R2468-2469, addendum E). The sentence was stayed pending appeal and
Defendant was released from jail (R2470-72, addendum F). The district court's
decision was affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 118,

P.3d

(addendum G).
From November 12, 2010 through March 29, 2011, numerous additional
probation violation reports were filed (see docket). A probation violation report
filed on March 29, 2011 alleged that Defendant had violated probation by not
reporting to AP&P (R2567, addendum H). It also alleged that Defendant had
violated probation based on criminal convictions in federal court. Id. at 2568.
Following an evidentiary hearing on April 27,2011, Defendant was found to
have violated probation by failing to report to AP&P as required (R2974:43,
addendum I; see also R2627-28, addendum J). Following an evidentiary hearing on
May 17, 2011, Defendant was found to have violated probation based on federal
criminal convictions (R2975:65-66, addendum K). The trial court revoked probation
and imposed the original sentence of one to fifteen years in the Utah State prison
(R2975:72, addendum K and see R2909, addendum L).
Defendant timely appealed the April 27 and May 17th rulings by filing notices
of appeal on May 17,2011 and May 20,2011 (R2629,2642). But on June 17,2011, the
trial court entered an Order purporting to amend its order revoking probation
4
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(R2896-2900, addendum M). The State filed a motion to vacate, arguing that the
court lacked jurisdiction because the case was on appeal (2904-06,2927-2934). On
July 27,2011, the court entered a memorandum decision, but did not grant or deny
the State's motion (R2964-2967). The decision states that the "court is inclined to
grant" the State's motion, but then questions whether it has jurisdiction to do so,
since it lost jurisdiction when Defendant appealed. Id. Although Defendant refers
to them, these decisions and issues are not specifically part of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Underlying Criminal Case. In the summer of 2000, two dairymen held a
family dairy farm as the sole members of a limited liability company. Johnson, 2009
UT App 382 f 2 (addendum B). The dairymen had a series of meetings with
Defendant and his co-defendant Schwenke to discuss a proposed investment in
American-Dairy.com, a company that Schwenke had recently incorporated. Id. at
f f 2-3. Schwenke said that he would obtain financing by selling stock in a public
offering. Defendant explained how stocks would work in the public offering. Id. at
f^f 3-4. But Defendant did not disclose that he was the subject of ongoing
disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State Bar for misappropriating client funds,
that he was subject to three tax liens totaling $1,669,562.89, or that he had a Small
Business Administration judgment against him. Defendant also did not tell the
dairymen that Schwenke was an attorney who had been disbarred for
5
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misappropriating client funds or that he was pursuing legal action against
Schwenke over a failed business deal. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, f 2.
The dairymen signed an agreement transferring all of the farm's assets to
American-Dairy, in exchange for stock in the company. Id. at f 5. But no other
stocks were ever issued, making the two dairymen the sole shareholders. Id. at f 6.
The dairymen never received any financing out of the transaction (R1999:152,
178,231). And, having transferred their deed to American-Dairy, they were no
longer able to get financing from a bank (Rl999:173). Within months of the
transaction, creditors foreclosed, the dairymen lost their farm and farm equipment,
and forfeited a $70,000 certificate of deposit, which had previously been used as
collateral for a loan to purchase cattle. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382 f 8.
The Probation Revocation Proceedings. On June 18, 2007, Defendant signed a
probation agreement, in which he agreed to "[r]eport as directed by the Department
of Corrections/7 to "[o]bey all state, federal and municipal laws/' to "report to the
court whenever ordered to do so/' and "to abide by all conditions of probation as
ordered by the court." (R2184-85, addendum C).
Evidentiary hearing on April 27,2011. The evidentiary hearing on April 27,
2011 was held on an order to show cause against Defendant alleging violations of
his probation (R2974:4, addendum I). Several violations were alleged, including
that Defendant had been convicted of federal crimes and had failed to report to
6
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AP&P as required. Id. at 7. The issue concerning federal convictions was continued
to a hearing in May. So the April hearing specifically addressed the issue of
Defendant failing to report to AP&P.
At the hearing, AP&P agent Troy Staker testified that Defendant was under
his personal supervision (R2974:10-ll, addendum I). Agent Staker testified that he
received an e-mail from the jail saying that Defendant was going to be released on
October 13,2010. So Agent Staker called the home telephone number provided by
Defendant, but Defendant's home number had been disconnected (R2974:12-13).
Agent Staker then called Defendant's mobile phone and left a message, letting
him know that he was aware that Defendant was going to be released from jail. Id.
His message reminded Defendant that he needed to report in person to AP&P the
next business day following his release from jail. Id. at 14. But Defendant did not
report to AP&P and did not call or leave a message as to why he did not report. Id.
Defendant's previous schedule required him to report to Agent Staker on the
third Thursday of every month. Id. at 14-15. But Defendant also did not report on
October 21st, the third Thursday of October, and did not call or leave a message as
to why he did not report. Id.
Defendant testified that he received Agent Staker's telephone message, but he
did not respond to Agent Staker. Id. at 26-27,29. In response to the phone message,

7
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Defendant said he instead called his attorney and checked the court docket. Id. at
27,29.
Prior to the April evidentiary hearing, Defendant's probation had been
revoked and then reinstated with the additional condition that he serve 60 days in
jail (R2435; 2550-52, addendum D). Defendant did not serve all of the jail time
because a certificate of probable cause and order of release was signed pending
appeal (R2468-69, addendum E). The certificate of probable cause required
Defendant to "continue^ to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of
each month/' Id.
At the evidentiary hearing, Defendant testified that it was his understanding
that probation had been shifted to the court during the appeal. Id. at 29. He
testified that the remedy he had asked for in his motion to stay was that his
probation be converted to court probation and that the sentence of probation also be
stayed pending appeal. Id. at 30. Defendant testified that the advice of his counsel
was that it was unnecessary for him to report to AP&P, but that he had to report to
the court. Id. at 30-31.
Defense counsel acknowledged that the certificate of probable cause was
dated November 3, 2010 (R2974:37, and see addenda E and F), but he argued that
the order should be considered nunc pro tunc, dating back to October 13, 2010
(R2974:37). Defendant's position was that after October 13,2010, he did not have to
8
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report to AP&P, but only had to report to the court. Defense counsel also argued
that it could not be said that Defendant willfully violated probation when he was
relying on the advice of counsel and the certificate of probable cause saying that he
was to report to the court. Id. at 38.
But the prosecutor pointed out that the certificate of probable cause and the
court's order did not say that Defendant could stop reporting to AP&P. Id, at 40.
The prosecutor also asked the court to take judicial notice of its own record, to find
that Defendant had also failed to report to the court. Id. at 33-34.
The court determined that Defendant had violated probation by failing to
report:
I don't believe I ever ruled from the Bench that his probation had
terminated. I think that's an assumption that he arrived at either on his
own or with the help of counsel, but having been contacted by
probation and being told that he needed to report, he then made the
decision to walk the tight rope of not reporting and relying upon his
belief that probation may have been terminated by my oral statements
from the Bench.
In the order that was prepared based on those oral statements it
also does not say that he's relieved from probation or that his
probation is terminated.
(R2974:46-47, addendum I).
The court also stated that he had "not laid eyes on Mr. Johnson since our
October meeting. And I do not know that he's reported on the 15th of each month
even under that order." Id. at 42-43.
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court concluded that Defendant was under the jurisdiction of AP&P, and
was still controlled by the terms and conditions of his probation agreement. Id. The
Court then found that Defendant willingly violated probation by not reporting to
AP&P. Id. at 43. Discussions about sanctions for the violation were postponed until
May 17,2011. Id.
The Court also warned that from that point forward, Defendant was to report
and abide by the terms of the AP&P agreement. Id. at 49. The Court noted that
Defendant "had that responsibility since [he] began that agreement and that it has
not terminated as of today/'54-55.
The Court also noted that it had "issued a stay on [Defendant's] jail term and
the imposition of the sanction that was issued by Judge Eyre pending an appeal and
outcome, but I have not terminated his probation/' Id. at 50. "The stay was not
addressing probation." It was addressing the sentence and that was stayed. Id. at
55. The Court also pointed out that "simply the filing of the order to show cause
tolls the probationary period." Id. at 51,53.2

2

On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke
his probation. This issue was never specifically raised below. However, in his
application for certificate of probable cause and motion for a stay pending appeal,
Johnson did argue that the probationary period could not toll under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1 if probation had been revoked (R2660, 2777).
10
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Evidentiary hearing on May 17, 2011: One of the purposes of the May
evidentiary hearing was to address the allegations that Defendant had "been
convicted of a crime in federal court in violation of a term of his probation."
(R2975:3, addendum K). Copies of the indictment and verdict form from federal
case no. 2:09-CR-00133 CW were provided. Id.
Defendant was charged in federal court with ten counts of mail fraud (1-10),
twelve counts of wire fraud (11-22), one count of conspiracy (23), and fourteen
counts of money laundering (24-37) (R2858-2876, addendum N). He was convicted
of counts 1-2,4-7,9,11-16,18-19,21,23,27-33,35, and 37-38 (R2877-2878, addendum
O).3
Defendant argued that all of the federal crimes for which he had been
convicted occurred before he was placed on probation in State court (R2975:13-14,
addendum K). Defendant pointed out that although counts 10 and 22 included
allegations for dates after imposition of probation, both those counts had been
dismissed. Id. Defendant argued that crimes committed before imposition of
probation could not be the basis for a probation violation. Id.
The prosecutor responded that some of the criminal activity was committed
after the State conviction. Id. at 15. The conspiracy charge (count 23) of which
3

From the documents provided in this case, it unclear why the federal
indictment only has 37 charges, but the verdict form includes count 38.
11
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Defendant was convicted, alleged that the crime of conspiracy was committed
"beginning in or about mid 2005 to around August 2007," which was after
probation was imposed and Defendant signed the probation agreement (R2975:44,
addendum K; R2872-73, addendum N).
The court noted that Defendant had been sentenced on June 6, 2007, and it
would be 'Very hesitant to find any actions taken by the defendant prior to June 6th
to be violations of probation (R2975:18, addendum K). But the court noted that it
appeared that Defendant "may have been involved in a series of conduct over a
period of several years interrupted by his conviction in this court, but in which he
continued to participate even following his conviction." Id. at 47. The court then
found that Defendant violated his probation as shown by his federal convictions of
aiding and abetting or willfully causing another to commit a crime; the trial court
specifically referred to the convictions on counts 18,19,21,23,27 and 28. Id. at 6566. The court also specifically found that Defendant was "in violation of probation
by having a conviction of conspiracy which, again, is Count 23." Id. at 66.
In deciding what sanction to impose, the Court said: "it appears the defendant
was involved in a continuing, ongoing criminal process that took a number of years
to commit various frauds. In the middle of which he was convicted in state court...
And yet that didn't have an impact on his behavior." Id. 71. "He didn't cease. He
didn't stop. He didn't try to undue [sic]. He took the benefit of and continued to
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

encourage others to take the benefit of his criminal activities. Some of those
activities occurred before he was sentenced, some occurred before he was on
probation, some after/7 Id.
Finally, the court addressed its previous finding at the April hearing that
Defendant had violated probation by not reporting to AP&P, and said: "I also don't
believe that he was on court probation, but if he understood it that way, he didn't
comply/7 Id. at 70.
The Court revoked Defendant's probation and executed the original statutory
prison term. Id. at 72.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Inadequate brief.

Defendant's brief should disregarded because it is

inadequate.
The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the alleged probation violations.
Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated for 36 months on August 30,
2010, which meant that his probation would not expire until August 30,2013. This
decision was affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, 2012 UP App 118 (addendum G).
The trial court thus clearly had jurisdiction to rule on any alleged probation
violations.

13
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The certificate of probable cause issued while Defendant's prior appeal was
pending, did not excuse Defendant from reporting to AP&P. Defendant was
found to have violated probation by failing to report to AP&P as required. He
argues that the certificate of probable cause the trial court issued while he appealed
this finding excused him from reporting to AP&P because it required him to report
to the court. But his probation agreement clearly stated that he was to report to
AP&P and "report to the court whenever ordered to do so/' (R2184-85, addendum
C). The fact that the certificate of probable cause required him to report to the court
did not excuse him from reporting to AP&P. And, even if Defendant were excused
from reporting to AP&P, he still violated probation by not reporting to the trial
court.
Defendant was convicted of a federal crime that he committed after he was
placed on probation. Defendant alleges that his federal convictions could not have
constituted a violation of probation because they were all based on conduct
committed before sentencing and imposition of probation. But Defendant is
mistaken. He was found guilty of conspiracy, "[beginning in or about mid 2005 to
around August 2007/' (R2872-73,2878, addenda N & O). He was sentenced on June
6, 2007. Defendant's federal conviction for conspiracy thus alleged conduct that
took place after he was placed on probation.

14
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ARGUMENT
ITHIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS
BECAUSE HIS BRIEF IS IN ADEQUATE AND BECAUSE HE DOES
NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
A. Defendant's brief fails to follow the requirements of Rule 24.
Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that for each
issue, an appellant must include a "citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved/' Section (a)(7) requires an appellant to include a statement of the facts,
supported by citations to the record. Defendant fails to cite to the record, showing
where his issues were preserved. See Aplt. br. at 2-3. He also fails to include a
statement of the facts. Although some of the facts are included in his "CASE
STATEMENT/7 he includes no record citations. Defendant also fails to include a
summary of arguments, as required by section (a)(8). See Aplt. br. at 9.
Rule 24 (a)(9) also requires an appellant to include his "contentions and
reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented," including "citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." in arguments 11 and III of his
brief, Defendant includes no citations to any authorities, statutes, or the record. See
Aplt. br. at 14-17,
This Court has repeatedly declined to address inadequately briefed issues.
See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT120\ \29, 63 P.3d 72 (refusing to consider inadequately

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

briefed argument); MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,947-48 (Utah 1998) (same); State
v. Wareham, 772 R2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (same). '"A reviewing court is entitled to
have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited/" State v. Snyder, 932
P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)),
see also Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (holding that brief "must contain some support for
each contention"). Because Defendant has not adequately briefed any of his claims,
this Court should simply affirm.
B.

Defendant's brief fails to marshal all the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings.
Defendant also fails to marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's

findings that he violated probation. It is well-settled that although a court of
appeals will review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, it will disturb
findings of fact only if they are "clearly erroneous." State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293,
295 (Utah 1992). A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against
the clear weight of the evidence'" or if the reviewing court "'reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). The appellant has the burden to marshal all the evidence
that supports the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that the marshaled
evidence does not support those findings. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-61
(Utah 1994).
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When an appellant fails "to properly marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings of fact, we do not consider those findings properly challenged
and, therefore, assume the evidence supports them/' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, %
3,100 P.3d 1177.

Because Defendant has not marshaled the evidence, this Court

may, and should, "accept the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling." State v.
Benvenuto, 983 R2d 556,558 (Utah 1999).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO REVOKE
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION
As explained, Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated on October
10,2007, for 36 months. Defendant argues that his probation expired on October 10,
2010, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any allegations of
probation violations filed after that date. (Aplt. br. at 6).
Defendant acknowledges that before that date his probation was again
revoked and reinstated for 36 months on August 30, 2010, which meant that his
probation would not expire until August 30, 2013. He argues, however, that
because he appealed that decision, and because the trial court granted a certificate of
probable cause and his motion to stay pending appeal, that the August 30, 2010
findings did not extend the term of probation (Aplt. br. at 5-6).
But Defendant also asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain allegations of probation violations " after October 10,2010, unless and until
17
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[his] appeal of the August 30,2010 findings fails and the stay is lifted/' (Aplt. br. at
6). Defendant's appeal has failed. On April 19, 2012, this Court affirmed the trial
court's decision to revoke and reinstate probation. State v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 118
(addendum G). Therefore, Defendant's argument that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the allegations of probation violations fails.4
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED PROBATION AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REVOKED PROBATION
Even if this Court excuses Defendant's failures to adequately brief his claims
and marshal the evidence, Defendant's claims fail on their merits/Probation may
not be revoked or modified except upon a hearing in court, unless waived by the
defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a) (Addendum A). If a defendant denies
an alleged violation, evidence is presented at a hearing. The defendant may call
witnesses and present evidence in his own behalf. After the hearing, the court
makes findings of fact. Id.

4

Even if this Court had not yet issued it decision, Defendant's jurisdiction
claim would still fail. The fact that the trial court granted a certificate of probable
cause, ordered a stay of the sentence, and released Defendant from jail pending
appeal, does not mean that the August 30,2010 decision did not extend probation.
The order revoking and reinstating probation remained valid unless overturned on
appeal. Therefore, Defendant's term of probation was extended until August 30,
2013, and the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on any alleged probation violations
filed before that date.
18
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That is exactly what happened in this case. Hearings were held on April 27th
and May 17,2011 (addenda I & K). The prosecution presented evidence and then
Defendant presented evidence, including testifying in his own behalf. Only then
did the Court find that Defendant had violated probation (R2974:43 & 2975:66).
"[I]n the trial court, the State must prove to the satisfaction of the trial judge
that it is more likely than not, i.e., by a preponderance, that defendant violated his
probation." State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)(emphasis in
original, referring to State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990)). An
appellate court then applies "a clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial
court's factual findings." State v. On, 2005 UT 92, f 8,127 P.3d 1213 (addressing
probation extensions).
A "'finding of fact by a trial court is 'clearly erroneous' only if it is against the
clear weight of the evidence.'" Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209, quoting Turnbaugh v.
Anderson, 793 P.2d 989, 941 (Utah App. 1990)). In determining whether a fact
finding is clearly erroneous, the appellate court reviews the "evidence of a probation
violation in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. Maestas, 2000
UT App 22, If 12, 997 P.2d 314.
"'The first step in a revocation decision . . . involves a wholly retrospective
factual question: whether the [probationer or] parolee has in fact acted in violation
of one or more of the conditions of his [probation or] parole.'" Gagnon v. Scaiyelli,
19
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411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973) (addressing probation revocations) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,479-80 (1972) (addressing parole revocations)). A review of the
transcripts of the evidentiary hearings establishes that Defendant did in fact violate
the conditions of his probation.
A, The trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant
violated his probation by failing to report
1. The probable cause certificate did not excuse Defendant from
the requirement that he report to AP&P.
The trial court found that Defendant violated probation when he failed to
report to AP&P as required by his probation agreement (R2974:43). Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated probation by failing
to report to AP&P, because the certificate of probable cause required only that he
report to the court. He thus argues that the probable cause certificate excused him
from reporting to AP&P (Aplt.br. at 7,14).
It is true that the certificate of probable cause states that the Defendant was to
"continue^ to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of each month/7
(R2469, addendum E). But neither the certificate of probable cause nor the Court's
Order said that Defendant no longer had to report to AP&P.
Indeed, at the evidentiary hearing, the Court said: "I don't believe I ever
ruled from the Bench that his probation had terminated ." R2974:46, addendum I).

20
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The Court also noted that the order /'does not say that he's relieved from probation
or that his probation is terminated." Id.
In addition, Defendant's probation agreement clearly states that he is to report
to AP&P and "to the court whenever ordered to do so." (addendum C) (emphasis
added). The fact that the certificate of probable cause required Defendant to report
to the court did not excuse him from reporting to AP&P, either implicitly or
explicitly.
2. The certificate of probable cause was not signed until
November 3,2010.
Even if the certificate of probable cause excused Defendant from reporting to
AP&P, the certificate of probable cause and the trial court's order were not signed
until November 3, 2010, more than two weeks after October 13, 2010, when
Defendant was released from jail (R2974:12, addenda E, F, and I). Plus, the
telephone message from his AP&P agent advised Defendant that he needed to
report in person to AP&P the day after his release (R2974:14). But Defendant did
not report the day after his release. Id. Nor did he report on his next regular date
for reporting to AP&P - the third Thursday of every month, which would have been
October 21,2010. Id. at 14-15.
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Because Defendant was not excused from reporting to AP&P until the
certificate of probable cause was signed on November 3,2010, Defendant violated
the terms of his probation by not reporting to AP&P in October as required.
3. Even if Defendant were excused from reporting to AP&P, he
still violated probation by failing to report to the trial court
But even if Defendant were excused from reporting to AP&P, he still violated
probation by failing to report directly to the trial court. As stated, Defendant's
probation agreement required him to "report to the court whenever ordered to do
so/7 (R2185, addendum C). The certificate of probable cause ordered Defendant to
report to the court by the 15th of each month (R2464, addendum E). There is no
testimony or evidence in the record that Defendant reported to the court on October
15, 2010. Indeed, the trial court found otherwise. The trial court said: Defendant
"claims that he reported to the Court on a monthly basis. And I appreciate the
argument, but it's not persuasive. I don't believe I ever met with Mr. Johnson. I
don't think he's ever provided me any information regarding his housing, his
employment, his income, his opportunities or his efforts to make restitution. . . . I
also don't believe that he was on court probation, but if he understood it that way,
he didn't comply." (R2975:70, addendum K).
In sum, Defendant has not established that the trial court's finding that he
violated probation by failing to report was "against the clear weight of the
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evidence/' Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209. When viewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court's findings, the finding was not clearly erroneous, and should therefore
be upheld. See Maestas, 2000 UT App 22 at \ 12.
B. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant had
violated probation by committing further law violations.
As stated, Defendant was sentenced and probation was imposed on June 6,
2007. As one of the terms of his probation agreement, Defendant agreed to "[o]bey
all state, federal and municipal laws/' (R2184-85, addendum C). The trial court
found that Defendant had violated his probation based on his federal criminal
convictions (R2975:66).
Defendant argues that all his federal convictions were based on conduct he
committed before he was sentenced and placed on probation. Defendant is
mistaken. It is true that many of the federal convictions were crimes alleged to have
been committed before the order of probation. But not all of them were. As the trial
court said: "Some of those activities occurred before he was sentenced, some
occurred before he was on probation, some after." R2975:72, addendum K).
Most specifically, count 23 of the federal indictment charged Defendant with
conspiracy "[bjeginning in or about mid 2005 to around August 2007/' (R2872-73,
addendum N). Therefore, the conspiracy was alleged to have continued even after
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probation was imposed in June of 2007. Defendant was convicted of the conspiracy
charge in count 23 (R2878, addendum O).
In ruling on whether Defendant had violated probation based on his
convictions in federal court, the trial court specifically found that Defendant was "in
violation of probation by having a conviction of conspiracy which, again, is Count
23." (R2975:66, addendum K).
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court's determination that he
violated probation based on his federal conviction was clearly erroneous. The trial
court decision should therefore be affirmed.5

5

Although not entirely clear from his brief, Defendant may be attempting to
argue that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous based on the trial court's
subsequent attempt to amend its decision on June 17,2011 (R2896-2900, addendum
M). There are several problems with this argument. First, it is inadequately briefed.
Second, because Defendant had already filed his notice of appeal, the trial
court had no jurisdiction to amend its decision and the June 17, 2011 order is
therefore without affect. A trial court is divested of jurisdiction while a case is
under advisement on appeal. See Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, |16,193 P.3d
640; Wltite v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990).
Third, the trial court states in its June 17, 2011 order that its previous
conclusion that Defendant had violated probation was made in error, because "the
dates of these offenses predate Defendant's sentencing in the present case." (R2897,
addendum M). But that conclusion is erroneous. As addressed above, probation
was imposed on June 7, 2007, and Defendant was convicted of count 23 of the
federal indictment, which alleged a conspiracy that continued until August 2007.
Therefore the conspiracy offense did not predate Defendant's sentencing and
probation in the State case.
24
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C. The trial court did not err in revoking probation.
A preponderance of the evidence, especially when viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court's findings, establishes that Defendant violated the terms
of his probation by failing to report to AP&P or to the court, and by being convicted
of a federal crime. Once a determination has been made that a defendant violated
probation, the court must then exercise its discretion to determine whether to
modify or revoke probation. See On, 2005 UT 92, f 9 (quoting State v. Jameson, 800
P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)) (stating that "the district court has discretion 'to grant,
modify, or revoke probation'").
On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's findings that probation was
violated, but he never challenges revocation of probation based on those findings.
For that reason alone, the revocation should be upheld.
In addition, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision to
revoke probation unless it determines "'that the evidence of a probation violation,
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the
trial court abused its discretion in revoking [or modifying appellant's] probation.'"
Id, (alteration in On) (quoting Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804). There is no indication that
the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation in this case. Therefore, the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted April 25,2012.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

ERIN RILEY,

/

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Page 1

U.C.A. 1953 §77-18-1
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
Chapter 18. The Judgment
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or
extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the
court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of
the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may,
after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may
place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors
or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with the department,
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the
court,
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred
to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of
Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and submit it to the appropriate
legislative appropriations subcommittee.
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(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the probation of persons
convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in
accordance with department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the
date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation reportfromthe department or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in
Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a
recommendationfromthe department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; and
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender.
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the
court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as
provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant
if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the
record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that
matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, anyfineimposed at the time of being placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the department, after considering
any recommendation by the court as to which jail the courtfindsmost appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
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(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or
vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1. with interest
and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any extension of that period by
the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the
case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt
Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion, the court
may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation
violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation
term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing,
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a
hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of probation
have been violated.
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(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions
of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified,
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or
extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be served upon the defendant
at least five days prior to the hearing,
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and
to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent,
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit,
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the
allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as
witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders,
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact,
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of Substance Abuse and
Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 632-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for purposes of supervision,
confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized
representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the
impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
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(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, including electronic monitoring,
for all individuals referred to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the defendant to participate in
home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the
court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's
whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's compliance with the court's order
may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic monitoring as a condition of
probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons
who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either directly or by contract with
a private provider.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1;
Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, §
l;Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1: Laws 1990. c. 134. § 2: Laws 1991. c. 66. § 5: Laws 1991, c. 206. § 6: Laws 1992. c. 14,
§ 3: Laws 1993. c. 82. § 7; Laws 1993. c. 220. § 3: Laws 1994. c. 13. g 24: Laws 1994, c. 198, § 1: Laws 1994, c.
230, g 1: Laws 1995. c. 20, g 146. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1995, c. 117. § 2. eff. Mav 1. 1995: Laws 1995. c. 184. g
1. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1995. c. 301. § 3. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1995. c. 337, 8 11. eff. May 1, 1995: Laws
1995. c. 352. g 6. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1996. c. 79. § 103. eff. April 29. 1996: Laws 1997. c. 390. $ 2. eff. Mav 5,
1997: Laws 1998. c. 94. $ 10. eff. May 4. 1998: Laws 1999. c. 279. g 8, eff. May 3. 1999: Laws 1999. c. 287. § 7,
eff. Mav 3. 1999: Laws 2001. c. 137. g 1. eff. April 30. 2001: Laws 2002. c. 35. g 7. eff. May 6. 2002: Laws 2002,
5th Sp.Sess.. c. 8. g 137. eff Sept 8. 2002: Laws 2003. c. 290. g 3. eff May 5. 2003: Laws 2005. 1st Sp.Sess., c. 14,
g 3, eff. July 1, 2005: Laws 2007, c. 218. g 3. eff. July 1, 2007.
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Court of Appeals of Utah,
. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jamis M. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20070909-CA.
Dec. 17,2009.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
Fourth District Court, Fillmore Department, Donald
J. Eyre Jr., J., of securities fraud, and defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held
that:
(1) defendant was not required to file second appeal
pertaining to trial court's final restitution order;
(2) defendant's action in transferring stock certificates for assets of limited liability company (LLC)
was a sale for value;
(3) evidence was sufficient to support finding that
property had a value of at least $10,000, as required
to support charge of second degree securities fraud;
(4) any error in allowing testimony of state's expert
was not prejudicial;
(5) statute making it unlawful to omit to state a material fact necessary to make statement not misleading was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
defendant;
(6) state was not required to prove individual investor believed defendant's statements to be true; and
(7) damages incurred by investors flowed from
fraudulent securities transaction and were properly
charged against defendant.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €^1144.13(2.1)

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(M) Presumptions
110kll.44 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
110kl'144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
1 lOkl 144.13(2) Construction
of
Evidence
HOkl 144.13(2.1) k. In general.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €==>1144.13(5)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(M) Presumptions
11Okl144 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
110k! 144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
110k 1144.13(5) k, Inferences or deductions from evidence. Most Cited Cases
In reviewing an appeal from a jury verdict, the
Court of Appeals views the evidence and ail reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the verdict.
[2] Criminal Law 110 €^>1134.28
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
11 OXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry
11 Okl 134.28 k. Statutory issues in
general. Most Cited Cases
The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness.
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^>469.2
1.10 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
. 1 10XVII(R) Opinion Evidence
110k468 Subjects of Expert Testimony
110k469.2 k. Discretion. Most Cited
Cases
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110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court
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11 Okl 153.12 Opinion Evidence
110kll53.12(3) k. Admissibility.
Most Cited Cases
It is within the discretion of the trial court to
determine the suitability of expert testimony in a
particular case, and the Court of Appeals will not
reverse that determination on appeal in the absence
of a clear showing of abuse.
[4] Constitutional Law 92 €=>990
92 Constitutional Law
92 VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction
as to Constitutionality
92k990 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, the Court of Appeals presumes that the statute
is constitutional.
[5] Constitutional Law 92 €=>1004

Questions
92VI(C)4 Burden of Proof
92kl030 k. In general. Most Cited
The challenger bears the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a statute; furthermore,
unconstitutionality of a statute must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
[6] Constitutional Law 92 €>=>976
92 Constitutional Law
92 VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) ' Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92 VI(C)2 Necessity of Determination
92k976 k. Resolution of nonconstitutional questions before constitutional questions. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>1134.29
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
11 OXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry
11 Okl 134.29 k. Constitutional issues
in general. Most Cited Cases
Appellate courts review constitutional challenges for correctness; however, courts should
avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can
be decided on other grounds.

92 Constitutional Law
92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction
as to Constitutionality
92k 1001 Doubt
92k 1004 k. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Most Cited Cases

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXI V(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)8 Sentencing
11 Okl 134.83 k. Restitution. Most
Cited Cases

Constitutional Law 92 €=>1030

Criminal Law 110 €=^1156.9

92 Constitutional Law
92 VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
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11 Okl 156.1 Sentencing
llOkl 156.9 k. Restitution. Most Cited.

[10] Statutes 361 €^>188

Cases
The Court of Appeals will not disturb a trial
court's order of restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion; furthermore, whether a restitution award
is proper depends solely upon interpretation of the
governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation
of a statute presents a question of law, which the
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness.

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 kl 87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In generaL Most Cited
In interpreting a statute, the Court of Appeals
looks to its plain language, unless it is ambiguous.

[8] Criminal Law 110 €^1081(1)

349B Securities Regulation
349BII State Regulation
349BII(A) In General
349Bk243 Statutory Provisions
349Bk246 k. Construction and operation in general. Most Cited Gases
Where any statutory ambiguities exist, the
Court of Appeals broadly and liberally construes
securities laws to give effect to the legislative purpose of preventing fraud.

110 Criminal Law
llOXXIV Review
1 lOXXIV(F) Proceedings, Generally
110k 1081 Notice of Appeal
HOklOgl(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Defendant was not required to file second notice of appeal pertaining to trial court's final restitution order, and its denial of defendant's renewed
motion for a new trial on charges of securities
fraud; issues raised in second appeal had been properly raised in defendant's original appeal, which
was timely filed, and second appeal differed from
original appeal only in that second appeal included
date of trial court's denial of defendant's renewed
motion for new trial.
[9] Securities Regulation 349B €=>278
349B Securities Regulation
349BII State Regulation
349BII(A) In General
349Bk278 k. Fraudulent or other prohibited practices. Most Cited Cases
Defendant's actions in transferring stock certificates in newly formed dairy company for assets of
limited liability company (LLC) was a sale for
value, pursuant to securities, "fraud unlawful" statute; newly formed company received indirect benefits from the distribution of stock because the transfer enhanced dairy company's ability to borrow.
U.C.A.1953, 61-l-13(22)(a) (2004),

[11] Securities Regulation 349B €^>246

[12] Securities Regulation 349B €^=>328
349B Securities Regulation
349BII State Regulation
349BII(C) Offenses and Prosecutions
349Bk325 Criminal Prosecutions
349Bk328 k. Weight and sufficiency
of evidence. Most Cited Cases
Evidence that assets of limited liability company obtained by newly formed dairy company
through a transfer of stock certificates included
farm equipment worth more than $150,000, recital
in transfer agreement that property had a value of
5200,000, and $50,000 loan co-defendant obtained
by recording trust deed against assets, was sufficient to support jury finding that property had a
value of at least $10,000, as required to support
charge of second degree felony securities fraud
against defendant. West's U.C.A. § 61-l-21(2)(b)(i).
[13] Criminal Law 110 €=^1169.9
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110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
I lOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
11 Ok 1169 Admission of Evidence
110k! 169.9 k. Opinion evidence. Most
Cited Cases
Any error in trial court's allowance of testimony of state's expert witness at defendant's trial
for securities fraud, in which expert allegedly gave
impermissible legal conclusions, and incorrectly
testified as to the law related to securities, was not
prejudicial; shortly after expert began his testimony, trial court admonished jury as to relative
roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence, and
gave careful instructions regarding the relevant legal definitions, defendant was able to cross-examine
expert at length, and to call his own expert to rebut
state expert's testimony. West's U.C.A. § 61-1-1.
[14] Criminal Law 110 €^>469.3
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
II OXVII(R) Opinion Evidence
110k468 Subjects of Expert Testimony
110k469.3 k. Questions of law. Most
Cited Cases
There are limits on an expert's license to testify
as to the legal meaning of a statute; where the witness's legal conclusions blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury and witness,
or there is danger that a juror may turn to the witness's legal conclusion rather than the judge for
guidance on the applicable law. the expert has exceeded those limits.
[15] Constitutional Law 92 €=>4509(!2)
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVII(H) Criminal Law
92XXVI1(H)2 Nature and Elements of
Crime
92k4502 Creation and Definition of

92k4509(12) k. False pretenses
and fraud. Most Cited Cases
Securities Regulation 349B €^>244
349B Securities Regulation
349BII State Regulation
349BII(A) In General
349Bk243 Statutory Provisions
349Bk244 k. Validity, Most Cited
Jury instruction that permitted jury to find defendant guilty of securities fraud only if it found
defendant had made an untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted to state a material fact necessary
in order to make statements made not misleading,
left jury free to find defendant guilty in the absence
of a predicate statement, and thus, statute was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant;
had defendant disclosed tenuous state of his membership in state bar, and reasons for order of disbarment, it would almost certainly have undermined
false statements made by co-defendant as to defendant's
securities
expertise.
U.S.CA.
Const.Amend. 14; West's U.C.A. Const. Art, 1, § 7;
West's U.C.A. §61-1-1(2).
[16] Criminal Law 110 € ^ 1 3 . 1
110 Criminal Law
1101 Nature and Elements of Crime
110k 12 Statutory Provisions
110k 13. I k . Certainty and defmiteness.
Most Cited Cases
A law is unconstitutional and void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined so as
to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that
he may act accordingly. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14
; West's U.C.A. Const. Art, 1, § 7.
[17] Securities Regulation 349B €^>323
349B Securities Regulation
349BH State Regulation
349BII(C) Offenses and Prosecutions

92k4509 Particular Offenses
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349Bk323 k. Fraud or misrepresentation.
Most Cited Cases
State was not required to prove individual investor believed defendant's statements to be true,
nor that investor relied on defendant's statements in
his decision making process, so long as statements
made were such that a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would have relied upon statements in
making an investment decision. West's U.C.A. §
61-1-1(2), .'
[18] Sentencing and Punishment 350H C==?2148
3 50H Sentencing and Punishment
3 50HXI Restitution
350HX](D) Compensable Losses
350Hk2148 k. Monetary, pecuniary, or
economic loss. Most Cited Cases
Damages incurred by dairymen related to foreclosure of trust deed and care and feeding of additional cows brought to farm at direction of codefendant, flowed from fraudulent securities transaction and were properly charged against defendant
as restitution, even though defendant was not convicted of any crime related to extra expenses, and
co-defendant obtained loan which burdened dairymen with additional cows; defendant's securities
fraud gave dairymen a false sense of security about
transaction, which resulted in them entering into
agreement.
[19] Criminal Law 110 €^1181.5(8)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(U) Determination and Disposition
of Cause
11 Ok 1181.5 Remand in General; Vacation
HOkl.181.5(3) Remand for Determination or Reconsideration of Particular Matters
HOkl 181.5(8) k. Sentence. Most
Cited Cases
Sentencing and Punishment 350H €^>2200

3 50HXI Restitution
350HXI(F) Proceedings
350Hk2196 Order
350Hk2200 k. Construction and operation. Most Cited Cases
Trial court's restitution order in the amount of
$120,000, based on $50,000 loan obtained by codefendant, and $70,000 in expenses dairymen incurred to care for additional cows brought to farm,
and which flowed out of defendant's securities
fraud, required remand, even though there was a
sufficient nexus between defendant's crime and
damages, where order did not address whether credits issued to dairymen in the amounts of $11,523.54
and $12,500 should be applied to offset amount of
restitution order.
*722 Rodney G. Snow, Walter A. Romney Jr., and
Aaron D. Lebenta, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Karen A.
Klucznik, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges THORNE, ORME, and McHUGH.
OPINION
McHUGH, Judge:
% 1 Jamis M. Johnson appeals his criminal conviction for securities fraud, a violation of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act (the Securities Act), see
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 .to.-30 (2006 &
Supp^OOP),™1 and the accompanying restitution
order entered by the trial court. We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.
FN1. Unless otherwise noted, we cite to
the current Utah Code as a convenience to
the reader because the relevant sections are
substantively unchanged from the version
in effect at the time of Johnson's crime.
BACKGROUND™2

350H Sentencing and Punishment
FN2. In reviewing an appeal from a jury
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verdict, "we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the verdict. We recite the facts accordingly." State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 1f 2, 989 P.2d 503
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Transaction
[1] f 2 In the summer of 2000, two dairymen
held a family dairy farm, as the sole members of a
limited liability company (the LLC). In July 2000,
the dairymen learned that A. Paul Schwenke "was
interested in meeting some dairy farmers to talk
about some investment." During July and August
2000, the dairymen had a series of meetings with
Schwenke, Johnson, and several other individuals
to discuss the proposed investment. Before attending the first meeting, Johnson did not know the details of Schwenke's plan.FN3 Schwenke introduced
Johnson as "a high powered lawyer" and a "security
expert from out of New York," which one of the
dairymen said "lent a great deal of credibility" to
Schwenke's presentation. Neither Schwenke nor
Johnson disclosed that Johnson was the subject of
ongoing disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State
Bar for misappropriating client fluids.™4 Johnson
was also subject to three tax liens, totaling
$1,669,562.89, against his property, *723 and had a
Small Business Administration judgment against
him. Johnson did not disclose these facts at the
meeting. Nor did Johnson tell the dairymen that
Schwenke was an attorney who had been disbarred
for misappropriating client funds and that Johnson
was pursuing legal action against Schwenke over a
failed business deal.
FN3. Johnson was invited to attend the
meeting to settle a debt related to Johnson's losses in a previous business deal
with Schwenke.
FN4. On September 14, 1999, the district
court entered an order and judgment of disbarment against Johnson for misappropriating client funds. At the time of the meetings with the dairymen, that judgment was

stayed, pending appeal. The Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of disbarment
in December 2001, see In re Johnson, 2001
UT 110, 48 P.3d 881, more than a year
after the transaction at issue in this case.
f 3 At the meetings, Schwenke proposed that
the dairymen invest in American-Dairy.com, Inc.
(American-Dairy), a ..company that Schwenke had
recently incorporated. Schwenke said his plan was
to obtain 10,000 to 15.000 cows, "go online" with
the company, and "show investors their cows over
the internet." Schwenke also indicated that he
would obtain financing by selling stock in an initial
public offering. Johnson explained how stocks
would work in the public company. Schwenke and
Johnson told the dairymen that there were some
risks associated with any stock transaction, but they
did not elaborate. The dairymen described the farm,
including the number of cows, the need to expand
to become profitable, and the need to refinance a
"substantial loan" against the dairy to complete the
transaction.
If 4 At a second meeting on August 2, 2000,
Johnson reviewed a draft of a stock purchase/trade
agreement with the dairymen.™5 At the request of
one of the dairymen, Johnson again explained how
the public offering would work, stating that the
share prices in an initial public offering would start
at a minimum of $4 per share and might be as high
as $8 per share.
FN5. Johnson did not draft the agreement,
and he claims that Schwenke presented it
to the dairymen. However, one of the
dairymen testified that it was Johnson who
presented the agreement.
If 5 Following the August 2 meeting, the dairymen's personal attorney reviewed the draft agreement and added a provision voiding the transaction
if American-Dairy had not registered its stock for a
public offering within two years. On August 9,
2000, the dairymen returned to Schwenke's office
and signed the revised agreement (the Agreement),
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thereby transferring all the farm's assets, including
the real estate, equipment, and livestock associated
with the farm, to American-Dairy in exchange for
stock in the company.
^ 6 Johnson signed the Agreement on behalf of
American-Dairy as the company's CEO and signed
stock certificates issuing 200,000 shares to the
dairymen. Although the Agreement recites that
American-Dairy had issued "10,000,000 shares of
.001 cents par value common stock," no other
shares were issued, making the dairymen the sole
shareholders. The dairymen also signed proxy
agreements naming Schwenke as their "attorney
and agent," which empowered Schwenke to vote
their shares at all shareholder meetings "for the
transaction of any business."
*| 7 Following the execution of the Agreement
and the transfer of assets, Johnson had no additional direct contact with the dairymen. The parties
never discussed whether Johnson would remain as
American-Dairy's CEO, although the record reflects
that Johnson continued to have some involvement
in that capacity, as evidenced by his signature on
American-Dairy's bankruptcy petition and his preparation of a temporary restraining order on behalf
of the company.
• 1 8 For the most part, the dairymen continued
to manage the day-to-day operations of the farm.
However, because the warranty deed had been
transferred to American-Dairy, they could not obtain any bank financing. The dairymen also testified
that Schwenke moved an additional 200 to 250
cows onto the farm, refused to allow the dairymen
to lease out an unused portion of the farm, and obtained a $50,000 loan against the farm on which he
never made any payments.™6 Eventually, creditors foreclosed on the farm and its equipment As
part of the foreclosure proceedings, one of the
dairymen also forfeited a $70,000 certificate of deposit, *724 which had previously been used as collateral for a loan to purchase cattle.

shareholders, the dairymen had the authority to fire or hire any officers or directors
of American-Dairy if they were unhappy
with how the company was managed. Although the dairymen might have removed
Johnson under normal circumstances, the
proxy agreement gave Schwenke the right
to vote their shares. Moreover, Schwenke
" could not be removed because he did not
have a formal position with American- Dairy.
The Trial
1| 9 On October 24, 2005, Johnson and Schwenke were charged as co-defendants with one count
each of securities fraud, a second degree felony, see
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006); id §
61-1-21 (2)(b) (Supp.2009), and theft by deception,
a second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. §§
76-6-405, -412 (2008). The trial court later severed
Johnson's and Schwenke's cases, and granted the
State's motion to dismiss the theft by deception
charge against Johnson. After several defense attorneys withdrew, Johnson represented himself at trial.
FN7. Appellate counsel, Rodney G, Snow,
Walter A. Romney Jr., and Aaron D.
Lebenta of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson were not involved in the trial proceedings until Johnson's sentencing and they
have generously donated their professional
services by handling this appeal on a pro
bono basis. We commend them for their
efforts.
f 10 The State called Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, to testify as an expert witness. After the
trial court qualified Hines as an expert, see generally Utah R. Evid. 702 ("[A] witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion ...."), the State questioned Hines about various topics related to securities transactions. Hines
testified that the purposes of securities laws are to

FN6. Johnson's brief states that as sole
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prevent fraud and to protect investors. Hines also
testified that, unlike other sales, the securities market is a "seller beware" market, meaning "the seller
has to make sure ... [he or she] disclose[s] all material facts to an investor." Hines defined the kind
of material facts that must be disclosed under section 61-1-1 of the Securities Act as those that "a
reasonable prudent investor ... would want to
know," adding that officers of a corporation have a
specific duty to disclose material facts about their
backgrounds. Hines further testified to the hypothetical types of statements and omissions that
would violate section 61-1-1, and to the meaning of
a direct or indirect connection to the sale of a security under the Securities Act.
T[ 11 Johnson repeatedly objected to Hines's
testimony on the grounds that Hines was misstating
the law and impermissibly stating legal conclusions
as to what the law is. In response, the trial court allowed Johnson to cross-examine Hines regarding
the alleged misstatements, and orally instructed the
jury that
the court is going to indicate to the jury that at
some point in this trial the court is going to give
you instructions with respect to ... issues of law
that will govern your deliberations. And .., at that
time ..., the court will instruct you as to what the
law is.
1 12 Johnson conducted a thorough crossexamination of Hines, questioning him about the
meaning of section 61-1-1, how the statute would
be applied in different hypothetical situations, including what additional disclosures a person like
Johnson would be required to make before completing a transaction similar to the one at issue. To rebut Hines's testimony, Johnson called Nathan
Dredge, a securities attorney and former securities
analyst, as an expert witness. Dredge also testified
to the purpose of state securities laws, the definition
of a security, what constituted material facts, and
whether Johnson had an affirmative duty to disclose
certain facts in this case. Dredge's interpretation of
those issues differed from the interpretation in

Hines's testimony. In addition to Dredge's testimony, Johnson testified on his own behalf and
called Schwenke as a defense witness.
Post-Trial Proceedings and Motions
\ 13 On March 7, 2007, after deliberating for
six hours, the jury found Johnson guilty of securities fraud. On June 6, 2007, the trial court sentenced
Johnson to a suspended prison term of one to fifteen years> thirty-six months of supervised probation, six months in the Millard County Jail, and an
additional six months of electronically monitored
home confinement. The trial court further imposed
a $5000 fine and "set [c]ourt ordered restitution ...
at $125,000, the same as [the court] ordered for ...
Schwenke," to be paid *725 jointly and severally
by Johnson and Schwenke.
If 14 On June 15, 2007, Johnson filed a timely
objection to the restitution order and requested a
hearing on the issue. Johnson filed a timely motion
for a new trial on June 20, 2007. The trial court
entered final judgment on July 2, 2007, and denied
Johnson's motion for new trial on October 10, 2007.
The trial court' held a restitution hearing on October
10 and 24, 2007, and entered its final restitution order on December 5, 2007, ordering $120,000 in
restitution, to be paid jointly and severally by Johnson and Schwenke.
\ 15 On November 8, 2007, after the restitution
hearing but before entry of the final restitution order, Johnson filed a timeiy notice of appeal
(Original Appeal) in the trial court. Johnson filed a
renewed motion for new trial on November 14,
2007, alleging that new evidence obtained at the
restitution hearing demonstrated that the farm property was not worth $10,000, as required to obtain a
second degree felony securities fraud conviction
under section 61-1-21 (2)(b)(i). See Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-l-21(2)(b)(i) (Supp.2009) ("A person who
willfully violates Section 61-1-1 ... is guilty of a
second degree felony if: ... at the time the crime
was committed, the property ... unlawfully obtained
... was worth $10,000 or more...."). The trial court
denied Johnson's renewed motion for new trial on
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August 12, 2008, and Johnson filed an amended notice of appeal (Second Appeal) with this court, but
not the trial court, on August 19, 2008. Johnson
now appeals from his conviction, the restitution order, and the denials of his motions for new trial.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[2] TI 16 On appeal, Johnson contends that section 61-1-1 does not apply to his case because the
transfer of the LLC assets to American-Dairy
merely "constituted a change in the form of ownership" and, therefore, the "transaction did not involve an 'offer' or 'sale' of a security for value."
Similarly, Johnson argues that the transfer was not
"for value" because the property that the dairymen
transferred was "so encumbered as to be valueless."
Whether the change in ownership constitutes a sale
for value under the statute is a question of statutory
interpretation. "The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness." State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, \ 7, 124
P.3d 259 (internal quotation marks omitted), affd,
2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d'540. The question of whether
the property in fact had any value is a factual question that was submitted to the jury, and we will not
overturn the jury's finding unless "the evidence and
its inferences are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have enter. tained a reasonable doubt... Thus, so long as some
evidence and reasonable inferences support the
jury's findings, we will not disturb them." Id. \ 16
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
[3] Tf 17 Johnson next claims that Hines impermissibly gave legal conclusions and incorrectly
testified as to the law related to securities, which
prejudiced Johnson. "It is within the discretion of
the trial court to determine the suitability of expert
testimony in a particular case, and we will not reverse that .determination on appeal in the absence of
a clear showing of abuse." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487, 492 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), affd, 865 P.2d 1355
(Utah 1993).
[4][5][6] f 18 Johnson further alleges that the

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No
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Securities Act, as applied to his case, resulted in
such a vague definition of the crime that it violated
his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution, see Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Johnson
also maintains that Hines's testimony violated the
Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers Clause,
see id. art. V, § 1. "When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we ... presume that the statute
is constitutional. The challenger bears the burden of
demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a statute.
Furthermore, unconstitutionality of a statute must
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate
courts review constitutional challenges for correctness." State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 8,
989 P.2d 503 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). However, "courts should avoid
reaching constitutional*726 issues if the case can
be decided on other grounds." West v. Thomson
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994).
[7] % 19 Finally, Johnson challenges the trial
court's restitution award. This court
will not disturb a trial court's order of restitution
unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion. Furthermore, [wjhether a restitution [award] is proper ...
depends solely upon interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a
statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.
State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, \ 6, 170
P.3d 1141 (alterations • and omission in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. The Timeliness of Johnson's Second Notice of
Appeal
f 20 As a threshold matter, the State argues
that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the issues
raised by Johnson in his Second Appeal, which pertain to the trial court's final restitution order and its
denial of Johnson's Renewed Motion for New Trial.
W8
See generally Utah R.App. P. 4(a) ("[Nbtice
of appeal ... shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
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court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from."); State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, K 23, 62 P.3d 444 ("[A defendant's] failure to timely file [an appeal] deprives
an appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal"),
Johnson responds that his Second Appeal was
timely because it was filed with this court less than
thirty days after the trial court entered its order
denying Johnson's Renewed Motion for New Trial
and that, in any event, the Original Appeal gives
this court jurisdiction to hear the issues Johnson
raises with respect to the trial court's restitution order.
FN8. The State concedes that Johnson's
Original Appeal, filed twenty-nine days
after the trial court denied Johnson's first
Motion for New Trial, was timely.
A. Johnson's Second Appeal Was Not Necessary.
[8] H 21 In support of its argument that the
Second Appeal was ineffective to confer jurisdiction on this court, the State notes that a notice of
appeal must be "filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order." Utah R.App. P. 4(a) (emphasis
added). If a defendant files a motion for new trial
under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "the time ... to appeal from the judgment runs
from the entry of the order disposing of the motion." See id. R. 4(b)(1). Therefore, the State contends that to appeal the trial court's denial of his
Renewed Motion for New Trial, Johnson was required to file his appeal of that decision with the
trial court within thirty days of the trial court denying that motion. In response, Johnson relies on the
fact that rule 4 does not expressly state that an
amended notice of appeal must also be filed in the
trial court. While Johnson is correct, there is also
nothing in the rale that provides different filing requirements for appeals based on orders entered by
the trial court after the appellant has filed an appeal
from a prior final judgment in the same case. See
generally id. R. 4 (specifying the requirements for
filing an appeal). In this case, however, the Second

Appeal was unnecessary because the issues raised
by it had been properly raised in his Original Appeal, which the State concedes was timely filed.
T[ 22 Both notices of appeal stated that Johnson
was' appealing from the trial court's orders concern- ,
ing. sentence, judgment, commitment, restitution,
FN9
and the denial of Johnson's first Motion for
New Trial. The Second Appeal only differed from
the Original Appeal in that the Second Appeal included the date of the trial court's restitution order
and stated that Johnson was appealing the trial
court's denial of his Renewed Motion for New Trial. In substance, the legal arguments contained in
Johnson's initial and renewed motions for new trial
were identical, and the motions only differed in the
evidence *727 cited by Johnson in support of his
argument. Because the same issues were already
raised by the Original Appeal, Johnson was not required to file a second notice of appeal for this
court to have jurisdiction to address those issues.
FN9. We address the timeliness of John- •
son's appeal of the final restitution order in
the next section.
B. The Original Appeal Included Restitution.
\ 23 The State argues that Johnson did not perfect his appeal of the trial court's December 5, 2007
restitution order because he filed the Original Appeal on November 8, 2007, almost a month before
the trial court entered the order.™10 Relying on
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 106 P.3d 729, the State
asserts that Johnson was required to perfect an appeal of the final restitution order by submitting a
new notice of appeal within thirty days of its enfry.
Johnson disagrees, claiming both that the State's interpretation of Garner is incorrect and that the
restitution order was part of the underlying judgment.
FN 10. The trial court set restitution in the
amount of $125,000 when Johnson was
initially sentenced on June 6, 2007, and
modified the restitution amount to
$120,000 in the December 5, 2007 order.
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\ 24 The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the judgment or order appealed from be
final. See Utah R.App. P. 4(a). In Garner, the Utah
Supreme Court considered the effect of a subsequent restitution hearing on the finality of a prior
judgment. See 2005 UT 6, ffl 11-16, 106 P.3d 729.
There, the trial court entered judgment, sentencing
Garner to prison and ordering him to pay restitution
in an amount not yet quantified. See id. f-2. Gamer
did not file a timely appeal of that judgment. See id.
Subsequently, the trial court clarified its judgment
to indicate that Garner's guilty plea was conditional. See id. Although Garner attempted to appeal his
underlying conviction from the date of that clarification, this court rejected his appeal as untimely. See
id % 5. Before the order from this court dismissing
Garner's first appeal was entered, the trial court
"re-entered the judgment, noting that the State had
satisfied the conditions of the plea and setting the
amount of restitution." Id ^[3. In response, Garner
filed a second notice of appeal, claiming that the
trial court's reentry of the judgment "created a new
final judgment for purposes of appeal" and that he
was entitled to a new thirty days to appeal the underlying conviction. Id. 1 4. This court disagreed,
dismissing the second appeal of the underlying conviction as untimely. See id ^ 6.
H 25 On certiorari review, the supreme court affirmed, stating, "Entering a restitution amount is
more like a clarification of a judgment than a material modification because the inclusion does not
change the substance or character of the judgment."
Id <f 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). The supreme court upheld our dismissal of Garner's
second appeal, holding "that where orders for restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the
• subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not
a new and final judgment for purposes of appealing
the underlying merits of a criminal conviction. " Id.
(emphasis added).
If 26 Unlike in Garner, the issue here is not
whether an appeal filed after entry of the restitution
amount could give the defendant an additional

thirty days to appeal the underlying conviction.
Rather, this case raises the question of whether a
defendant must file a new appeal where a trial court
initially enters a restitution amount at sentencing
and subsequently modifies that amount after holding a restitution hearing. In its original judgment,
the trial court set restitution at $125,000, which the
court said was "the same [amount] as [it] ordered
for ... Schwenke." Johnson filed his Original Appeal on November 8, 2007, expressly challenging
"the Court's ruling concerning Full Restitution,"
After Johnson filed the Original Appeal, the trial
court modified the restitution amount to $120,000
to be paid jointly and severally by Johnson and
Schwenke.
\ 27 The State correctly contends that under
Garner, a criminal proceeding may result in several
final orders. See id fl 15-16 (distinguishing finality in criminal and civil cases). Applying that possibility here, the State argues that the change in the
restitution amount was a material modification of
the judgment, necessitating a new notice of *728
appeal. Johnson disagrees. Under the unique facts
of this case, we agree with Johnson that a new notice of appeal was not required.
\ 28 Before entering the original judgment in
Johnson's case, the trial court held a restitution
hearing in Schwenke's case and set Schwenke's
restitution at $120,000.FNn Then, in entering
judgment in Johnson's case, the trial court stated
that it was ordering restitution at $125,000, which
the trial court said was "the same as [it] ordered for '
... Schwenke," and which Johnson and Schwenke
were to pay jointly and severally. These statements
establish that the trial court intended Johnson and
Schwenke to pay the same amount of restitution,
which the trial court had previously set at $120,000
in Schwenke's case. When the trial court changed
the amount of Johnson's restitution to $120,000
after the restitution hearing, it merely changed the
amount to correct an error it made when entering
the original judgment.™12 Because that correction
did not constitute a material modification of the tri-
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al court's original judgment, Johnson was not required to file a new notice of appeal. See generally
Gittins v. Smithfield City, 2008 UT App 171, \ 6,
185 P.3d 1133 (mem.) (stating that "only material
modifications of or amendments to a judgment ..,
affect the finality of an earlier court order," and that
"clerical matters" that correct or amend a judgment
do not materially modify the original judgment);
see also State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, K II, 106 P.3d
729 ("[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an.
amendment or modification not changing the substance or character of the judgment, such entry is
merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to
the time the original judgment was entered ....")
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Consequently, we have subject matter jurisdiction over the restitution award pursuant to the
Original Appeal. We now address the merits of
Johnson's arguments on appeal.
FN 11. In a jury trial presided over by the
same trial judge who presided over Johnson's case, Schwenke was convicted of securities fraud for his involvement in the
transaction with the dairymen.
FN 12. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor incorrectly stated, "I understand
that the restitution in the Schwenke case is
$125,000. I'm certainly appreciative of
[defense counsel's] concession that that
was a number that he can live with and
[Johnson] can live with."
II. Whether the Sale Was For Value.
[9][10j[ll] 1 29 We first address Johnson's argument that section 61-1-1 does not apply because
the transfer of assets was not for value. The determination of whether the transfer of assets meets the
statutory definition of a sale for value under Utah
Code sections 61-1-1 and -13 is a question of statutory construction. See Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d
561, 562 (Utah 1996). In interpreting a statute, we
look to its plain language, unless it is ambiguous.
See id. at 562-63. Where any statutory ambiguities
exist, this court "broadly and liberally construe[s

securities laws] to give effect to the legislative purpose" of "prevent[ing] fraud." Technomedical Labs,
Inc. v. Utah Sec. Div., 744 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah
Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If 30 Under the plain language of the statute,
section 61-1-1 applies only if Johnson's actions
were "in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly." Id
(emphasis added). Section 61-1-13 defines "sale" as
"every contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for
value," Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(a) (2000),
and "offer" as "every attempt or offer to dispose of,
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value," id § 61-l-13(22)(b).
Thus, to prove a violation of the statute, the State
had to prove that the transfer of American-Dairy
stock was "for value." Johnson argues that the
transfer of assets from the LLC to American-Dairy
was not a sale for value because it was simply "a
change in the form of ownership" of the farm assets
and because the farm assets were "so encumbered
as to be valueless."
A. The Transfer of Assets Was a Sale for Value.
1f 31 The Securities Act does not specifically
define the term "for value," but in the *729 section
defining a "sale" for value, the legislature provided
several examples of the types of transfers that are
governed by the statute, including
the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall constitute
the offer or sale of the security issued as well as
the offer to buy or the purchase of any security
surrendered in connection therewith, unless the
sole purpose of the transaction is to change the
issuer's domicile.
Id § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii). Thus, the legislature
expressly intended that section 61-1-1 apply to a
transfer of assets like that from the LLC to American-Dairy.
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% 32 Johnson nevertheless argues that our previous decision in Capital General Corp. v. Utah
Department of Business Regulation, 111 P.2d 494
(Utah Ct.App.1989), supports his position that the
transfer of assets was not for value.™13 We disagree. In Capital General, a corporation acquired
100 million shares in another company and subsequently distributed 90,000 of those shares as gifts
to its clients. See id. at 495. We rejected the argument that the. gifts did not constitute a "sale for
value/5 stating, " TVlalue' can include enhanced
abilities to borrow, raise capital, and other general
benefits associated with publicly held companies....
[Tjhese economic benefits render the disposition
'for value' under [the Securities Act], even though
those benefits flowed indirectly from the marketplace rather than directly from the transferees." Id.
at 497. Thus, we concluded that because the corporation received indirect benefits from the distribution, the transfer was "for value" under the Securities Act. See id
FN13. Johnson also relies on Premier Van
Schaack Realty, Inc. v. Sieg 2002 UT App
173, 51 P.3d 24. Because that decision interpreted the term "value" in the context of
a contractual provision rather than the Securities Act, see id. % 13, it is not helpful to
our analysis.
^f 33 Like the transfer in Capital General, the
acquisition of the LLC assets "enhanced
[American-Dairy's] ability to borrow," see id, as
evidenced by the $50,000 loan Schwenke obtained
by using, the farm assets as collateral. Indeed,
American-Dairy received indirect benefits "from
the marketplace," see id, because the company now
had operational assets, including land, cattle, and
equipment that would have increased the value of
any stock it subsequently sold. Based on our holding in Capital General and the plain language of
the Securities Act, we hold that the definition of a
sale for value under Utah Code section 61-1-13
(22)(a) was met here because the transfer of the
farm assets from the LLC to American-Dairy con-

ferred indirect benefits that, among other things, included an enhanced ability to borrow and raise capital. See generally id,
B. The Evidence Supports that the Farm Was Worth
at Least $10,000,
[12] f 34 Johnson next contends that the property was so heavily encumbered that its value was.
less than $10,000 and that, in fact, it had no value.
See generally Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2)(b)(i)
(Supp.2009) (stating that, to support a charge of
second degree felony securities fraud, the State
must show that "the property ... unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000
or more"). Accordingly, we review the record to
determine whether there was evidence from which
the jury could conclude that the property had a
value of at least $10,000.
^| 35 We agree with the trial court that the jury
had sufficient evidence before it from which it
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the property had a value of at least $10,000. The State's
evidence of the property's value included the dairymen's testimony that the farm equipment was worth
between $150,000 and $200,000, the recital in the
Agreement stating that the property had a value of
$200,000, and the $50,000 loan that Schwenke obtained by recording a trust deed against the farm.
Where there was evidence in the record from which
the jury could find the property had a value of at
least $10,000, as required by Utah Code section
61-l-21(2)(b)(i), we will not disturb the jury's decision on that point. See State v. Wallace, 2005 UT
App 434, H 16, 124 P.3d 259 ("[S]o long as some
evidence and reasonable inferences support the
jury's findings, we will not *730 disturb them,"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
III. The Expert Testimony
[13] T| 36 We next address Johnson's argument
that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Hines, the State's expert witness, to give
testimony that uwas riddled with impermissible legal conclusions" and "[i]ncorrect ^Interpretation[s]
of the [l]aw." In response, the State argues that the
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witness's testimony was admissible, and that even if
it were not, Johnson was not prejudiced by the testimony.
[14] f 37 To prevail on appeal, Johnson must
show that the testimony was both (1) admitted in
error and (2) prejudicial. See State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993); State v. Davis, 2007
UT App 13, 1fi[ 15-21, 155 P.3d 909; State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App. 1996), Because we conclude that Johnson was not prejudiced
by the expert's testimony, we need not decide
whether it was admitted in error.™14
FN 14. Nevertheless, we caution that there
are limits on an expert's license to testify
as to the legal meaning of a statute. Where
the witness's legal conclusions "blur the
separate and distinct responsibilities of the
judge, jury, and witness," or there is
"danger that a juror may turn to the
[witness's legal conclusion] rather than the
judge for guidance on the applicable law,"
the expert has exceeded those limits. State
" v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 15, 155 P.3d
909 (alteration in original).
^ 38 Johnson cannot meet his burden to show
that he was prejudiced by Hines's testimony because the trial court correctly and promptly instructed the jury. In Larsen, the defendant appealed the
trial court's admission of testimony from a securities expert regarding the materiality of the defendant's statements. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357. The
supreme court held both that the testimony was not
improper and that the defendant was not prejudiced
by the testimony. See id, at 1363. In reaching its
conclusion that the defendant had not been prejudiced, the Larsen court noted that the trial court
"correctly admonished the jury as to the relative
roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence,"
and "gave careful instructions regarding the
[relevant] legal definition." Id,
^[39 Here, shortly after Hines began his testimony, the trial court admonished the jury that "at

some point in this trial the court is going to give
you instructions with respect to ..., issues of law
that... will govern your deliberations. And ... at that
time ..., the court will instruct you as to what the
law is." Prior to deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury, "If an expert witness has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict
with these instructions, you are to disregard the
opinion of the expert witness." The trial court also
accurately instructed the jury as to the law regarding the requirements of section 61-1-1 and the
definitions of "sale," "material fact," "fraud," and
"willful." As in Larsen, the trial court here
"substantially reduced whatever slight risk of confusion [Hines's testimony] might have engendered
in the jury." Id Moreover, Johnson was able to
cross-examine Hines at length regarding the alleged
misstatements of the law and its application, and he
called his own securities expert to rebut Hines's
testimony. Those actions, combined with the trial
court's prompt and correct instructions to the jury,
alleviated any potentially prejudicial effects of
Hines's testimony. Accordingly, we hold that any
error in the admission of Hines's testimony was not
prejudiciai.FN15
FN 15. Because the jury instructions adequately explained that it was the trial
court, not Hines, who would instruct the
. jury as to the meaning and requirements of
section 61-1-1, we do not reach Johnson's
claim that Hines's testimony violated the
Separation of Powers Clause of the Utah
Constitution. See West v. Tliomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994)
("[Cjourts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on
other grounds.").
IV. Johnson's Due Process Claim
[15][16] \ 40 We next address Johnson's claim
that section 61-1-1, as applied in Johnson's case, is
unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process
Clause of the Utah Constitution, see Utah Const,
art, I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life,
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liberty or property, without due process of law.").
A law is unconstitutional and 'Void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined .... [so as to
give] the person of ordinary intelligence *731 a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly." West Valley City v.
Streeter, 849 * P.2d 613, 615 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson argues
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him for two reasons: First, because the
State and its expert witness improperly stated the
requirements of section 61-1-1(2) as it relates to
omissions, and second, because the jury was incorrectly instructed that the State was not required to
prove the dairymen relied on Johnson's statements
or omissions in making their investment decision.
A. The Trial Court Properly Applied the Statute.
f 41 Johnson maintains that, contrary to the assertions of the prosecutor and the State's expert witness, section 61-1-1(2) does not impose an affirmative duty to disclose all material facts. Johnson argues that the statute instead "requires proof of a
material omission that renders a predicate statement
misleading, in light of the circumstances in which it
is made." Johnson further contends that, because no
such predicate statements were proved, his conviction must have been based on some vague obligation to disclose. Such an undefined basis for conviction, he argues, violates his due process rights.
We need not reach that issue, however, because we
conclude that the instructions required the jury to
find that a predicate statement was made and that
the record supports the jury's finding that such predicate statements were made.
<f 42 The jury instructions permitted the jury to
find Johnson guilty only if it found that he "made
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. "
(Emphasis added.) This instruction is consistent
with the plain language of section 61-1-1(2) and
makes no mention of an affirmative duty to disclose

in the absence of a prior statement We presume the
jury followed this instruction. See State v. Harmon,
956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998). Because the jury
was not free to find Johnson guilty in the absence
of a predicate statement, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Johnson.™16
FN 16. We also reject Johnson's argument
that section 61-1-1(2) requires that the person who omits a material fact also be the
person who made the predicate statement.
To conclude otherwise would inject language not found in the statute and allow a
person to evade criminal liability by remaining silent while others make gross
misstatements about the person's background, skills, experience, or other qualities. See generally Dungan v. Smith, 76
N.M. 424, 415 P.2d 549, 551 (1966)
(upholding a finding of liability where one
majority shareholder remained silent about
the fact that the other majority shareholder
had "demonstrated a capacity for misappropriation of funds").
1 43 Schwenke's statements regarding Johnson's background and experience were designed to
create confidence in the transaction. Indeed, the
dairymen testified that Johnson's qualifications
"lent a great deal of credibility" to Schwenke's
presentation, giving the dairymen a "false sense of
security." The statements that Johnson was a "high
powered lawyer" and a "security expert from out of
New York" were misleading in light of the pending
disciplinary proceedings against Johnson for misappropriation of client funds. Had Johnson disclosed
the tenuous state of his membership in the Utah Bar
and the reasons for the order of disbarment that had
been entered but stayed pending appeal, it almost
certainly would have undermined the false confidence created by Schwenke's statements. Thus, the
jury could have reasonably found that predicate
statements were made and that Johnson omitted to
state a material fact necessary to make those statements not misleading.
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B. The Jury Was Properly Instructed on Reliance.
[17] If 44 We next address Johnson's contention
that the jury instruction regarding reliance was incorrect. At trial, the jury was instructed that
it is not necessary for the State to prove that the
individual investor believed the statements to be
true, nor that he relied upon the statements in his
decision-making process, so long as the statements made *732 were such that a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would have relied upon the statements in making an investment
decision,
Johnson argues that this instruction is unconstitutional because it "invites the jury to ignore the
[dairymen's] testimony and instead substitute its
own judgment of what information is important."
We disagree. The supreme court, in Gohler v.
Wood, 919 P.2d 561 (Utah 1996), held that section
61-1-1(2) does not contain a subjective reliance element. See id. at 563-64. The jury instruction here
was correct. In addition, there was evidence of actual reliance in the form of the dairymen's testimony that Johnson's status as an attorney "lent a
great deal of credibility" to Schwenke's presentation and gave the dairymen a "false sense of security" about the transaction,
V. Restitution
\ 45 Finally, we address Johnson's claim that
the trial court's restitution order was erroneous both
as to any award of restitution and as to the specific
amount of restitution awarded. The trial court awarded restitution in the amount of $120,000, based on
the $50,000 loan obtained by Schwenke and the extra 570,000 in expenses that the dairymen incurred
to care for the additional cows Schwenke brought
onto the farm. Johnson challenges the award of
restitution because he was not convicted of theft in
connection with the $50,000 loan that Schwenke
obtained and secured by a trust deed on the farm.
Likewise, Johnson argues that he was not convicted
of any crimes related to the extra expenses incurred
for the care and feeding of the additional cows. Finally, Johnson contends that the trial court failed to

account for two payments that the dairymen received following foreclosure.
If 46 "When a person is convicted of criminal
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution
•to the victims...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)
(2008). "Criminal activities" are defined as "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (2008).
"Pecuniary damages" are defmed as "all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the
fair market value of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed." Id § 77-3 8a-102(6).
Interpreting these statutory provisions, this court requires a "sufficient nexus" between the defendant's
criminal conduct and the pecuniary damages
suffered by the victim. See State v. Mast, 2001 UT
App 402, 1f 13, 40 P.3d 1143. "Utah has adopted a
modified but for test to determine whether pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal activities," which test requires a showing "that (1) the
damages would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the ... [defendant's] conviction and
(2) the causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct
and the loss ... is not too attenuated (either factually
or temporally)." State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285,
\ 11, 221 P.3d 273 (alterations and omissions in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[18] ^f 47 Johnson claims that Schwenke caused
the dairymen's pecuniary loss, independently of
Johnson's fraud. We do not agree. Johnson's securities fraud gave the dairymen a "false sense of security" about the transaction, which resulted in
them entering into the Agreement. That Agreement
allowed Schwenke to obtain the $50,000 loan and
burden the dairymen with the additional cows.™17
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But for Johnson's fraud, the dairymen would not
have suffered the damages related to foreclosure of
the trust deed and the care and feeding of the additional cows. *733 These damages flow from the
fraudulent securities transaction and were properly
charged against Johnson. See generally State v.
McBride, 940 P.2d 539, . 540-41, 544 (Utah
Ct.App.1997) (holding that where the defendant
stole a car that was impounded and negligently sold
by the police at auction before the victim could recover the car, the defendant's criminal conduct was
the but for cause of the victim's pecuniary loss because the defendant's "criminal act... resulted in the
impoundment that created the opportunity for the
[negligent sale]").
FN17. The cows did not provide any revenue to the dairymen. Had the additional
cows remained on the farm, they would
have produced milk that could have been
sold to offset the costs associated with
their feeding and maintenance. However,
as one of the dairymen testified, it generally takes several weeks for milk production to take place and the additional cattle
did not generate any income because they
were just "starting to produce some milk"
when they were repossessed.

not prejudicial. Section 61-1-1(2) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Johnson. Accordingly, we affirm Johnson's securities fraud conviction, There was a sufficient nexus between Johnson's criminal conduct and the pecuniary damages
suffered by the dairymen, and we affirm the trial
court's determination that restitution was appropriate. We remand, however, for further proceedings
to determine whether the amounts received by the
dairymen after the foreclosure sale of the farm
should be deducted from the amount of restitution.
f 50 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.
Utah App.,2009.
State v. Johnson
224 P.3d 720, Blue Sky L. Rep. P 74,808, 645 Utah
Adv. Rep. 44, 2009 UT App 382
END OF DOCUMENT

[19] \ 48 Notwithstanding our conclusion that
there is a sufficient nexus between Johnson's crime
and the dairymen's damages, we agree that Johnson
raises legitimate questions regarding the amount of
restitution awarded by the trial court. Johnson notes
that after the foreclosure, the dairymen received
one check for $11,523.54 and another check for
$12,500.00. The order of restitution does not address either of these credits. We therefore remand
to the trial court for further proceedings to determine if these payments should offset the amount of
the restitution order.
CONCLUSION
\ 49 The transfer of assets from the LLC to
American-Dairy was a sale for value. Even assuming that the expert's testimony was improper, it was
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Jon M Huntsman, Jr.
Governor

STATE OF UTAH
Department of Corrections

PROBATION AGREEMENT
Name: JOHNSON, JAM1S M

Offender* 178175

Court: 4THDIST JUVENILE, RLlCounty: MILLARD

Case: 051700056

USP #

I, JOHNSON, JAMIS M, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be accountable for my
actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court. I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the
court and set forth in thi^greement, consistent with the laws of the stats of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or
any condiu^n&*&erepf; or any new convictions for a crime, may result in action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my
probation p^n0ti|pMcommence again.
1.

VISIT!

Permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by officers of Adult Probation and
Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of the Probation Agreement. I will not
interfere with this requirement by having vicious dogs, perimeter security doors, refusing to open the door, etc.

2.

REPOy

Not abscond from probation supervision. A-Reporting: Report as directed by the Department of Corrections.
B-Residence>£Stablish and reside at a residence of record and not change residence without first obtaining
penmssienrfom the AP&P Officer. C-Leaving the State: Not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other
statMo which I am released or transferred without prior written permission from the AP&P Officer..
federal and municipal laws.

'

Not possess, have under control, have in my custody or on the premises where residing any explosives, firearms
or dangerous weapons. (Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is
capable, of causing death or serious bodily injur}'.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the supervising
agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and who
have never been convicted of a felony.
Abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled
substances (58-37-2 U.C.A.) and submit to tests of breath or body fluids to ensure compliance with the Probation
Agreement.
J^errrut officers of Adult Probation and Parole to search my person, residence, vehicle or any other property under
my control without a warrant at any time, day or night upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the
conditions of the Probation Agreement.
ot knowingly associate with any person who is involved in crirninal activity or who has been convicted of a
felony without approval from the AP&P Officer.
Unless otherwise authorized by the AP&P Officer; seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful, full-time
mployment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by the AP&P Officer. Notify the AP&P Officer of any
change in my employment within 48 hours of the change.
Be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all dealings with Adult Probation and Parole. If arrested, cited or
questioned by a peace officer; notify the AP&P Officer within 48 hours.
Agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department of Corrections under
the provisions of Utah Statute 64-13-21.
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Section 53-10-403-406 by submitting an adequate DNA specimen, and,

Comply with Utah Code A]
unless dete
1.

COURT

2.

FINES,

3.

JAIL

4.
5.

NO CO.
NO FUDICIA&Y

A

v r? CTTTT rn

ie is no abihty to pay, pay the required fee specified by statute.
Defendant is to keep a current address on file with the court. Defendant is to
report to the court whenever ordered to do so. Service by mail is deemed
adpqrate notice.
y?ay fines and fees in the amount of $5,000.00, plus interest.
/
/^

" /I
rwp

Serve 365 days in the Millard County Jail commencing 07/02/2007.
Defendant to serve the first 6 months, the remaining 6 months he may be on
home confinement with electronic monitoring. Defendant may be on work
;se if the Sheriff approves it.
ave no contact with Mr. Myers or Mr. Young.
t be employed in a fudiciary position. Not to represent or handle third
arty money,
/ray restitution in the amount of $125,000.00, plus interest, jointly and
severally with Mr. Schwenkie. Court notes this is not the full restitution,
either side may request a restitution hearing.

I have read, understand and agree to be boui/d by this; agreement. If I violate any of th^co^dmons of this agreement, the Court mayjwoke
my Probation or the Department of Correj#onsma/take other appropriate action^agifistme, an^J I hereby acknowledged-copy j>fthjs'/
agreement.
Dated this

Witnessed By

2.135
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MARK BAER, Bar No. 5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0199
Facsimile: (801) 366-0268
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 051700056

JAMIS M. JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Judge Donald Eyre

The Court received evidence and heard testimony on an Order to Show Cause
(OSC) on Aug 30, 2010 in the above cited case and based upon the evidence presented,
and with good cause appearing, this Court finds that the defendant has violated the term of
probation in that the defendant has not obtained independent, verifiable employment and
hereby Orders that the defendant's probation is hereby revoked and reinstated with the
following conditions:
1. The defendant's probationary period is reinstated for 36 months beginning August
30,2010.
2. The defendant is to serve 60 days in the Millard County Jail.
3. The defendant and is to report to the Millard County Jail by no later than 5pm on
Friday, September 3, 2010; to the Millard County Sheriff; Th§ dependant is
J/)/
^ ^
remanded to your custody for confinement en <yi o r ^ n ^ ^ - ^ ^ $*Js^*^
J~<L^,
4. All other conditions or probation previously ordered in this case shall remain in effect.
SO ORDERED this^Tday of

I

By:
Fourth District Court J i k i g f ^
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
dS£
<? JL
Thereby certify that on this $_ day of *J&&*:* , 2010,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order to be served by regular mail (or as otherwise noted)
upon the following:
Jamis Johnson, Pro Se
1408 Military Way
SLC, Utah 84103
Jamis Johnson
c/o Millard County Jail
765 So. Highway #99
Fillmore, Utah 84631
Mark Baer / Chariene Barlow
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Q. ^ ^ _ L /£*f.uXx Q ~ A ^ O W c
X
m

United States Mail, postage prepaid
Overnight Express Mail
Via Facsimile
Via Messenger

2
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Jamis M. Johnson
c/o Millard County Jail
765So.Hwy99
Fillmore, UT 84631
Tel. 801-530-0100
Defendant Pro Se
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
AND ORDER OF RELEASE

Vs.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON
Defendant

Case No. 051700056
Judge James Brady

Defendant Jamis Johnson's Notice of Appeal and Application for Certificate of Probable
Cause came regularly before the Court, the Honorable James Brady, Fourth District Court Judge
presiding. The Court after having reviewed the pleadings onfileand for good cause appearing
now finds and certifies as follows:
1.

The appeal is not being taken for the purpose of delay.

2,

The appeal raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal,

an order for a new trial or a sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in jail or
prison.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED:
The Court determines defendant is not a flight risk and that the defendant does not pose a
danger to any other person or the community and is released pending appeal upon the following
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least restrictive conditions that the court has determined will reasonably assure the appearance of
the person as required and the safety of persons and property in the community:
a. not commit a federal, state or local crime during the period of release;
b. abide by specified restrictions on personal associations with any other person engaged in
any criminal activity, remain residing at his usual place of abode, and engage in no travel
outside the State without further order of the Court;
c. avoid all conduct with the victim or victims of the crime(s), any witness who might
testify concerning the offenses if the appeal results in a reversal or an order for a new
trial;
d. continues to report on a regular basis to the Court by the 15th day of each month;
e. refrainfrompossessing a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon;
f. except as prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner, refrainfrompossessing or using
any narcotic drug or other controlled substance.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COuSfNUV ~k
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

P

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 051700056
J A M S M. JOHNSON,

Defendant

Judge James Brady
[

Defendant, Jamis Johnson's Motion To Stay Sentence Pending Appeal,
("Motion to Stay") and Application For Certificate of Probable Cause,
("Application") came before the Court at a regularly scheduled and duly noticed
hearing at 9:00 a.m., October 13, 2010. Defendant Johnson was present, and
also Tate Bennett, who, upon affidavit of indigence, was duly appointed Mr.
Johnson's public defender for the purpose of handling the appeal in this matter.
No representative from the State was present and no responsive pleadings were
on file from the State. The Court continued the hearing until the afternoon so that
counsel for the State could be contacted. The matter was reconsidered at 3:00
p.m. Present were Mr. Johnson and counsel Tate Bennett. The Court Clerk
reported that since the morning continuance, she had contacted Assistant
Attorney General Mark Baer and that he stated that he did not receive notice of
the hearing and would not be available in person or teiephonicaliy for argument
on this matter this day nor for the next ensuing two weeks. The Court Clerk
affirmed that notice of this hearing was duly sent to Assistant Attorney General
Mark Baer and to Defendant Johnson on October 4, 2010. The Court had read
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the pleadings of Defendant and had reviewed the file and record in this matter. It
was determined that Defendant Johnson had mailed copies of all pleadings to
Assistant Attorney General Baer on September 7, 2010 but that the form of the
Certificate of Probable Cause did not bear a signed mailing certificate and, the
Court thus sent all parties a notice of an ex parte communication as to the form
of Certificate of Probable Cause. A copy of the Certificate of Probable Cause
was then further mailed by Defendant Johnson to Assistant Attorney General
Mark Baer on September 21, 2010 and all pleadings hand delivered on October
22, 2010 per letter in the record of Defendant. The record reflects that the Court
Clerk duly sent notice of the hearing to Assistant Attorney General Mark Baer.
The State has not filed any response to Defendant's Motion To Stay or to the
Application, and has not appeared in the matter, and, although reached by the
Court Clerk, Assistant Attorney General Baer declined to appear in person or
telephonically or have other Assistant Attorneys General appear in behalf of the
State.
The Court duly and fully reviewed Defendant Johnson's Motion to Stay
Sentence Pending Appeal, and the Application For A Probable Cause Certificate,
and all related pleadings, and the same were also reviewed by Defendant's
Public Defender Tate Bennett, who was appointed as appellate counsel for the
purposes of the Appeal. Defendant Johnson represented himself for argument
on the pending Motion To Stay and the Application before the Court.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having ascertained that the
State had due notice and has not filed a responsive pleading, and the time for
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response having passed, and the State declined to appear, and there appearing
good cause in support of the motion and the application of Defendant,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Stay of Sentence
Pending Appeal is granted as follows:
1. The sentence entered August 30,2010 revoking the probation of
Defendant Johnson and reinstating it for a further 36 months is hereby
SHSpentigu pending the appeal of this sentence; and
2. Defendant Johnson is released from incarceration in the Millard County
Jail with credit for time served.
• DATED this __t3_ day of ©etaber, 2010.

\^^^W

D j

s t r i c t Judge

<5
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED,
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jamis M. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.
No.20100734-CA.
April 19, 2012.
Background: State petitioned for revocation of
probation. The Fourth District Court, Fillmore Department, Donald J. Eyre Jr., J., granted petition, revoking and reinstating terms of probation. Probationer appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that:
(1) court's determination that probationer's employment did not constitute full-time employment was
not clearly erroneous or against clear weight of the
evidence, and
(2) evidence was sufficient to support finding that
probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet
conditions of his probation.
Affirmed.

attorney for whom he claimed to work as paralegal,
but attorney's responses to interrogatories and other
testimony raised questions as to whether probationer remained employed with attorney and whether
affidavits were legitimate, and probationer did not
take other available steps to establish his employment status.
[2] Criminal Law 110 €==>0
110 Criminal Law
Assuming that revocation court was required to
make willfulness determination in connection with
revocation and reinstatement of probation, evidence
was sufficient to support finding that probationer
did not make bona fide efforts to meet conditions of
his probation; probationer avoided repeated requests from agent to verify employment he was required to maintain as condition of his probation,
maintaining that order of clarification issued by
court entitled him to rely solely on affidavit originally provided by his employer, making no effort to
seek clarification from agent or court in response to
agent's repeated requests.

Fourth District, Fillmore Department, 051700056;
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr.Tate W. Bennett,
Fillmore, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 C ^ O -

Before Judges ORME, DAVIS, and ROTH.

110 Criminal Law
Trial court's determination that probationer's
employment did not constitute full-time employment required as condition of his probation was not
clearly erroneous or against clear weight of the
evidence, where determination rested on assessment
of credibility; probationer submitted affidavits from

MEMORANDUM DECISION
DAVIS, Judge:
*1 f 1 Jamis M. Johnson appeals the trial
court's order revoking and reinstating the terms of
his probation. See generally Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1 (Supp.2011). We affirm.
U 2 "The decision to grant, modify, or revoke

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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probation is in the discretion of the trial court."
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990).
"[A] trial court's finding of a probation violation is
a factual one and therefore must be given deference
on appeal unless the finding is clearly erroneous."
State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah
Ct.App.1994); see also State v. Maestas, 2000 UT
App 22, 1 12, 997 P.2d 314 ("The trial court's determinations underlying its conclusion that defendant violated his probation are findings of fact we
will not disturb unless clearly erroneous, i.e.,
against the clear weight of the evidence."). In challenging the trial court's decision to revoke and reinstate his probation, Johnson "must show that the
evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light
most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking [his] probation." See Jameson, 800 P.2d at
804 (footnote omitted).
% 3 Johnson was required to maintain verifiable
full-time employment as a condition of his probation for a March 2007 conviction of securities
fraud. In an October 2008 Order of Clarification,
the trial court approved Johnson's employment as a
part-time legal assistant with attorney Joseph R.
Goodman as being in compliance with the terms of
his probation. The court based its determination
primarily on an affidavit from Goodman (the verification affidavit), which described Johnson as "a
1099 employee" that is paid "on a contract basis" at
a rate of "$15 per hour" for "approximately 20-30
hours per week." In the Order of Clarification, the
trial court also noted that "Goodman (or any other
attorney for whom Mr. Johnson finds employment)
shall verify Mr. Johnson's work as [Adult Probation
and Parole (AP & P) ] periodically inquires." Dissatisfied with the employment verification Johnson
provided, AP & P filed several probation progress/
verification reports, one of which resulted in an order to show cause hearing held on August 30, 2010
(the August 2010 hearing). During the August 2010
hearing, the trial court determined that Johnson was
"in violation of the terms of his probation" for failing "to provide verification of] full-time employ-

ment." This determination was based on the testimony of three witnesses—an agent from AP & P
(the agent), a volunteer with the Utah State Bar's
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (the volunteer), and Johnson himself.
TJ 4 The agent testified that he repeatedly requested that Johnson provide documentation to
verify his employment status and that Johnson was
consistently unable to provide the agent with a
paycheck stub, a 1099 tax form, an employment
contract, or any other similar documentation. The
agent testified that he "even brainstormed with Mr.
Johnson on thingfs] that [Johnson] could provide"
to help AP & P verify his employment, but ultimately "Johnson felt that the only way to verify
employment for him was by an affidavit." Additionally, the agent testified that Johnson had fallen
behind on his restitution payments, also a violation
of the terms of his probation, which prompted the
agent to send "a request to the court for a writ of
garnishment, and [that,] as part of that writ of garnishment [,] ... interrogatories ... were sent to Mr.
Goodman." Goodman's answers indicated that he
was not "indebted to" Johnson; that Johnson had no
interest in "any property or money" in Goodman's
"possession," "charge," or "control"; and that
Goodman knew of no debts that might be owed to
Johnson or property owned or controlled by Johnson. The agent testified that Goodman's answers to
the interrogatories implied that "there was really no
nexus... between [Goodman] and Mr. Johnson."
*2 H 5 Next, the volunteer testified that in May
2010, he investigated Johnson for the unauthorized
practice of law in conjunction with a business
called Homeowners Legal Defense. The volunteer
discovered that Goodman was listed as the agent
for Homeowners Legal Defense. The volunteer contacted Goodman to ask if he "was aware or familiar
with" Johnson; Goodman responded that "he was
not involved at all with ... Johnson ..., and he only
agreed to be the[ ] agent for this company."
f 6 Johnson then testified, contending that the
agent never asked him for a pay stub and explaining

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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that his "2009 tax information [had] not [been] prepared yet," so he could not provide it to the agent to
verify his employment. Johnson testified that he
"consistently ... work[s] with" Goodman, that
Goodman submitted the verification affidavit in
2008 upon which the court approved Johnson's
work arrangement with Goodman as in compliance
with the terms of his probation, see supra f 3, and
that Goodman filed another affidavit with the trial
court in May 2010 to verify that "Johnson continue[d] to work with [him] on law matters per the
Court's authorization" in its October 2008 Order of
Clarification. Johnson further testified that "the
cases that [he] worked on [were] contingency cases
... and [he] didn't have income most of 2008." Noting a disparity between Johnson's testimony that he
worked on a contingency basis and Goodman's
verification affidavit, which stated that Johnson
was paid $15 an hour, the trial court asked Johnson
for clarification. Johnson responded,
Mr. Goodman did not say he was going to hire
me fiill time at $15 an hour. What happens is—if
someone comes in on a case, I am attributed $15
an hour.

[H]e doesn't pay me unless money comes in from
clients and then hopefully we get more than that
if I get bonused as a staff member from a contingency, but he doesn't pay me $15 an hour for
work I do automatically. We've got to get payment in on his cases, and then I get paid at the
rate of $15 an hour.... [I]f we are victorious, I get
$15 an hour for everything I did on a case plus if
he's successful he will bonus me more than that
amount....
\ 7 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court determined that Johnson's description of his
employment did not constitute "full-time employment," and that the terms of his probation require
that he both retain full-time employment and
provide verification of that employment. Consequently, the trial court "revoke[d Johnson's] pro-

bation" and "reinstate[d] it under the same terms
and conditions as previously ordered with the additional provision that [Johnson] serve 60 days in ...
jail."
[1] f 8 We conclude that the trial court's determination was not "clearly erroneous" or "against
the clear weight of the evidence," State v. Maestas,
2000 UT App 22, ] 12, 997 P.2d 314. In this case,
the trial court's determination boiled down to a matter of credibility, pitting the testimony of the agent
and the volunteer against that of Johnson; such
credibility determinations are distinctly within the
province of the trial court, see State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (noting that the trial
court is "in the best position to assess the credibility
of witnesses"). Here, the agent testified that he repeatedly asked Johnson for documentation to verify
his employment and that Johnson insisted that an
affidavit from Goodman was the only verification
he could provide. Although Goodman submitted a
subsequent affidavit verifying Johnson's ongoing
employment in May 2010, Goodman's responses to
the interrogatories and the volunteer's testimony
raise doubts as to whether Johnson remained employed with Goodman and whether one or both of
Goodman's affidavits were legitimate. Johnson
pointed out during the hearing that the agent could
have spoken with Goodman to confirm Johnson's
status as his employee; however, the agent's failure
to do so does not render the trial court's determination clearly erroneous. Johnson testified that he was
not paid in a traditional manner, implying that he
did not receive pay stubs or sign an employment
contract, and that his tax documents were not yet
ready because he was still working on filing them.
However, as the trial court aptly observed, Johnson's "problems personally filing his own income
tax return" should "not prevent Mr. Goodman from
issuing a 1099 to" Johnson that Johnson could then
show the agent to verify his employment.
*3 [2] Tf 9 Johnson also argues that the trial
court's revocation and reinstatement of his probation was arbitrary and capricious because Johnson's
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violation was not willful, nor did it threaten the
safety of society. We agree that "as a general rule,
in order to revoke probation for the violation of a
condition of probation not involving the payment of
money, the violation must be willful or, if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society."
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277 (Utah
Ct.App.1990). The court must determine willfulness "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v.
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct.App.1994).
Assuming, without deciding, that a willfulness determination is necessary here where probation was
revoked and reinstated rather than just revoked, cf.
State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, | 35, 127 P.3d 1213 ("It
is not clear whether the willfulness requirement applies to the mere extension of probation for failure
to pay restitution."), "a finding of willfulness
'merely requires a finding that the probationer did
not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of
his probation,' " Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991
(emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Archuleta, 812
P.2d 80, 84 (Utah CtApp.1991')). Additionally,
"the word 'willful' should not be equated with the
word 'intentional' " Id.
If 10 Johnson argues that the trial court could
not conclude that he willfully violated a term of his
probation because he "was reasonable in his reliance on the November 12, 2008 Order [of Clarification,] which outlined the manner in which [his] employment was to be verified, wherein it stated that
'Attorney Goodman (or any other attorney for
whom Mr. Johnson finds employment) shall verify
Mr. Johnson's work as AP & P periodically inquires.' " This argument is unavailing. Although
Johnson was permitted to rely on the November
2008 order as confirmation that the employment arrangement with Goodman, as it was described in
Goodman's verification affidavit, satisfied the terms
of his probation, the order did not permit Johnson
to duck the probation agent's requests that Johnson
verify his employment status himself. Assuming
Johnson truly believed that the November 2008 Order of Clarification placed the employment verification responsibility entirely on Goodman, then the

agent's repeated requests of Johnson to verify his
employment surely should have prompted Johnson
to seek clarification from the agent or trial court in
light of this otherwise obvious misunderstanding.
There is no evidence that Johnson did any such
thing. Moreover, Johnson failed to present this argument during the August 2010 hearing from which
he appeals, lending weight to the inference that
Johnson was not confused about his responsibilities
under the November 2008 Order of Clarification
but that he was simply avoiding the agent's requests. Such behavior does not demonstrate "bona
fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation."
Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991 (emphasis omitted).
*4 f 11 Accordingly, the trial court's determination that Johnson violated a term of his probation
was not clearly erroneous, and its decision to revoke and reinstate his probation was not an abuse
of discretion. Affirmed.
t 12 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, and
STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judges.
UtahApp.,2012.
State v. Johnson
— P.3d — , 2012 WL 1356488 (Utah App.), 2012
UT App 118
END OF DOCUMENT
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MAR 2 9 2011
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT-FILLMORE COURfl OF MUJLARD COUNTY

MILLARD COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAjH

^

:AMENDED

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

vs

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
:ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
:COURT CASE NO. 051700056

JOHNSON. J amis M
Defendant,

JUDGE: JAMES BRADY
.•DEFATTY: TATE W. BENNETT

STATE OF UTAH

)
):ss

COUNTY OF MILLARD

)

TROY STAKER, being duly sw orn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a Probation
Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 7th day of March, 2007, the
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Securities Fraud, a Second Degree
Felony, in the above-entitled Court and on the 6th day of June, 2007, was sentenced to serve a
term of One to Fifteen Years in the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence
was stayed and the defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections; that the above-entitled defendant did violate the terms and conditions of the
defendant's probation as follows, to-wit:

(d> *,jt? O
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DEPUTX

RE: JOHNSON, Jamis M

-21. By having failed to establish residence of record or changed residence without permission, on
or about October 21, 2010, in violation of a standard condition of the Probation Agreement.
2. By having failed to report as directed, on or about October 21, 2010, in violation of a standard
condition of the Probation Agreement.
3. By having been convicted of the offense of Aiding and Abetting; Willfully Causing another to
Commit a Crime (18 USCA 1349 (2)(a) and (b)), on or about March 18. 201U in violation of
condition number three of the Probation Agreement.
4. By having committed or by having been convicted of the offense of Conspiracy (18 USCA
1349), on or about March 18, 2011, in violation of condition number three of the Probation
Agreement.
5. By having committed or by having been convicted of the offense of Mail Fraud (18 USCA
1341), on or about June 27. 2007, in violation of condition number three of the Probation
Agreement.
6. By having committed or by having been convicted of the offense of Wire Fraud (18 USCA
1343). on or about March 18, 2011, in violation of condition number three of the Probation
Agreement.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order from the Court issue directing and
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any he
has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should
not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.

3

TROY STAKER, PROBATION OFFICER

Subscribed and,sworn to before me this

£&

day of \A(\ Y~C Y)

20 \\

NzictY Publi*

v

-

•

•

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing:^ j A \ j ~ 1 ( l Y { , Utah
Commission expires: M H S " ^ T ) \ I
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OF THE DISTRICT COUR"

STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
PROTECTED
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT

MILLARD COUNTY
_CLERK
DEPUTY

n

TO: FOURTH DISTRICT COURT Fillmore, Millard County, Utah

REGARDING: JOHNSON, Janus M.

ATTN: Judge James Brady

CASE NO.: 051700056

FROM: Salt Lake A.P.& P.

OFFENSE: Securities Fraud, a Second Degree
Felony

DATE: 03/22/2011

OFFENDERS 178175

PROBATION DATE: 06/06/2007

ADDRESS: FEDERAL CUSTODY, Davis
County Jail, Farmmgton, Utah

LEGISLATIVE DATE: 08/29/2013

EMPLOYMENT: None

DEFENSE ATTY: Tate W. Bennett

COMMENTS:
On June 6, 2007, the Court placed Jamis M JOHNSON on probation with the following conditions:
1. Defendant is to keep a current address on file with the court. Defendant is to report to the court
whenever ordered to do so. Service by mail is deemed adequate notice.
2. Pay fines and fees in the amount of 55,000.00, plus interest.
3. Serve 365 days in the Millard County Jail commencing 07/02/2007. Defendant to serve the first 6
months, the remaining 6 months he may be on home confinement with electronic monitoring.
Defendant may be on work release if the Sheriff approves it.
4. Have no contact with Mr. Myers or Mr. Young.
5. Not be employed in a fiduciary position. Not to represent or handle third party money.
6. Pay restitution in the amount of $120,000.00, in reference to case #051700056, at a rate as directed by
Adult Probation and Parole.
PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED INFORMATION:
On August 30, 2010, the Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on one of the two pending Orders to Show
Causes in this matter.
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Note* There is another Order to Show Cause from March 2009 on multiple Federal Charges. This
Order to Show Cause has been continued several times. The defendant has a trial set for February 22,
2011 in the United States District Court.
At the conclusion of the Evidentiaiy Hearing, the Court found the defendant m violation of his probation,
to wit: Failure to maintain full time employment. The Court ordered the defendant to serve 60 days in
the Millard County Jail. The Court then placed the defendant on probation for his third attempt to
complete probation.

{

'
I
•
I

On October 13, 2010. the Court held a hearing and released the defendant from the Millard County Jail. It
appears the defendant filed a second appeal in this court case.
Note: The defendant has pursued an earlier appeal. The appeal w as denied by the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court denied review. The defendant filed an Affidavit with the Court in this affidavit, he admits he has not had employment
since July 2007. See page 2 (top of the page) Affidavit of Indigency, Jamis Johnson, October 13, 2010
in the Court's File.
The Court suspended the balance of the 60 days jail sentence and released the defendant. The Millard
County Jail released the defendant.
When 1 got the email (October 13, 2010) from the Millard County Jail that the defendant was being
released, I called 801-364-2411. This phone number has been disconnected. I called the defendant's cell
phone 801-347-1112. I left a message to remind him to report to Adult Probation and Parole on October
14,2010.

'
i
j
,
,

'
|
j

On October 14, 2010, the defendant did not report to Adult Probation and Parole. The defendant did not
call or otherwise leave a message about why he didn't report.
Note: Each time the defendant has reported to Adult Probation and Parole, I have given him a paper
of instructions. The instructions denotes: Report in person upon release from jail at 8:00 am the
next business morning. This instruction is capitalized, bolded, and underlined on this paper.

I
|

On October 21, 2010, the defendant did not report to Adult Probation and Parole. The defendant did not
call or otherwise leave a message about why he didn't report.
Note: On July 15, 2010, the defendant was told to report on October 21, 2010. This instruction was
denoted on a calendar of the month of October 2010. This date was shaded and bolded.
i

On October 22, 2010, the defendant has not reported since he was released from the Millard County Jail on
October 13, 2010.
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NEW INFORMATION:
On March 18, 2011, a federal Jury convicted the defendant of the offense of Aiding and Abetting; Willfully
Causing another to Commit a Crime (18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2)(a) and (b)); Conspiracy (18 U.S C. § 1349);
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341); and Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343). He is set to be sentenced on July
18,2011
The defendant is m the kro-risk category. This category suggests we can help the defendant by getting him
onto the right path and he would continue thereafter. The defendant has been working on his attitude and
finances. The defendant still has a severe attitude problem, in that: he will not get viable employment and
start doing the items on his probation agreement.
The defendant has a severe employment problem. The defendant has NEVER held employment during the
last three years on probation. Further, the defendant has racked up multiple new federal offenses of Mail
Fraud, Wire Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting, and Willfully causing another
to commit a crime. Adult Probation and Parole is concerned these new crimes arise solely and because of
the defendant's refusal to get and hold viable, full time employment as approved by Adult Probation and
Parole. Adult Probation and Parole is concerned about the relationship between the defendant and Joseph
R. Goodman. Mr. Goodman has sworn out several Affidavits to this Court attesting the defendant has an
employment type relationship going back through the years to October 2008. However, the defendant
finally admitted (October 13, 2010) that he has not had employment since July 2007.

2568
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This is the FIFTH Order to Show Cause requested on the defendant. This is the SIXTH problem the
defendant has had while on probation. In August 2007, the defendant was caught attempting to short sell
his home (that is a part of the above alleged crimes) after the "buyer" ended up in foreclosure when no
payment was made on the defendant's home. In May 2008, the defendant had no verifiable employment
and had missed a restitution payment. In March 2009, the defendant was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury
for Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting; and Willfully
causing another to commit a crime. In February 2010, it was discovered the defendant doesn't actually have
employment and isn't making his restitution payments. In March 2010, the defendant didn't have \ mble
employment and was still committing the violation denoted m August 2007. In October 2010, the
defendant was released from jail and never reported to Adult Probation and Parole. In March 2011, he was
convicted of these federal charges.
It should be noted one co-defendant taking a plea deal was sentenced to 56 months in federal prison. The
other co-defendant hasn't been sentenced. It is estimated the defendant will receive about 60 to 180
months in federal prison.
OSC RECOMMENDATION:
It is respectfully recommended to the Court that if the defendant is found in violation of one or more of the
conditions of his probation that his probation be revoked, and the original sentence be imposed.
RECOMMENDATION:
It is respectfully recommended to the Court to allow Adult Probation and Parole to amend the pending
Affidavit in Support of an Order to Show Cause and close Adult Probation and Parole's interest in this
matter.

AL LOLOHEA, SUPERVJ^OR

Zh&=&

TROY STfKER, PROBATION OFFICER
APPROVED AND ORDERED:.
DENIED:
DATE:
COMMENTS:
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APPEARANCES

2
3
4
5

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
MARKW. BAER
Deputy Millard County Attorney
765 South Highway 99
Fillmore, Utah 84631

6
7
8
9

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
TATE W. BENNETT
Millard County Public Defenders
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1
2

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: Please be seated, gentlemen. Call the

3 case of State of Utah versus Jamis M. Johnson. Could I have
4 both parties make their appearances, please.
5

MR. BENNETT: Tate Bennett for Jamis Johnson,

6 defendant.
7

MR. BAER: Mark Baer, Attorney General's Office, for

8 the State of Utah.
9

THE COURT: Are both sides ready to proceed?

10

MR. BAER: Your Honor, could we briefly approach?

11

THE COURT: You may.

12
13

(An off-the-record discussion was held at the Bench.)
THE COURT: You've been listening to my white noise

14 for the last little while. Counsel, I believe we're ready to
15 proceed now. Let me just make a record and indicate that
16 during the last 15 or 20 minutes we've tried to make certain
17 that we were organized and prepared and all addressing the same
18 issues today.
19

There has been some question since late October as to

20 which documents have been filed as order to show causes with
21 affidavits, which documents are requests for the hearing, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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22 what issues are actually before the Court today. I think we've
23 clarified. The Court has reviewed its file and has made copies
24 for the parties, but just so we're clear, this is the State of
25 Utah versus Jamis Johnson, Case No. 051700056. We're here

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 today for hearing on the order to show cause brought against
2 Mr. Johnson by the State of Utah alleging violations of his
3 probation.
4

These allegations were initially raised in October.

5 Based on a number of hearings that were held and motions that
6 were filed, they were not responded to until the end of January
7 at which time they were denied by Mr. Bennett on behalf of his
8 client and the matters are now at issue for an evidentiary
9 hearing.
10

I also have before me an order to show cause which

11 was only recently filed. Garth, I can't find the order to show
12 cause from April. This is, excuse me, these are all stapled
13 together. Just give me one moment so I can read through them.
14 Okay. I have the March ones here. And the November ones here.
15 Thank you. I do have them.
16

We also have an order to show cause which was filed

17 recently, the end of March, and it was scheduled and noticed
18 for a hearing today. However, the defendant has not yet had a
19 chance to admit or deny the allegations raised in that order to
20 show cause and I'mDigitized
just asking
counsel
now Law
for Library,
defense,
do you
by the Howard
W. Hunter
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
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21 wish to have an admit deny hearing today and if necessary
22 schedule an evidentiary hearing for another day or how would
23 you like to proceed?
24

MR. BENNETT: I think that's the way we need to

25 proceed, your Honor. And will the Court accept me entering a
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
5

1 denial on Mr. Johnson's behalf?
2

THE COURT: I'll accept a general denial on all

3 allegations.
4

MR. BENNETT: When it comes to the issue of setting a

5 date, your Honor, the allegations include, among other things,
6 that he was — that Mr. Johnson was convicted in federal court
7 of and then there's a number of charges listed there. While
8 ordinarily an evidentiary hearing on that matter would just be
9 a matter of well were you convicted or not and, you know, it's
10 a pretty simple evidentiary hearing, never that simple, of
11 course, with us. And what I mean by that is as the Court can
12 see, despite what may have entered as a conviction, Mr. Johnson
13 remains free today.
14

That's based in part on a hearing from about a week

15 ago that I do not pretend to understand, but he has, in fact,
16 been released. Sentencing is set for mid-July. In the interim
17 Mr. Johnson plans on filing a motion for a new trial, et cetera
18 which could potentially backdate or move back a sentencing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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19 date. In any event, we have to deal with what's actually set
20 and right now sentencing is set for July 18th. Fully
21 anticipate the federal public defender's office filing the
22 motion for new trial as we said earlier. Apparently it has
23 been filed.
24

So we'd ask that if those are denied, then I would

25 imagine they go forward with sentencing and then this
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
6

1 evidentiary hearing would be rather short and sweet. So could
2 we set it for just after the federal sentencing date as it
3 exists now? Then if it gets more complicated, we can move it,
4 but at the earliest I'd like it set -- my request is that it be
5 set after the sentencing date in federal court which I believe
6 right now is July 18th.
7

THE COURT: Okay. Before you respond, Mr. Baer, I'll

8 give you a chance to respond, I don't have my calendar right in
9 front of me. I can turn to my clerk and ask her to verify, the
10 month of June is almost not available anymore and the month of
11 May with the exception of the 17th and 18th — well, not
12 the 17th. We're already using that. The month of May is
13 almost not available because of the Court's schedule already.
14 I think we may have the 18th as a full day. That's
15 available. We may actually have a day next week that I just
16 found out about, but what I'm getting at is if it's not set
17 before June 12th, and
I don't know that we have the ability
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18 to set it before June 12th, it cannot be set until after the
19 Fourth of July.
20

So with that in mind, Mr. Baer, tell me what your

21 preference would be?
22

MR. BAER: Our preference would be, your Honor, to

23 have the hearing as soon as possible because we can combine —
24 well, let's start the first issue. If you take a look at this
25 new March, relatively new March allegations. It's not just the
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 federal convictions. It also alleges other matters such as
2 failure to report or failure to reveal established residence of
3 record, that's allegation No. 1, or failure to report. I mean,
4 these are much the same as the other allegations. And I
5 believe that is exactly the issues that we're going to address
6 today on the earlier orders to show cause which the Court would
7 know he's a defendant, he's a felon, and he has an obligation
8 to report both to this Court and to his probation officer. And
9 so if he continues to not do that, probation officer has
10 continued to file his PV report.
11

So there are other issues which would warrant us

12 hearing it earlier regardless, but secondarily, he does stand
13 convicted, this individual does stand convicted of federal
14 crimes at this point. It is pro forma in some cases and
15 certainly customary that individuals file appeals, unless
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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16 there's some sort of stay issued by the federal court, those
17 are convictions and we'd like to proceed on those.
18

But given that they are separate issues entirely

19 besides the federal that the Court can rest its hat on if the
20 Court feels more comfortable, we'd ask it be set as soon as
21 possible. And to make it hopefully not too much more money,
22 this individual was released last week from federal custody.
23 He has not reported to our knowledge to any authorities whether
24 it's this Court or to the probation officer since his release
25 last week.
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

And based upon that, there's another ongoing PV

2 report that we'd like to file today and then he can deny those
3 so we know we're dealing with today's Filing, March filings at
4 our next sentencing. Today we know we're dealing — all very
5 clear now that we're dealing with November's allegations so it
6 becomes very succinct so we don't run into this problem again.
7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MR.BAER: Thank you.

9

THE COURT: Thank you.

10

MR. BENNETT: May we respond?

11

THE COURT: Yes.

12

MR. BENNETT: First, what he has filed is not an

13 appeal. It's a motion for a new trial which would serve as a
14 stay. So holding anDigitized
evidentiary
hearing
basedLaw
onLibrary,
convictions
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15 prior to letting those convictions — whether we know they
16 stand or not kind of negates the purpose of him filing a motion
17 for new trial. What would happen if we held the evidentiary
18 hearing, the Court probably is going to take judicial notice
19 that at this moment of our evidentiary hearing the convictions
20 have been ordered and then they turn around and are overturned
21 weeks later, then we have — it's just a quagmire we don't need
22 to get into.
23

So there's really no need — if his motions are

24 defeated, they will go forward with sentencing and then we can
25 come back and it will just be a much cleaner situation so

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 that's the basis for this. Well, and as to the allegations of
2 not reporting, your Honor, those aren't before us now so I
3 actually choose not to respond to those.
4

THE COURT: And I am not taking — I won't be making

5 decisions based on just allegations that are not before me, not
6 admitted and not proven at this point, but I'm taking them as
7 simply notice that the State is giving me that we may well have
8 other matters that we may need to schedule.
9

In terms of today's hearing, we're going to proceed

10 with the November issues. We'll have an evidentiary hearing on
11 those issues. When we complete that, I'm going to address the
12 timing of the next hearing. I'm not persuaded that I should
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13 not hold a hearing until he's sentenced. I believe that his
14 motion for a new trial could be granted or denied before the
15 July date. It may not be. And so I'll address that when it
16 comes time to setting that hearing.
17

I'm also not persuaded that I need to rush a hearing

18 on his convictions if there is a pending motion to set aside
19 that decision. And other than the convictions, I only have
20 failures to respond, excuse me, failures to establish a
21 residence or notify a change and failure to report which are
22 not unlike what he already has alleged against him. So I'm not
23 in a big rush to hear this on matters that we're not certain
24 of, but I also don't feel a need to delay it until after a
25 future sentencing date which may or may not exist by the time
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
10

1 we get there anyway.
2

So we'll deal with that at the appropriate time. I

3 believe the only issues that are before me today, other than
4 having accepted his general denial on the January orders to
5 show cause, the only things that are before me today is an
6 evidentiary7 hearing on ~ I'll call it the November order to
7 show cause.
8

Are we ready to proceed on that?

9

MR. BAER: We are, your Honor.

10

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baer. If you would call

11 your first witness, please.
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12

MR. BAER: First witness I call Mr. Troy Staker to

13 the stand.
14

THE COURT: Please come forward, Mr. Staker. My

15 clerk will swear you in.
16

MR. BAER: Judge, may I just proceed from the bench

17 here?
18

THE COURT: Please do. I need to have you near a

19 microphone.
20
21

DIRECT EXAMINATION

22

BY MR. BAER:

23

Q

Sir, can you please state your full name and spell

24 your last name for the record.
25

A Yes, Troy Staker, S-t-a-k-e-r.
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

Q Mr. Staker, where do you work and what do you do,

2 please?
3

A I work at Adult Probation and Parole for the

4 Department of Corrections for the State of Utah.
5

Q And what office do you work under?

6

A Like what's the address?

7

Q No - yeah, the Salt Lake office?

8

A Yeah, the Salt Lake office at 36 West Fremont.

9

Q All right. Sir, have you had an opportunity to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10 supervise an individual by the name of Mr. Jamis Johnson?
11

A I have.

12

Q And when were you first assigned that case?

13

A It's been a while. Pm not actually sure about when

14 I was first assigned that case.
15

Q You've had it for a couple of years at least?

16

A That would be accurate.

17

Q And has Mr. Johnson — he's been under your

18 supervision personally. Is that correct?
19

A That would be correct.

20

Q And this individual, you've met with him previously,

21 seen him previously?
22

A Yes.

23

Q Is that individual in the courtroom today?

24

A Yes, he's sitting at the defendant's table.

25

MR. BAER: Your Honor, may the record reflect just
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 the identification of the defendant?
2

THE COURT: Yes.

3

MR. BAER: Thank you.

4

BY MR. BAER:

5

Q Mr. Staker, you prepared and submitted an order to

6 show cause in this matter which we're referring to as the
7 November, meaning November 2010, order to show cause, correct?
8

A Yes, that's correct.
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9

Q And we're just dealing with that one here today,

10 correct?
11

A Yes.

12

Q Could you outline for the Court what gave rise to the

13 filing and execution of that affidavit?
14

A Yes, basically what had happened is the Court had

15 found Mr. Johnson in violation of his probation and sentenced
16 him to a period of time in the Millard County Jail. I had
17 received an email from the Millard County Jail saying that they
18 were going to release Jamis Johnson on October 13th 2010. So
19 what happened is that I took and Mr. Johnson — I didn't want
20 him to have any difficulties on this go around for probation so
2.1 what I did is I called his phone number of record to let him
22 know that basically I was aware that he would be getting out,
23 but that number had been disconnected so.
24

Q How would you have been provided with that number?

25

A When he would report. I would ask him what his phone
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 number was. His address, phone number, wrhere he worked, things
2 like that.
3

Q That number then was provided by the defendant

4 originally?
5

A Yes, that's correct.

6

Q Had he given you any additional numbers or any
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7 additional contacts to substitute for that one?
8

A Yes, he had. He gave me a mobile number as well.

9

Q Okay. Well, did he give you another non-mobile

10 number?
11

A I believe he gave me a house phone number that was

12 disconnected and a mobile number that was not disconnected.
13

Q

So you indicated that you called the home number.

14 Just to be clear the record is clear, what happened when you
15 did that?
16

A The thing said that the number had been disconnected.

17

Q Okay. Since the release of this defendant, had he

18 called you and said I have a different home number?
19

A No.

20

Q Had he notified you of any different numbers?

21

A No.

22

Q Okay. You may proceed.

23

A

So I called the defendant's mobile number which was

24 still active and basically left a message letting him know that
25 I was aware that he was going to be released from the Millard
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 County Jail.
2

Q And who provided you with that number, again, so the

3 record is clear?
4

A The defendant.

5

Q Okay. Proceed,
please.
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6

A

And basically at that point I reminded him that

7 whenever he'd come in and report, that I would always direct
8 him to report to me at 8:00 the next business morning in person
9 upon his release from jail and that would be October 14th.
10

Q

What happened October 14th?

11

A

The defendant didn't report to Adult Probation and

12 Parole. He didn't call or otherwise leave a message to why he
13 didn't report.
14

Q

Did he do any of those activities any time relative

15 to that October date?
16

A

No.

17

Q

Now, with respect to your affidavit, your second

18 allegation indicates that — I guess actually the first one,
19 we've done this in reverse order, die failure to establish
20 residency of record.
21
22

Why did you file that allegation?
A

Oh, what had happened is that when Mr. Johnson had

23 got out of jail, when I last met with Mr. Johnson on
24 July 15th, 2010,1 gave him a calendar and on the calendar
25 basically it showed to report every third Thursday of every

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 month. And basically the next third Thursday after his release
2 from the Millard County Jail would have been October 21st and
3 so at that point I waited to see if he was going to show up for
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4 that meeting as well. On October 21st he didn't report and
5 he didn't call or leave a message as to why he didn't report.
6

At that point we hadn't had any communication from

7 Mr. Johnson as to where he left the Millard County Jail to go
8 live, and we didn't have him ever reporting to us and letting
9 us know that he had been released from Millard County Jail
10

Q Did you ever receive any new, additional or

11 subsequent addresses from this defendant within that time
12 period?
13

A No.

14

Q Or any other contact information within that time

15 period?
16
17

A No.
MR. BAER: All right. Your witness.

18
19

CROSS-EXAMINATION

20

BY MR. BENNETT:

21

Q Mr. Staker, you indicated that you received a jail

22 phone call from the Millard County Jail indicating that Mr.
23 Johnson would be released on October 21st, 2010, correct?
24

A No, that wouldn't be correct. I received an email

25 from the Millard County Jail on October 13th saying they were
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 releasing him that day.
2

Q Okay. So heDigitized
was tobybe
on October
13th.
the released
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3 Did the email indicate why they were releasing him on
4 October 13th, 2010?
5

A

No.

6

Q

Were you aware of why they were releasing him on

7 October 13th, 2010?
8

A

No.

9

Q

Did it strike you as odd that they were releasing

10 him?
11

A

Yes, I was wondering because his 60 days or whatever

12 sentence the Court had given him hadn't expired at that time.
13

Q

So you were, in fact, confused as to why they were

14 releasing him?
15

MR. BAER: I'll object to the form of the question.

16

THE COURT: You can ask the question. You can't tell

17 him what you think he was. I don't think he stated he was
18 confused so you need to re-ask the question.
19

MR. BENNETT: I believe I did ask. I said were you

20 confused as to why and he said yeah because the 60 days hadn't
21 been —
22

THE COURT: Okay. I thought I had heard it

23 differently.
24

MR. BENNETT: And perhaps I'm mistaken.

25

MR. BAER: I think the term was, and it's okay, we're

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 probably splitting a hair here, but I think he asked him if he
2 was surprised which is a different concept.
3

THE COURT: That was my understanding as well.

4

MR. BENNETT: Okay. I apologize.

5

THE COURT: Yep.

6

BY MR. BENNETT:

7

Q

8

A Yes.

9

Q Because of the surprise did you take any affirmative

So you were surprised that he was being released?

10 steps to find out why he was being released early?
11

A I did look up on court links to see if there was any

12 notations and there was nothing on court links as to why he was
13 being released.
14

Q

So you had no idea as to why he was released?

15

A No.

16

Q As of today do you understand why he was released?

17

A I'm actually not 100 percent sure on that in that no

18 motion documents or orders have ever been sent to me as to why
19 he was released.
20

Q

So none have ever been sent to you, but are you

21 aware?
22

A I believe that he had a court hearing and the judge

23 released him.
24

(Mr. Bennett is speaking away from the microphone and

25

cannot be heard consistently.)
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

Q Mr. Staker, do you recognize (inaudible)?

2

A You want me to —

3

Q Do you recognize the document?

4

A I've never seen it actually before until now.

5

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is what I'm moving to

6 introduce into evidence and so I'm asking to try and lay a
7 foundation here. It's a Court signed certificate of probable
8 cause and order of release. I'm asking the Court to take
9 judicial notice that it, in fact, existed and (inaudible.)
10

THE COURT: May I see it?

11

MR. BENNETT: (Inaudible).

12

THE COURT: Have you shown it to counsel?

13

MR. BENNETT: I have.

14

MR. BAER: I have a copy.

.15

THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel?

16

MR. BAER: No, I think the Court can take judicial

17 notice of its own pleadings anyway.
18

THE COURT: Yeah.

19

MR. BAER: And we're not going to argue about the

20 foundation of that. I'm fairly certain where the argument will
21 go in any event and we're prepared for that so that's fine.
22

THE COURT: Having reviewed the document I recognize

23 it as the document I previously reviewed that's in the Court
24 file that I signed on November 3rd. It's admitted.
25

(An exhibit was admitted but no number was mentioned
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1

so it cannot be identified in the index.)

2

MR. BENNETT: And then I would also - I think this

3 is probably the quickest way to do this, move for admission of
4 both — well, the Court would have conceded that order and
5 that's the motion for stay pending appeal and application for
6 certificate of probable cause, both of which were prepared by
7 Mr. Johnson in his pro se capacity. You know, and I failed to
8 mention there's also a memorandum in support of that motion for
9 stay So there aretiiree—
10

MR. BAER: Well, again, I think the Court can take

11 judicial notice of its own pleadings. I don't know if it has
12 to be entered as separate.
13

THE COURT: The only thing I need to do is verify

14 what he's referring to is what I recognize. I'll note for the
15 record and I will take judicial notice that I'm looking at a
16 motion for stay pending appeal and memorandum in support of
17 motion for stay and an application for certification of
18 probable cause, all appear to have been prepared by Mr.
19 Johnson. They all bear the Court stamps. All of them on •
20 September 7th, 2010. I'll take judicial notice of the fact
21 that they are already in the Court's file.
22

MR. BENNETT: So in that case we do not need to

23 (inaudible?)
24

THE COURT: You do not.
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25

BY MR. BENNETT:
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1

Q

Mr. Staker, you indicated that upon Mr. Johnson's

2 release you attempted to make contact via telephone with Mr.
3 Johnson, correct?
4

A

That would be correct.

5

Q

But that those numbers were disconnected, correct?

6

A

That would not be correct. One number was

7 disconnected, one number actually had a message machine or
8 message-type thing that you could leave a message.
9

Q

Okay. First, do you recall the number that you

10 attempted to make contact with Mr. Johnson on that was
11 disconnected?
12

A

I don't. However, it's in the report. I believe it

13 started with 347 and it's in the report of October 22nd I
14 believe is the date of the report.
15

Q

And then the number that you called where you

16 indicated it just went to a voice machine-type thing?
17

A

Uh-huh, that number is also reflected in the report.

18

Q

Okay. Thank you. You indicated that part of your

19 allegations in the probation violation were that Mr. Johnson
20 had failed to establish a residence of record, correct?
21

A

That would be correct.

22

Q

And the requirement to establish a residence of

23 record is part of the Adult Probation and Parole agreement

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24 entered into with Mr. Johnson and the Office of Adult Probation
25 and Parole, correct?
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1

A Right, Paragraph 2.

2

Q And that agreement was entered into when

3 approximately, if you don't know the exact date?
4

A I don't know the exact date Mr. Johnson executed that

5 document.
6

Q Do you recall when Mr. Johnson was sentenced in this

7 matter?
8

A I believe it was in 2007.

9

Q And so is it safe to say that he entered into the

10 probation agreement sometime shortly after being sentenced in
11 2007? "'

/

12

A That would be correct.

13

Q Okay. Do you recall when you filed this order to

14 show cause dated — counsel for the State referred to it as the
15 November progress report violation?
16

A Uh-huh.

17

Q The day on, it and correct me if I am wrong, is

18 October 25th, 2010, right?
19

A That would be correct.

20

Q Do you recall emailing that report to the local Adult

21 Probation and Parole office here in Millard County for
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22 dissemination?
23

A

Yes, I don't do that personally. Our agent assistant

24 does that and then sent me a copy saying that that had been
25 done.

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

Q

Okay. And then do you recall or are you aware of

2 counsel for Mr. Johnson responding to that email and kind have
3 questioning what the basis for the probation violation was?
4

A

I recall something about a motion or something that

5 was filed to quash the warrant that was issued from that
6 report.
7

Q

And so just so we're clear, you're acknowledging that

8 you recall receiving an email from counsel that stated to the
9 effect of hold on a minute this motion is being filed?
10

Do you recall receiving an email from counsel is the

11 specific question?
12

A

That I do not.

13

Q

You do not recall receiving an email from myself —

14

A

No.

15

Q

— in response to your email to the local AP&P

16 office?
17

A

No, I don't recall an email on that. I'm not saying

18 that email wasn't sent. I'm just saying I don't specifically
19 recall anything on that.
20

Q

And I guess it's possible that where you didn't send
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21 the email personally, any response perhaps wasn't due by you
22 personally either?
23

A

Right.

24

Q

But you were aware that an email was sent and this

25 motion — you called it a motion to quash, but this motion was

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 filed. You were aware of that?
2

A

I'm aware that basically I sent a report to the

3 Court. The Court issued a warrant, I believe, in November and
4 that basically there was some pleadings pursuant to having the
5 warrant set aside and basically allowing Mr. Johnson to just
6 come to an order to show cause.
7

MR. BENNETT: Okay. Thank you. No other questions,

8 your Honor.
9

THE COURT: Very well. You may step down.

10

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

11

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Do you have any reply?

12

MR. BAER: It was just — probably just to make sure

13 that it's clear
14
15

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

16
17

BY MR. BAER:
Q

How many times have you met with Mr. Johnson over the

18 years?
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19

A

Gosh-

20

MR. BENNETT: Objection. Relevance.

21

THE COURT: I find it relevant.

22

THE WITNESS: I would say - well, generally Mr.

23 Johnson comes in every third Thursday of every month since he's
24 been assigned to the Salt Lake office and met with me.
25

BYMR.BAER:
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1

Q

All right. With the exception of these allegations,

2 his non-report, correct?
3

A

Right.

4

Q

All right. So it's been years that you've had them,

5 correct?
6

A

That would be correct.

7

Q

Have you ever changed residence, your employment

8 residence at any time during this time period?
9

A

No.

10

Q

Have you changed your telephone number at any time

11 during this time period?
12

A

No.

13

Q

Have you changed your email at any time during this

14 time period.
15

A

No.

16

Q

Has anything changed that would make it different,

17 more difficult or otherwise minor or substantially altered way
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18 to contact you from the beginning of this case to, in fact,
19 this very day?
20

A No, and our reporting times have, I believe, been

21 uniformly the third Thursday of every month between 7:30 in the
22 morning and seven at night.
23

Q All right. It's fair to say you've handled hundreds

24 if not thousands of probations over the years?
25

A That would be correct.
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1

Q This is standard procedure in these cases?

2

A Yes.

3

MR. BAER: No other questions.

4

THE COURT: Thank you? Any further questions.

5

MR. BENNETT: No, your Honor.

6

THE COURT: Witness may step down. Mr. Baer, any

7 other witnesses?
8

MR. BAER: No, your Honor. I think we'd submit on

9 those two narrow issues for purposes of today's hearing.
10

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr Bennett, do you wish to

11 call any witnesses?
12

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, Mr. Johnson would like to

13 testify on his own behalf so defense calls Jamis M. Johnson.
14

THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, if you'll come forward,

15 raise your right hand to be sworn in.
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16

JAMIS M. JOHNSON

17

Called by the Defendant, being first

18

duly sworn, testified as follows:

19

THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony

20 you are about to give in this matter will be the truth, the
21 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
22

THE WITNESS: I do.

23

THE COURT: Come up here, Mr. Johnson. Have a seat.

24
25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
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1

BY MR. BENNETT:

2

Q

Mr. Johnson, you've heard Mr. Staker testify today

3 that he attempted to contact you at sometime after release on
4 October 13th from the Millard County Jail, October 13th of
5 2010 from the Millard County Jail, correct?
6

A

Yeah, I heard that.

7

Q

Were you aware at that time that Kir. Staker had

8 attempted to contact you?
9

A

I wras aware, but I would like to go back before that

10 because he —
11

THE COURT: No. Mr. Johnson, I'm going to instruct

12 you that in this instance you're the witness and he's the
13 attorney so you answer his questions at this time. Then if you
14 need to take a moment to talk to him about how he's conducting
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15 his case, you're welcome to do that.
16

THE WITNESS: Okay.

17

THE COURT: But I'm not going to have you direct the

18 conversation from the witness chair anymore than I would any
19 other.
20

THE WITNESS: Okay.

21

THE COURT: So you ask the questions, you answer the

22 questions, we'll proceed that way. Then if you want to take a
23 break and talk to your attorney, you may.
24
25

THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
BY MR. BENNETT:
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1

Q So, again, were you aware that Mr. Staker had

2 attempted to contact you?
3

A I was aware of that. Mr. Staker called me and left a

4 message October 14th at 7:45 in the morning. I'd gotten home
5 the night before about 9:00. The judge had released me the day
6 before and I got that call.
7

Q What did you do in response to that call?

8

A Well, I contacted you and I checked the Court docket

9 because the judge had granted my two motions and —
10

Q You just mentioned two motions. Let's be clear what

11 you're referring to.
12

A I had filed on September 7th — when I entered the
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13 Millard County Jail, I filed personally a — as I recall, a
14 motion for — I filed a notice of appeal and I filed a motion
15 for a stay pending appeal and I had filed an application for a
16 probable cause certificate on September 7th and I sent notice
17 to the State, to Mr. Baer.
18

Q

Do you recall the date on which you sent that notice?

19

A

Notices were sent three times. I sent notices on

20 September 7th to Mr. Baers office and then again roughly
21 about 15 days later.
22

MR. BAER: Judge, I'm going to object on a relevance

23 basis. You know whether or not he sends notice to the State
24 doesn't change one way or another his obligations to the Court.
25 I'd just ask for some sort of foundation as to the relevance to
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1 this proceeding.
2

THE COURT: Help me with the relevance question, Mr.

3 Bennett.
4

MR. BENNETT: Well, first of all, Mr. Staker

5 indicated that he had no notice of this. I think additionally
6 whether the State had notice is relevant because ultimately
7 these motions and the probable cause certificate were granted,
8 in part I think the Court could deem it as a default because
9 (inaudible). The Court, when the State failed to appear,
10 granted these motions so I think whether or not Mr. Jamis
11 complied with the concept of notice is important in
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12 establishing that the State did, in fact, have notice of the
13 filing of the proper—
14

THE COURT: But those issues have been resolved.

15 They've been ruled on. As far as I know, there's not a
16 question of notice at this time. The only question is after he
17 was released what did he know, what did he do, and that's where
18 we need to go.
19

MR. BENNETT: Okay. And we'll fast forward to that.

20 And the Court is correct I was setting up an argument
21 anticipating so I'll just farther forward.
22

BY MR. BENNETT:

23

Q

So, Mr. Johnson, ultimately these probable causes,

24 your motion for stay was granted or denied?
25

A It was granted.
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1

Q The probable cause certificate in order of release

2 was granted or denied?
3

A It was granted.

4

Q And you were aware that they were granted of course?

5

A They were granted, yes, on October 13th and then

6 again on November 4th.
7

Q What do you mean by that?

8

A November 4th there was — the Court signed a fairly

9 extensive order affirming the granting.
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10

Q

Okay. So you're released — we need to fast forward

11 kind of to the ultimate point. You're released. And as
12 Mr. Staker indicated and you've sort of conceded, he made
13 contact with you, but you did not respond to Mr. Staker,
14 instead you responded by calling your counselor, correct?
15

A

Right, I called you and also checked the court

16 docket.
17

Q

Can you kind of give us the context of what that

18 conversation between — and, of course, that would be otherwise
19 frivolous conversation, but if you choose, would you like to
20 share with the Court what the context of that conversation was?
21

A

Yes, I indicated to you that I'd received this call

22 from Mr. Staker and the — I thought that this matter had been
23 stayed and that probation had been shifted to the Court during
24 the appeal.
25

Q

That was your understanding?
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1

A

That was my understanding.

2

Q

And you base that understanding on what?

3

A

Well, it was extensively argued. This specific

4 remedy was asked for with specificity and it had been granted.
5

Q

Okay. So you're saying that you had asked for that

6 remedy in your motion to stay, in your memorandum in support of
7 the motion to stay, correct?
8

A

Yes.
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9

Q

So that we're clear, the remedy that you had asked

10 for in those motions was that your probation be converted to
11 court probation pending the outcome of the appeal, correct?
12

A

Yes, and that the sentence of probation also be

13 stayed pending the appeal.
14

Q

Yes, correct. So after our conversation, did you

15 then return Mr. S taker's call and report to AP&P as he
16 indicated you should?
17

A

No, the advice of counsel was that that was

18 unnecessary, the matter had been stayed and that I had to
19 report to the Court. You also indicated that you were
20 concerned that I would — it was simply an effort to get
21 further information from me because the State had deliberately
22 not appeared and we were concerned that that was improper.
23

Q

I'm not — well — in any event, so is it safe to say

24 then that you're relying on the orders of the Court and that
25 your counsel was relying — well, first of all, who prepared
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1 the order that was ultimately signed by the Court?
2

A

On November 10th? I mean, November 4th?

3

Q

The certificate of probable cause?

4

A

Oh, I did.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

The Court signed — yeah, I think I did.
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7

Q Okay. So for the purposes of determining your

8 mindset on that day and maybe even today, what's your
9 understanding as to what your probation obligations are pending
10 the outcome of the appeal?
11

A My understanding was that the (inaudible) of

12 probation was stayed pending appeal and that I had to report
13 to --1 was on court probation and to clarify also that further
14 action with the State sort of ratified, seemed to be ratifying
15 their claim that they still were in charge.
16

Q But your belief of who you had to report to was whom?

17

A The Court.

18

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, I have no further

19 questions, but I'd like to confer with my client.
20

THE COURT: That's fine.

21

MR. BENNETT: No further questions.

22

THE COURT: Mr. Baer.

23

MR. BAER: Just a moment, please.

24

THE COURT: Okay.

25

MR. BAER: No questions, your Honor. I have no
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1 questions of this witness.
2

THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down.

3

THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Any other witnesses that are going to be

5 called by the defense?
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6

MR. BENNETT: No, your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Do the parties wish to be heard on

8 argument?
9

MR. BAER: Yeah, I think we do.

10

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Baer.

11

MR. BAER: Thank you very much. And I'd like to

12 reserve a little bit of my argument for rebuttal, but as far as
13 the gravamen, the central theme and thrust and point of this is
14 very clear. Mr. Johnson is — has been convicted of a felony
15 in this case. He is the probationer. Mr. Staker is not the
16 probationer. Court is not the probationer. The State is not
17 the probationer. Mr. Bennett is not the probationer. The
18 Court and certainly this defendant is well aware of the
19 obligations of any probationer in this case.
20

Mr. Staker has testified that he told him he had to

21 report. He had to report regularly. He indicated that he had
22 to keep in contact with him, give him information if he changed
23 his residence. He didn't do that. He didn't give him the new
24 telephone number. He didn't come into his office. Mr,
25 Johnson's creation of documents do not go to the central
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1 obligation of a probationer to report to his probation officer.
2

What's pretty clear from this is Mr. Johnson is

3 attempting to play off this Court against the AP&P department,
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4 and/or vice versa and cover that by essentially irrelevant
5 testimony about whether he had any emails to his counsel or
6 not. Actually what happened is what the Court should center
7 its attention on. And what happened is this individual was
8 convicted in July of 2007 of a securities fraud.
9

He has distinct and clear obligations as all

10 probationers do to report to his officer, to let the officer
11 know when he changes his address, to let the officer know if he
12 has a new telephone number, if his old telephone number changes
13 and to regularly report. And the unrefuted testimony, in fact,
14 the admission by the defendant is that he didn't report to
15 Mr. Staker or at least that he was aware that he had to report.
16 That was his first point, but there's no evidence in front of
17 this Court that he actually did report.
18

Instead he has an amorphous obligation in his mind

19 that he has to report to the Court. If you take a look in any
20 of those orders that the Court signed, nowhere in there does it
21 negate his obligation to report to AP&P. It doesn't say here
22 oh just report to the Court but never mind reporting to AP&P.
23 It doesn't do that. It asked him to continue to report on a
24 regular basis to the Court. And I think the Court — by the
25 way, I would ask that the Court take judicial notice of its own
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1 record. There's no point in asking the defendant. I think the
2 Court can know whether he reported on a regular basis each
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3 month on the 15th.
4

The Court--

5

MR. BENNETT: Objection, your Honor. That is not

6 evidence that is properly admitted during the taking of
7 evidence in this. It's introduction of evidence (inaudible).
8

MR. BAER: Well, he introduced, defense counsel

9 introduced or attempted to introduce a certificate of probable
10 cause. The Court takes judicial notice of its own pleading.
11 So it's now been taken judicial notice in this proceeding and,
12 therefore, the content of it is before the Court.
13

THE COURT: The content is before the Court. Whether

14 he reported or not is the form of the objection. Counsel,
15 that's not going to be the basis for my decision, but I do
16 understand your point.
17

MR. BAER: Yeah, the argument, other than putting the

18 Court or the clerk on the stand or maybe your computer, I'm not
19 sure what other basis — what other avenue we could use to get
20 to that point, but it's the point and I appreciate the Court
21 notes that.
22

It's a relatively simple matter — despite the

23 State's position, it's a relatively simple matter despite the
24 defendant's attempts here to muddy the v/aters and to make them
25 more difficult. He is a felon. As a felon he is a

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
35

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 probationer. As a probationer he has a probation officer. He,
2 like every other probationer, has a myriad of obligations both
3 to this Court, to the Adult Probation and Parole, and, in fact,
4 to society at large.
5

Society at large has reasonable expectation that this

6 probationer like any probationer doesn't play games with the
7 Court and doesn't play games with AP&P, but he reports as he
8 should be reasonably and has been reasonably requested and
9 ordered to do both by this Court and by his AP&P officer. And
10 he just didn't do it. And he didn't report a change in
11 residence and he didn't report that his phone had been changed.
12 Again, we believe he's played off the Court against AP&P
13 perhaps and vice vera, but despite all that at the end of the
14 day he didn't do what he was asked to do.
15

And the final point would be this. And please

16 correct me if I'm missing something because Lord knows it's
17 confusing enough, but the documents that the Court took
18 judicial notice of, the certificate of probable cause and order
19 of release, is dated November 4th. That's the stamp on that
20 document, and it was signed by this Court on November 3rd.
21 Mr. Staker's testimony was about October. Now, that's before
22 this order. So either he did or he didn't report in October.
23 Either he did or didn't turn over the information or report the
24 information to Mr. Staker that he was supposed to.
25

This November 4th, even if it were effective or the
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1 Court could find in some way that it effected the intent or the
2 knowledge of this defendant, it's certainly not retroactive to
3 October. And on that basis alone I think the Court can find
4 this defendant in violation of the affidavit signed
5 October 25th, 2010. Thank you.
6

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baer. Mr. Bennett.

7

MR. BENNETT: The truth is we probably could have,

8 and this is the fault of the attorney, we probably could have
9 stipulated to some facts and made this a legal —
10

THE COURT: I think maybe, but we didn't do that.

11

MR. BENNETT: Anyhow, that's what we're doing now.

12 Everything that Mr. Baer said I really take no issue with
13 except that he doesn't address, and I think the State has to in
14 order to make its argument, intentionally just ignore the fact
15 that that certificate of probable cause in Subparagraph d, and
16 I turned mine in as Exhibit 1 so I don't have it before me, but
17 it clearly states that Mr. Johnson is to, upon his release,
18 report to the Court on the 15th of each month. I'm not
19 reading, but that's just what it says.
20

That's the intervening cause here. Forget about —

21 well, Judge Eyre's revocation and reinstatement of probation
22 was stayed. The Court previously ruled that nonetheless the
23 filing of the original cause tolled out through at least
24 December, and that's the only reason Mr. Johnson really has to
25 respond to this allegation today because according to the
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1 Court, the probation was tolled, but that doesn't change the
2 fact that the Court actually ordered Mr. Johnson's release,
3 signed a certificate of probable cause which stated, among
4 other things, and I think the relevant one is that he only had
5 to be — he reported to the Court. That then usurps the power
6 from Adult Probation and Parole.
7

Therefore, it means Mr. Johnson isn't required — I

8 understand Mr. Staker, I questioned him and I have no reason to
9 not take him at his word. He wasn't aware. He thought that
10 Mr. Johnson, and he was telling Mr. Johnson you've got to
11 comply, you've got to comply and, of course, in his mind he
12 felt that he did, but that's because he wasn't aware of the
13 certificate of probable cause which directs Mr. Johnson to
14 report to the Court. I think it really is just that simple.
15

Mr. Baer did make one valid point a point that I

16 considered previously and that's that the order is dated
17 November 3rd, Well, that's simple. Nunc pro tunc ~ orders
18 are nunc pro tunc back to the day that they are actually
19 ordered in court, that's the effective date of the order. This
20 hearing that we held was September.
21

MR. BAER: October 13 th.

22

MR. BENNETT: October 13th. That's the date that's

23 relevant. So the fact that the Court didn't actually stamp or
24 sign the order until November 3rd becomes irrelevant. I'd
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25 just like to — and I think I made my point, but quoting, your
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1 Honor, from State versus Hodges, which is actually quoting
2 numerous other cases, in fact, it's an analysis of State v
3 Bonza (phonetic) and United States Supreme Court case Bearden
4 (phonetic) versus Georgia. It simply states that consistent
5 with Utah law and with Bearden we hold that, as a general rule,
6 in order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition
7 of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation
8 must be willful or if not willful, must presently threaten
9 safety of society.
10

It can't be said then that Mr. Johnson willfully

11 violated probation when he's relying on a probable cause
12 certificate saying that he's to report to the court in lieu of
13 reporting to AP&P. That was the opinion his counsel gave. I
14 stand by that legal analysis as good legal analysis and as good
15 legal advice. Even if the Court were to then say, and the
16 memorandum of decision, and I think we'll ask the Court to
17 clear this up, may have revoked the stay and may have actually
18 ordered Mr. Johnson back on the original terms of probation, I
19 don't believe it does, but that may be argument for another
20 day. Even if the Court were to decide that, that order was
21 issued in January so we can't then say Mr. Johnson should have
22 known that we were going to change our mind about the probable
23 cause certificate andDigitized
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24

What's relevant is was Mr. Johnson — did he do

25 anything that willfully violated probation? He did not. One,
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1 he actually did exactly what the Court told him to do, reported
2 to the court on the 15th of each month. And two, even if
3 that ultimately turns out not to have been the right way to
4 handle it, he was reasonable in relying on that and, therefore,
5 it can't be said to be a willful violation.
6

THE COURT: Mr. Baer.

7

MR. BAER: Just quickly, your Honor. The Court well

8 knows standard here is lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.
9 And the State believes its proved its burden of proof to the
10 level necessary today. There are burdens on this defendant.
11 Wilfulness, like intent, and I'm sure the Court has seen
12 hundreds if not thousands of instructions to that effect, are
13 not always — are not always — you cannot always find them
14 intentional like I willfully decide not to call the Court, I
15 willfully. You have to take the circumstances in total and
16 look at those total circumstances to make that determination of
17 willfulness or intent.
18

I think it's very clear from what's gone on here that

19 this was an intentional act by the defendant not to comply with
20 his orders of this Court and/or Adult Probation and Parole.
21 He, in fact, did not do those things in the allegation. The
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22 allegation is before this order whether the order is nunc pro
23 tunc, his intent isn't nunc pro tunc, I mean, either he's
24 thinking that or he wasn't in real time. So I think the case
25 has been made that he didn't do what his obligation was. If
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1 you have to go to the letter of his own order, I'll just
2 redirect the Court to that order.
3

Nowhere in there does it say he has to stop reporting

4 to AP&P. Nowhere in there does it say that he's not under the
5 obligation of what he and any other probationer would have with
6 Adult Probation and Parole. And I think the Court — the State
7 has made its case regarding these particular allegations.
8 Again, just as we're attending to that first set and we'll
9 obviously get to the other ones later.
10

We ask that the Court find him in violation at this

11 time.
12

THE COURT: Thank you. Very interesting case. Very

13 interesting issues. I need to indicate upfront that my initial
14 impression is that there's plenty of questions about what Mr.
15 Johnson may have been thinlcing at any given time when we talk
16 about October 13th. There's a certain amount of known facts
17 on that day. If we look at November 4th, there are different
18 facts. In December there's different facts. January,
19 February, March different facts, but on November 13th we had
20 had a hearing and atDigitized
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21

I don't believe I ever ruled from the Bench that his

22 probation had terminated. I think that's an assumption that he
23 arrived at either on his own or with the help of counsel, but
24 having been contacted by probation and being told that he
25 needed to report, he then made the decision to walk the tight
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1 rope of not reporting and relying upon his belief that
2 probation may have been terminated by my oral statements from
3 the Bench.
4

In the order that was prepared based on those oral

5 statements it also does not say that he's relieved from
6 probation or that his probation is terminated. There was a
7 question regarding his probation and how long his probation
8 runs. And often times when faced with the perilous
9 consequences, people sometimes like to see how close to the
10 edge they can get. Some people like to stay far away and be
11 more conservative.
12

I believe in my mind most conservative approach by

13 Mr. Johnson would simply have been to make a phone call on the
14 13th once he received his notice and to say I believe there's
15 a question as to whether or not probation has jurisdiction over
16 me or not. I believe the judge just released me from
17 jurisdiction of probation. If I'm wrong, I'll check with my
18 attorney, file the appropriate papers for clarification, but
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19 instead Mr. Johnson decided to go forward with his belief that
20 his probation had either terminated by act of time and along
21 the terms of its original creations, or he relied on advice to
22 believe that his probation may have terminated.
23

In either event subsequent to the 13th a

24 determination was made that his probation had not terminated
25 and it had nothing to do with this particular hearing or the

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
42

1 release that had been signed by me. It had more to do with the
2 tolling of the times for his probation. So I'm concerned that
3 Mr. Johnson relied upon his belief or understanding and thereby
4 took no action to respond to probation instead of at least
5 broaching the subject with probation as I believe would have
6 been reasonable under the circumstances and to say I know you
7 want me to report, I'm not certain that I need to report,
8 however, I don't want to be in trouble with you or with the
9 Court. He didn't choose to go that direction. That may or may
10 not be the determining factor in my decision, but it is one of
11 the determining factors.
12

There's a little more fault to go around because this

13 whole issue may not have come up but for a motion that was
14 filed and not responded to and a hearing where nobody appeared
15 and the Court entered an order that may have created confusion
16 and that, I think, creates the argument that defense is relying
17 upon that wouldn't be
herebybut
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circumstances.
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18

It was interesting in the closing arguments that Mr.

19 Bennett argued that the Court should not consider evidence of
20 whether Mr. Johnson reported to the Court by the 15th of each
21 month under the terms of court probation, but then in his
22 closing argument he indicated that Mr. Johnson met those terms
23 and met with the Court on the 15th of each month. And I have
24 to tell you from the Court's own knowledge, I'll take judicial
25 notice of the fact, that I have not laid eyes on Mr. Johnson
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1 since our October meeting. And I do not know that he's
2 reported on the 15th of each month even under that order.
3 That's not before the Court. I haven't issued a Sua sponte
4 order to show cause on those issues.
5

My point is that I believe both sides are doing a

6 fair job of trying to present their case. In the end I do find
7 that Mr. Johnson was under the jurisdiction of probation, Adult
8 Probation and Parole. He was still controlled by the terms and
9 conditions of his probation agreement and that he willingly
10 violated that by not reporting notwithstanding that he was
11 confused or that he was relying on his own beliefs or the
12 beliefs that had been given to him by others.
13

Having said all of that, this is not a probation

14 violation whose consequences I'm going to determine today. I'm
15 going to enter the finding that he has violated. My
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16 anticipation is that we're going to come back for further
17 discussions about sentence or — I don't know mean sentence,
1.8 excuse me, sanctioning for these probation violations. We'll
19 come back on another day and we will pursue other issues
20 regarding the now outstanding order to show cause. And I've
21 been told, we've all heard, that there may be yet another that
22 may be filed.
23

So I think what's imperative today is I am finding

24 that there was a violation. I'm going to reserve for a later
25 date the opportunity to determine what the appropriate sanction
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1 would be. And we need to set a date for that hearing which
2 will be a combination of any orders to show cause that are
3 filed more than 20 days prior to that hearing. So if there is
4 an order to show cause now that we know about, we're setting
5 that. We're going to review the sanctions on this one. There
6 may be another order to show cause filed between now and then,
7 but I'm not going to allow any additional orders to show cause
8 to be piled on to that date unless they are filed at least 20
9 days prior to that date so that counsel has a chance to review
10 and understand — no, I can't even do that because we have to
11 do the admit or deny. So at this point nothing else will be
12 scheduled. We will schedule only the one that has been denied
13 and the sanctions on this hearing.
14
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15 through the admit and deny, we can add those to it, but I can't
16 bypass the admit or deny stage.
17

MR. BAER: Your Honor, we do have another one here

18 today because it's based —.as I mentioned before, there are
19 allegations of violations since his release from federal
20 custody so we could present those to the Court, enter denials,
21 we'll hear those at the same time that we hear the March
22 allegations and that way we have the November done. We just do
23 the March and today's and there will be no more filed,
24 particularly if we can get this hearing set fairly
25 expeditiously.
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1

THE COURT: Well, at this point if you want to file

2 something, file it. If Mr. Bennett wants to admit or deny, he
3 can on behalf of his client, but I'm not going to press him to
4 make that decision at this moment.
5

MR. BENNETT: The allegations that he hasn't reported

6 since he was released on April 20th?
7

MR. BAER: Yeah.

8

THE COURT: I'm only responding to what I've heard.

9 You certainly can review those allegations and in an
10 appropriate timeframe respond to them, but at this point I'm
11 just indicating that if we have appropriate pleadings,
12 admissions and denials, then when we come back, we can hear
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13 them. And if there's not enough time, we won't hear them so
14 we'll deal with it when the time comes.
15

Right now I need to know when our available date is.

16 We're going to have an evidentiary hearing similar to this one
17 so I'm assuming it will be done in an hour or less. Is that
18 fair?
19

MR. BAER: It should be quicker than today because we

20 now have the blue print and we knowr where we're headed.
21

THE COURT: Okay.

22

MR. BAER: And I suppose the only thing that would

23 add a little time to it is if we add the new allegations. The
24 State would also ask that the Court add what the Court declined
25 to do. It's sua-sponte request is information as to whether or
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1 not this individual reported to the Court. If he makes that
2 representation, let's have that at issue at our next hearing.
3

THE COURT: And the Court will determine. That's why

4 they call it Sua sponte. So at this time we have one hearing
5 with a sanctions attached to it that we're scheduled for. When
6 is my next available date?
7

MR. BENNETT: Which is joint with the evidentiary

8 hearing on the denials that were entered today.
9

THE COURT: I'm sorry. That's what I meant to say,

10 yes.
11

MR. BAER: Digitized
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12 to be in trial.
13

THE CLERK: (Inaudible).

14

THE COURT: You could do the 17th. What we have on

15 May 17th and 18th went off so we've now scheduled for the
16 17th a morning calendar in Juab, but I could come here for an
17 afternoon calendar.
18

THE CLERK: (Inaudible).

19

MR. BAER: The afternoon actually works better. I

20 have a final pretrial for that trial in the morning and then I
21 could come straight from court.
22

THE COURT: Well, let me see what Mr. Bennett's

23 calendar indicates.
24

MR. BENNETT: I'm available May 17th, the

25 afternoon, your Honor, but I just remind the Court what I've
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1 already stated, and maybe the Court is taking this into
2 consideration, and that is the motions for new trial that would
3 directly affect the evidentiary hearing on that day.
4

THE COURT: It would affect all but two of the items.

5 Would you like to proceed on those two if the decision hasn't
6 been made on die motions? The other option, Counsel, let me
7 give counsel another option because you have a desire to wait
8 until that decision comes out.
9

MR. BENNETT: Sure.
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10

THE COURT: As a practical matter you may or may not

11 choose to wait for that decision, but clearly I'm not going to
12 address issues that are pending in motion in the other court so
13 let me ask counsel this. I can simply set a date further out
14 giving the Court, that is considering the motion, plenty of
15 time. And then if and when a ruling is made on that motion,
16 you could contact the Court and we could move it up.
17

MR. BAER: No, I think we should address the

18 remaining allegation to one and two that are separate and
19 distinct from the convictions. However, I would appreciate at
20 least the opportunity to brief the Court on that issue if we
21 find otherwise.
22

THE COURT: I understand that and that would be fine.

23

MR. BAER: Okay.

24

THE COURT: Let's go with the 17th. I'm coming

25 from Juab. I believe we're doing prelims in the morning.
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1 Let's do it at 2:00 just so I'm sure I can be here.
2

MR. BENNETT: That's May 17th?

3

THE COURT: May 17th at 2:00. And just so we're

4 clear on the record, evidentiary hearing on the order to show
5 cause that was just recently filed at the end of March and
6 determination of sanctions on the hearing that we had today.
7

MR. BAER: Judge, I guess we should probably then

8 have an admit/denyDigitized
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9 don't choose to admit or deny today, right, so we know where
10 we're headed?
11

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, may I approach the Bench

12 with the new —
13

THE COURT: Give it to my clerk. That will be fine.

14 I believe counsel has the right to review those with his client
15 before he has to submit an admit or deny. I'm not going to put
16 him on the spot at this moment at the Bench, although I can
17 indicate a timeframe for him to enter an admit or deny then we
18 can address those issues.
19

MR. BAER: Sure. No, I'm suggesting (inaudible.) If

20 he doesn't respond to the Court with a denial, whatever is
21 convenient for the Court or sufficient for the defendant, we'll
22 just add that admit deny.
23

THE COURT: I'll add it as an admit deny in May.

24

MR. BAER: If we don't — if he chooses not to do

25 that in sometime, then (inaudible.)
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1

THE COURT: That's fine. Then let's put that as the

2 third item on the calendar.
3

I'm sorry. Have I confused you completely? Oh, for

4 purposes of the computer it will be evidentiary/sanctions.
5 That would be fine.
6

Mr. Bennett.
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7

MR. BENNETT: Yes.

8

THE COURT: On that date if it hasn't occurred prior

9 to that time, I'm going to ask that your client respond to the
10 allegations on the affidavit and order to show cause that are
11 being filed today.
12

MR. BENNETT: That's what I would anticipate. Your

13 Honor, I think I know the answer Mr. Johnson's request, and I
14 don't think it's an unreasonable request, based on this Court's
15 ruling then it's now Mr. Johnson's understanding that from this
16 point forward he is to report and abide by the terms of the
17 Adult Probation and Parole probationary terms, not the probable
18 cause certificate probationary terms, correct.
19

THE COURT: That's my understanding?

20

MR. BENNETT: Okay.

21

THE COURT: And just to clarify. I understand there

22 was a question at one time as to whether or not he was under
23 Adult Probation and Parole jurisdiction because of the running
24 of time, not addressing the tolling of time, and things of that
25 nature. I don't know that I have ever intended to give anybody
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
50

1 an indication other than that at this time he's under Adult
2 Probation and Parole jurisdiction.
3

MR. BENNETT: Thank you.

4

THE COURT: So if there was confusion, I'm taking

5 this opportunity to clear
it by
up.the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6

MR. BENNETT: There's kind of the parallel question

7 and that's did the Court's memorandum of decision then overrule
8 the motion to stay — well, I think we know the answer to that
9 too, but the motion to stay sentence pending appeal? The
10 answer to that I'm assuming is no. That's a separate, that's a
11 separate parallel, similar to parallel matter, right? I
12 mean —
13

THE COURT: I would suggest that you read through my

14 decision because I'm happy to answer the question. I just
15 don't want to rehash the same material two or three times and
16 run the risk that it's understood one way one time and another
17 way another time. The decision really speaks for itself, but
18 if you're asking me my current recollection of what I ruled on
19 that date, my recollection is that I have issued a stay on his
20 jail term and the imposition of the sanction that was issued by
21 Judge Eyre pending an appeal and outcome, but I have not
22 terminated his probation. That's my understanding.
23

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And, your Honor, I believe in

24 our current PV going before the Court we're asking for a
25 warrant. Perhaps now would be an appropriate time to look at

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 whether or not it would be appropriate to issue a warrant and
2 take Mr. Johnson in custody or if just issue the order to show
3 cause —
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4

THE COURT: I'll be glad to address that question.

5 Is the State requesting a decision on that?
6

MR. BAER: Yes, I think it's appropriate.

7

THE COURT: Very well. I now have a commitment from

8 Mr. Johnson's attorney that they are going to respond to those
9 allegations that were just filed today by the 17th of
10 November. He is represented by counsel. I'm not going to
i 1 authorize a warrant on this order to show cause, but we will
12 have a response by May 17th.
13

MR. BAER: Good.

14

THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, did you have anything

15 further?
16

MR. BENNETT: I do, but I don't want to try the

17 Court's patience. The Court's memorandum of decision indicated
18 that probation was tolled at least through December 17th. It
19 intentionally does not address whether it was tolled beyond
20 that.
21

THE COURT: Well, and that's because I don't have a

22 crystal ball and I don't know to what extent other probation
23 violations may be alleged and what affect they would have. As
24 was indicated, I think, in my memorandum of decision, that upon
25 the filing of an order to show cause sim^>lv the filina of the
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 order to show cause tolls the probationary period. Now, if you
2 put that into effect on
Mr. Johnson's
let's say,
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3 October 13th or even before when Judge Eyre was considering the
4 one that was filed last spring or last summer, you can count up
5 the days and you can add those up and see if there was ever a
6 time period. I don't believe there has been a time period
7 since Judge Eyre issued his order when there wasn't some level
8 of tolling that was being considered.
9

Now, maybe from the time he ordered until the time he

10 was serving his sanctions in jail, maybe it tolled then. I
11 don't recall, but there was a tolling when it was filed last
12 spring and summer. This one we were dealing with was filed at
13 the end of October and we're just now dealing with it today so
14 it's arguable that it tolled from the end of October until
15 today. My decision said at least until December 17th because I
16 didn't know when this would be resolved, if it would be
17 resolved, anything else that might be filed and the effect it
18 might have.
19

I can't project how many different toliings might

20 come in on a certain case, but on this case I hope I've
21 clarified for you that it did not end with the tolling on
22 December 17th. It was at least until that time.
23

MR. BENNETT: Right. I understood the at least. So

24 at the very least the time between the October order to show
25 cause and this, that amount of time, Mr. Johnson is at least
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1 responsible to report to AP&P that amount of days starting
2 today?
3

THE COURT: If you want to look into the future, and

4 I'm not going to be held to establishing a deadline —
5

MR. BENNETT: Yeah. No, no, no. Right.

6

THE COURT: — or any early date for probation, but I

7 am going to indicate my understanding, and you can do the math,
8 that anytime an order to show cause issues until the order to
9 show cause is resolved, at the very least that period of time
10 is added on. It's not added on, but the time is tolled during
11 that period so the necessary effect is that the probationary
12 period extends out farther and farther.
13

Now, I won't go through the math. I won't give you a

14 date and I won't make you feel comfortable that as of June or
15 July or three years from August, I'm not going to do that, but
16 you can go through the math and calculate it. And if there is
17 a question, you can present it and I'll address that question,
18 but at this point I'm not going to do it today.
19

Counsel, I appreciate both of you being here and

20 responding. I need to move on. We do have other matters.
21

MR. BAER: Can I just ask one quick request with

22 that. Could the judge issue at least its order just clarify
23 what we're going to do on that next hearing or would you like
24 me to prepare one either way just so there's no —
25

THE COURT: If you would like to prepare one, send it
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
54

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 over to Mr. Bennett and Mr. Bennett will approve it as to form
2 or let you know why he doesn't. The other option is my clerk
3 can prepare a minute entry, but if you want it to be more
4 specific, you're welcome to prepare the order.
5

MR. BAER: So we don't have any confusion. And just

6 so it's clear on the record, I will include that, at least the
7 State's understanding currently if the Court will consider what
8 it would not consider Sua sponte today, whether or not there
9 was compliance then with the defendant's own order. Now, that
10 will be coming. He may not approve of that as to form, but
11 that will be one of the things the State is asking the Court to
12 consider at our next hearing,
13

THE COURT: You might indicate that you're requesting

14 it to be considered.
15

MR. BAER: Exactly.

16

THE COURT: But I'm not very comfortable having

17 parties indicate to me what I ought to be doing Sua sponte so.
18

MR. B AER: That's probably the wrong way to phrase

19 it.
20

THE COURT: Thank you.

21

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I ask a clarification

22 and I do this with ail due respect so I understand and it's on
23 the record. From this day forward I will contact — I'm to
24 contact my probation officer, Mr. Staker, and comply with the
25 probation that was in place.
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1

Have I understood you correctly?

2

THE COURT: I will answer it this way. I believe you

3 had that responsibility since you began that agreement and that
4 it has not terminated as of today.
5

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

6

THE COURT: And that it will continue for some future

7 time. I do not know how long.
8

THE DEFENDANT: And then I have a further question.

9 There was a stay. Is the Court today overruling the stay or is
10 the stay that was ordered still in place?
11

THE COURT: The stay was not addressing probation.

12 It was addressing the order of Judge Eyre and that included his
13 findings and his sentence, whatever that sentence was. It's on
14 appeal and I've stayed it.
15

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

16

MR. BAER: Thank you, your Honor.

17

MR. BENNETT: Thank you.

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19
20

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)
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4
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5 Reporter for the State of Utah, do certify that the foregoing
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8
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9 transcription of the said proceedings;
10
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COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK
OF THE DISTRICT COURT

MAY 1 6 2011
MILLARD COUNTY
CLERK
/foFoEPUTY
MARK BAER, Bar No. 5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0197
Facsimile: (801) 366-0268
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 051700056
Judge James Brady

A hearing was held on April 27, 2011 in the above cited matter. The defendant,
defendant's counsel, counsel for the State and the defendant's probation officer were in
attendance. Based upon testimony received, representations of the parties, and good
cause appearing, this Court hereby Orders as follows:
1. Defendant Jamis M. Johnson is found to be in violation of his conditions of
probation as memorialized in the November 2010 affidavit of defendant's probation
officer, Troy Staker. The defendant will be sentenced on this finding of violation on May
17, 2011 at 2pm.
2. The defendant Jamis M. Johnson further entered denials to allegations
contained in the March 2011 affidavit of probation officer Troy Staker. The Court will
hear evidence concerning this affidavit alleging a probation violation on May 17, 2011 at
2pm.
3. Adult probation officer Troy Staker filed an additional Probation/Violation
Report and affidavit on April 27, 2011. The Court will receive defendant's admit or deny
responses to the allegations in this affidavit on May 17, 201
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4. Other (per the Court): H/lo^

SO ORDERED this j i day of

,2011

i^VS
mes Brady
istrict Court Judge

Tate Bennett
Attorney for defendant Johnson
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J hereby certify that on this _/4_ day of ¥H(LUL , 2011,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated below upon the
following:

fcttj -J^L^A,

Tate Bennett, Esq.
P.O Box 272
Fillmore, Utah 84631
Fax No. (888)743-4102
MarkBaer
Office of the Attorney General
IOU catii ouu ouuui o

nuui

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax No. (801)366-0268

n^P^—
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STATE OF UTAH

A/v^-
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)
) CASE NO. 051700056

JAMIS M. JOHNSON

)

Defendant.

)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES BRADY

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - FILLMORE
765 S. HIGHWAY 99, SUITE 6
FILLMORE, UTAH
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A P P E A R A N C E

S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
MARK W. BAER

Deputy Millard County Attorney
765 South Highway 99
Fillmore, Utah 84631

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
TATE W. BENNETT
Millard County Public Defenders
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

Thank you.

P l e a s e b e seated,

3

W e ' r e h e r e t o d a y o n two d i f f e r e n t

4

Jamis M. J o h n s o n , Case N o . 0 5 1 7 0 0 0 5 6 .

5

an a l l e g a t i o n of p r o b a t i o n v i o l a t i o n w h i c h w a s d e n i e d

6

M r . D o t s o n a n d is set for an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g t o d a y .

7

t o d a y is t h e sentencing b a s e d on an e a r l i e r finding

8

probation violation. • ' •

9
10
11

items.

gentlemen.

S t a t e of U t a h v e r s u s

T o d a y w e are to

address
by
Also

of

A r e b o t h p a r t i e s ready to p r o c e e d ?
I

M R . BAER:

S t a t e is ready, y o u r H o n o r .

Mark Baer

for

the S t a t e .

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BENNETT:

Thank you, Mr. Bear.
Tate Bennett

for the d e f e n s e .

Your

14

H o n o r , m a y I address the issue of the e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g

15

briefly?

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BENNETT:

issue

You may.
Last time w e w e r e h e r e w h e n

we

18

d i s c u s s e d a n issue of w h e t h e r or not it w a s a p p r o p r i a t e for M r .

19

J o h n s o n to e v e n enter a n a d m i s s i o n or d e n i a l to.new

allegations

20 I which are allegations that he'd been convicted of a crime in
21

federal c o u r t in v i o l a t i o n of a term of h i s p r o b a t i o n ,

22

indicated to the Court at that time that there was a motion for

23

new trial, another potentially dispositive motion pending

24

that case.

25

we

T h e Court i n d i c a t e d at that time that it w o u l d
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be

1

hesitant to hold a n evidentiary hearing o r make

2

s u b s e q u e n t t o a n e v i d e n t i a r y r u l i n g if that w a s , i n fact, t h e

3

case.

4

a n e w trial d o e s e x i s t , it is p e n d i n g a n d s o i s i t , i n fact,

—*

I

W--.W*

findings

S o a s a p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r that m o t i o n t o -- m o t i o n f o r

w.--. w

www«..*_w

w

^-U.J.V-.N-.«L*»^-I.VW/<J.J.

v- W

3V-'

A.WJ.KVUJ.U

KVJ.U1X

UX1U.

(—

^/UJ. U

\-J J-

6. j t o d a y ' s h e a r i n g ?
7

THE COURT:

Mr. Bennett, I'm going to ask you to

8

remind me your recollection of what it is I said because I

9

b e l i e v e that at that time w e h a d a l l e g a t i o n s .

There was a

10 . q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r h e w a n t e d t o admit o r d e n y .
11

MR. BENNETT:

12

THE COURT:

Correct.
You indicated there was a matter -- that

13

a l t h o u g h there w a s a c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e w e r e m o t i o n s p e n d i n g i n

14

t h e federal c a s e .

15

r e g a r d i n g t h e federal c a s e .

16

believe, evidence of the conviction other than verbal

I h a d n o t h i n g i n front o f m e at that time
I didn't even have, I don't

17 • c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d v e r b a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that t h e r e w e r e some
18

matters pending.

19
20

D i d w e n o t p r o c e e d at that p o i n t t o e n t e r a denial
f o r him?

21

MR. BENNETT:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BENNETT:

W e did.

W e did.

Okay.
A n d for t h o s e r e a s o n s , b u t i n the

24

interim, though, assuming the Court has verified that there is,

25

in fact,
a motion, there are motions pending in the federal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

court which would then serve -- if I understood the Court's

2

position correctly would then serve as a precursor, that they

3

would have to be resolved prior to this evidentiary hearing

4

which of course they haven't.

5 •

THE COURT:

I may have misread the Court.'

And "^erha^s I wasn' t V6r v clear in my

6 J thinking at that time or in my expressions.

I would hesitate

7

to proceed on anything based on verbal representations that

8

there were either convictions or that there were matters

9

pending.

And today in response to a comment you've just made,

10

Mr. Bennett, the Court has done nothing to research whether or

11

not there are any orders or any motions pending in the federal

12

court.

13

kind of information rather than have me do that research.

I'm anticipating the parties will fill me in on that

14

MR. BENNETT:

15

THE COURT:

Okay.
So I don't have any firsthand knowledge

16

of anything other than I did receive a document that appears to

17

have been filed just today and I'm --well, I'm in -- excuse

18

me.

19

but I don't k n o w that it's p e r t i n e n t to t o d a y ' s h e a r i n g .

20

w a s an a p p e a l b y M r . J o h n s o n that h e filed p r o se.

21

document that is recorded as of yesterday and in that document

22

I do have attached to that a verdict form from the federal

23

district court indicating various findings and indictment and

24

other documents relating to the federal court.

25

That's not true.

There was a document filed just today,

aware
ofLawthat
because
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That

I have a

it was filed

6

1

with me.

I'm not aware of any other information.

And when I

2

say I hesitate to go forward, I don't think it was that I would

3

hesitate to go forward because in another matter there may be

4

other proceedings, but I would not want to go forward without

5 I some evidence of what those were or what their status was.

So

6 [ I am prepared for both sides to go forward today on this
7

probation violation allegation.

8
9

MR. BENNETT:

Okay.

Then the follow-up question is

does the Court want the parties to actually present evidence,

10 ! for example, be it testimony or just proffer?
11
12

THE COURT:

Have you received a copy of the State's

hearing and sentencing memorandum?

13

MR. BENNETT:

I did.

It was in my email this

14

morning.

15

actually being - - w e haven't reviewed it.

16

had time to go over it so I object to the Court actually

17

considering that in determining because there is two parts to

18

this hearing the sentencing so I object to the —

19

need time to be able to prepare and respond to that memorandum.

20 I

I can see it was sent yesterday.

THE COURT:

I object to that
Obviously I haven't

or at least

Well, let me tell you what I guess I need

21

more information from you on then, Mr. Bennett.

22

this, there's a couple of items that they've attached with

23

regard to restitution that you dispute, the calculation of the

24

amounts or the payment or nonpayment, but when it comes to a

25

document
that
presented
toClark
meLawthat
comes from -Digitized
by the they've
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
School, BYU.
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As I look at

7

1

purports to come from the federal district court and it does

2

have the federal district court stamp on it and it does

3

reference a trial which I assume your client was present for,

4

what is there that you would need to prepare for that would

5

preclude me from simply taking judicial notice of the fact that

6 I there are (inaudible).
7

MR. BENNETT:

Well, I'm only saying we need some time

8

to respond to the sentencing.

9

verdict, I don't need time to respond to that.

10

itself.

The fact that there's a jury
It speaks for

Am I clear there --

11

THE COURT:

You were asking me if I wanted evidence

12

or proffer and I was going to indicate that we do have some

13

items that I think could be proffered or I could take judicial

14

notice of, and that may resolve at least part of what those new

15

allegations are.

Is that correct?

16-

MR. BENNETT:

17

THE COURT:

18

Absolutely.
Okay.

So as to that aspect we're not

in -- you don't have a request for additional time to respond?

19 I

MR. BENNETT:

No, no, no, no.

Absolutely not.

That

20 I verdict form is something or the conviction is something that
21

Mr. Staker actually provided, although it wasn't a certified

22

copy.

23

the verdict form at least ten days ago so I have no objection

24

to that.

25

I don't know that it matters, he provided me a copy with

THE COURT:

Okay.
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1
2

MR. BENNETT:

Just the sentencing memorandum itself

which I haven't even had time to review.

3

THE COURT:

And the truth is I don't know that I

4

asked either side to give me a memorandum for sentencing.

I

5

think that I simply stayed my decision until after this hearing

6 J was held and it's not -- it's not my custom to take the
7

evidence and then ask the parties to brief what their

8

recommendations are for my decision with regard to any type of

9

sentence.

It's really not a sentence.

10

. MR. BENNETT:

11

THE COURT:

It's a --

Sanction.
-- it's a sanction hearing.

And I

12

typically don't ask for briefs on sanctions, but I allow either

13

side to make any comment that they think I ought to take into

14

consideration.

15

Having addressed these issues, with you, Mr. Bennett,

16

the Court is ready to proceed with an evidentiary hearing and I

17

do have some documents which I anticipate, Mr. Bear, you're

18

going to want the Court to take judicial notice of?

19

MR. BAER:

I will, your Honor, if I could -- just to

2 0 I back up just a moment.

Your first comments were that we were

21

here on two matters.

I think we're here on three matters

22

actually.

23

evidentiary hearing which is on the federal convictions, and

24

then the third one is an admit deny on the probation violation

25

report Digitized
that bywthe
as
filed
last
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r iSchool,
n g . BYU.
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W. Hunterat
Law the
Library, J.
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1

THE COURT:

2

copy of that report?

3

admit or deny?

4
5

Okay.

And has Mr. Johnson received a

Is he in a position today that he could

Do you know?

MR. BENNETT:

I can just enter a denial on his

behalf, your Honor.

6 J

THE COURT:

7

MR. BAER:

Okay.
So that would take care of No. 3. on your

8

last order so we're down to the last two points.

9

your Honor, then I can address the next point which was we did

10

bring a certified copy of that verdict, if I may approach, and

11

we would ask the Court to take judicial notice of that .

12

certified copy.

13

THE COURT:

And, yes,

Just so we're clear on the record, I've

14

just received Mr. Bennett's general denial on the admit deny on

15

the new allegations and we'll set a hearing date for that.

16

that correct?

17

MR. BENNETT:

18

THE COURT:

19

That's correct.

On the sanctions to be imposed for the

hearing that was held in April, that has not occurred at this

2 0 | point and we are now proceeding with what will be the
21

evidentiary portion of the hearing scheduled today on an

22

evidentiary hearing.

23

MR. BAER:

24

THE COURT:

25

Is

MR. B A E R :

That's correct, your Honor.
Very well.
If I might a p p r o a c h , y o u r
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. BAER:

Please.
This is a certified copy.

The State would

3

ask that be accepted by the Court as our sole exhibit for the

4

purposes of the evidentiary hearing for today's allegations,

5 J the allegations that are being held, substantive hearing on
6

them --

7

THE COURT:

I'll note I just received a certified .

8

copy of the verdict form from the District Court Central

9

Division in the federal court here in Salt Lake City

10

identifying Jamis Melwood Johnson as the defendant and the

11

United States of America as the plaintiff.

12

through this, it appears that we have 3 8 counts and they appear

13

to be sequential.

14

being presented to show me 38 guilty verdicts with regard to

15

Mr. Johnson in the federal court case?

So am I to understand then that this is

16

MR. BAER:

17

THE COURT:

18

Counsel, as I read

That is correct, your Honor.
Very well.

It will be received for that

' purpose.

19

(An exhibit has been received into evidence but not

20 I

identified by number and cannot be entered in the

21

index.)

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Mr. Bennett, did you have any objections?

I was quick on the draw?
MR. BENNETT:

No objections, your Honor.

THE
Very
well.
It Law
will
Digitized
by the COURT:
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
School,be
BYU. received.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

1

Anything further, Mr. Bear?

2

MR. BAER:

I don't believe so, your Honor, not on

3

that particular issue unless the Court needs some elucidation.

4

I know the probation officer monitored that case being his

5 I probation officer, Mr. Staker, who is present here today can
6

answer any questions of the Court.

I think the allegations

7

we're addressing from an evidentiary standpoint today regard

8

those convictions.

9

convictions which speaks directly to that allegation.

We've entered certified copies now of those
And

10

unless the Court needs clarification, I think that evidence

11

speaks for itself on that issue.

12

THE COURT:

13

have -- I'm sorry.

14

the State rest?

Mr. Bennett, do you

Do you have any other evidence then?

15

MR. BAER:

16

THE COURT:

17

Thank you, Mr. Bear.

Does

The State rests on that allegation.
Thank you.

Mr. Bennett, do you have any

evidence that you want the Court to consider?

18

MR. BENNETT:' First -- and, yes, I will address that

19 I your Honor, but allegation five of the order to show cause for
20 I which v^e' re here for an evidentiary hearing states that Mr,
21

Johnson was convicted of mail fraud on or about June 2 7

of

22

2007.

23

evidence was offered that substantiates that allegation, I'm

24

going to ask that the Court dismiss allegation No. 5 from the

25

order to show cause.

As the State has just rested and I don't believe any

I'm referring to Mr. Staker's affidavit.
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Well, no, allegation five from the order to show cause.
THE COURT:

Give me just a moment.

I may have that

in my earlier files because I'm not finding it here.
you, counsel.

I have it.

Staker, March 22

Thank

This is the affidavit of Troy

, 2011, Paragraph 5 having committed or

having been convicted of the offense of mail fraud on or about
June 27 t , 2007, in violation of condition number 3 of the
probation agreement.
Is that what you're referring to?
•
Honor.

MR. BENNETT:

I don't believe -- I'm sorry, your

You indicated you're looking at the March 22

probation violation report, correct?
THE COURT:

That's correct.

MR. BENNETT:

And the order to show cause page 2

allegation No. 5.
THE COURT:

Is that not what I read?

By having

committed or having been convicted of the offense of mail
fraud, and then the section on or about June 27
MR. BENNETT:
THE COURT:

, 2007?

That's correct.
Okay, .

MR. BENNETT:

So I motion the Court to dismiss that

as the State hasn't even attempted to introduce evidence that
substantiates that allegation.
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:

Any response?
Yes, your Honor.

If you take a look at
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1

the copy of the -- now, the certified copy of the guilty

2

verdict form what's attached to it starting at page 11, you'll

3

see it corresponds to the Count 5, 6, 7, 8, all that is mail

4

fraud.

5

fraud 18 USCA, 1341, and that's what those counts were

6

referring to in that document.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BAER:

9

With respect to having committed, No. 5 here says mail

Beginning on page 11?
Yeah, I mean, actually if 'y°u look at

page 9, it says Counts 1 through 10 are mail fraud, and then it

10

spells out each one and names this particular defendant in

11

those - - i n each one of those federal Counts 5, 6, 7, 8 , 9 , and

12

10 so it's all mail fraud.

13

MR. BENNETT:

Your Honor, so that this makes sense,

14

Mr. Johnson was sentenced and placed on probation in this Court

15

in -- kind of just off the top of my head -- June of 2007.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BENNETT:

Right?
Count 1 indicates the date of the

18

occurrence would be March of 2 006.

19

3, April 2006.

20

Count 10.

21
22
23
24
25

,

Count 2, April 2 006.

Count

It's true of every count with the exception of

Indicates it's June 2 2 n d , 2007.

. THE COURT:

That doesn't happen often.

Excuse me,

folks.
Mr. Bennett, I see the dates you're referring to
ending with June 22nd of '07 before I interrupted you.
MR. BENNETT:

Okay.

So all a c t i o n s there
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1

occurred prior to Mr. Johnson being placed on probation can't

2

serve as the basis for a probation violation.

3

that doesn't resolve Count 10, 22 --,.— •

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BENNETT:

6

THE COURT:

7

Let me make it easy for you.
—

10 or 22.

Yeah, please.

No, I'm sorry.

Go ahead.

I shouldn't

cut you off. .

8
9

I understand

MR. BENNETT:

However, we brought today, your Honor,

a copy of the minute entry which was just actually obtained.

10

If you recall, I indicated I assumed the Court was going to do

11

it whereas in state court we use court exchange.

12

Pacer system for the federal court.

13

clearly that both Counts 10 and 22, among others, but only

14

dealing with 10 and 22, were dismissed.

15

prior to violation can't be deemed as the basis for a probation

16

violation nor can counts that were dismissed.

17

convicted of them.

18

'

There's the

The minute entry indicates

So actions occurring

He wasn't

They were dismissed.

The only two counts that even fit chronologically

19 I within the terms of his probation were 10 and 22 and the minute
20 ! entry that I'll present to the Court indicates that those were
21
22

dismissed.
MR. BAER:

Judge, I'd object to the entry of that

23

document in this hearing.

It's not certified.

24

where it came from.

25

can address it in a different way that may make it easier for

We don't have any notice of that, but I
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1

the Court, that the Court could look at that, but I don't think

2

it's -- and I'll object also on a relevancy basis and let me

3

tell you why.

4

timing of the convictions, but.he's going-off of the wrong date

Because counsel brings up the point about the

5 I because he's going off of the conviction date in this case
6

which happened in 2 007.

7

However, this case was filed in 2005 for allegations

8

of activities that happened back before 2005, so what's going

9

on here is that after the filing of the criminal Information in

10

this case, and at least some of the counts occurred during the

11

time period between when this case was filed and this case was

12

continued and some of them continued on past the date of

13

conviction in this case.

14

to the introduction of that document, we don't know the source

15

of it, we don't know the contents of it, it's not certified, we

16

maintain that the criminal activity occurred subsequent to the

17

filing of the criminal case in .this case and some of the

18

convictions occurred -- some of the criminal activity occurred

So beyond the fact that we'd object

19 I clearly after the convictions were entered in this case, some
20

of the criminal activity in the federal case, and I think it's

21

a distinction without a difference, the Court could find on one

22

or two as easily as it could find on six.

23

activities continued past both the filing and the conviction in

24

our case and that's the sui generis of our allegation here

25

today.

The criminal
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1
2

THE COURT:

Mr. Baer, let me ask you a question

directly if I can?

3

MR. BAER:

4

THE COURT:

Sure.
Take this away from our current set of

5 I facts because of the involvement that everybody has with their
6

own case, but just in generic sense, an individual commits a

7

crime.

8

then at trial he's convicted and he is sentenced and he's

9

placed on probation.

He has a two-year delay before he goes to trial and

Subsequent to being placed on probation

10

the Court finds out that he has committed other crimes in the

11

interim. .

12

Are those considered probation violations if the

13

person is not on probation at the time of their commission

14

regardless of when he gets convicted?

15

violation something where the probation has to be in existence,

16

right in place before the actions take place?

17

MR. BAER:

Isn't the probation

Correct, your Honor, and that would go to

18

the second point.

We don't know the general context of that

19

particular document that was just handed to us, but clearly

2 0 I some of the convictions happened for acts after the convictions
21

of the -- the federal convictions happened far after

22

convictions that were entered in this state case.

23

distinction that you're making is a good one, but at the end of

.24

the day one or two or ten, a violation is a violation, and I'd

25

ask that you find a violation based upon those.
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1

If we can -- it may warrant if the Court is not

2

anxious -- I understand why the Court may not be anxious to

3

enter violations on those earlier ones, if we just give leave,

4

if the Court feels if necessary for us to check those dates and

5 I cross check them to make sure we have - - t o make sure that the
6

numbers in this document just handed to us are consistent with

7

the numbers in the federal indictment and cross check with the

8

dates of occurrence, we'd be able to respond, I guess, a little

9

bit more accurately, but the bottom line is at least a couple

10 I of them have occurred clearly outside that critical timeframe.
11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me do this just so we're clear

12

on the record.

The State has rested its case.

There's a

13

motion to dismiss at least as to No. 5 and I'm going to deny

14

that motion because I believe there is evidence indicating at

15

least one, if not more, possible counts that would apply.

16

However, I think there are arguments to to be made.

17

concern is we're slipping into arguments on the motion to

And my

18 I dismiss which more appropriately ought to be placed on whether
19

or not there's a violation.

20

argument that I anticipate State will make on other violations.

21

And I don't want to preclude the

Counsel, I think that you've made a good argument as

22

to items that are alleged to have occurred prior to being

23

placed on probation, and you can elucidate me further at the

24

end of your presentation of evidence if you intend to, but if

25

you don't intend to present evidence, we can go into those
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1

arguments now.

2

MR. BENNETT:

No, we do.

That was just the evidence

3

as it related to just allegation five.

4

obviously to address any of the other allegations.

5

THE COURT:

That wasn't meant

And what I do note is that in my file

6

sentencing took place on June 6

, 2007.

That being the

7

case, I would be very hesitant to find any actions taken by the

8

defendant prior to June 6

9

but he was placed on probation on June 6

to be violations of probation,
.

In response to

10 J your motion I see that Count 10 does occur after June 6th and,
11

therefore, I'm going to deny your motion, but I'll allow you to

12

argue further at a later time.

13

Do you have other motions or would you like to

14

continue?

15

MR. BENNETT:

16

Well, you say it's -- you're looking at

Count 10?

17

THE COURT:

Yes.

Excuse me, Count.10 of the.

18

exhibit -- Count 10 on page 12 of the exhibit that was

19

presented

20

•

to m e b y the S t a t e .
MR. BENNETT:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BENNETT:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BENNETT:

25

THE COURT:

Oka'17.

If you look at page 9 -Yes.

Yes.

-- page 9 indicates these are mail fraud.
My apologies.
Y o u t u r n t h r o u g h e a c h p a g e then, has
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dates

1

of events.

All of these up through nine predate his conviction

2

here and his sentencing here, excuse me, predate his sentencing

3

here.

4

placed on probation..

Count 10 comes at least several weeks after he was

5 I

MR. BENNETT:

6

• ... MR. BAER:

7

THE COURT:

I understand.

And that would include No. 22 as well.
And as I said, there is at least a basis

8

for me to deny the motion on No. 10 alone and you can argue the

9

rest when we complete evidence.

10 J

MR. BENNETT:

Which then brings me to the exhibit

11 I that I move to introduce.
12

'

THE COURT:

13

MR. BAER:

14

If the Court could just note the State's

objections at this point.

15 I

THE COURT:

16

at this point.

17

objections better.

18

I note the State has made its objection

I'd like to see the exhibit so I understand the
Thank you.

.

I've been handed Defendant's Exhibit 2 which appears

19
1 r\

I'll be glad to consider the exhibit.

to be a printout from the Pacer Service Center.
!

rrv—mom +-

21

ar^

T
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Give me just a

t~ "h i a

If I understand the objection correctly, Mr. Baer, if

22

I misstate this, you correct me, you're indicating it's not a

23

certified court document.

24

concerned about the source and accuracy of the information.

25

that

You don't have foundation and you're

correct?
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MR. BAER:

That's correct, your Honor.

p r o p e r time to cross r e f e r e n c e the c o n t e n t , the
content of t h a t .

And

without

substantive

T h e r e are a lot of n u m b e r s b e i n g

bantered

around.

T h e o n l y c e r t i f i e d c o p y of a n y t h i n g h e r e is

verdict,

the federal v e r d i c t w h i c h h a s the n u m b e r s

the

clearly

d e l i n e a t e d o n it that the State is r e l y i n g u p o n .
THE COURT:
enlighten me on this.

I don't k n o w if e i t h e r of y o u
I do h a v e a c o n c e r n .

m o r e and m o r e o n c o m p u t e r i z e d p r i n t o u t s .

W e are

The C o u r t s

can
relying
are

e n c o u r a g i n g p e o p l e to file and u t i l i z e c o m p u t e r s y s t e m s .
n o w have a P a c e r service that is n a t i o n w i d e
and some of the state c o u r t s and I'm

for f e d e r a l

We
courts

handed a document which

v e r y s i m i l a r t o b e i n g h a n d e d a c o p y of a d o c k e t , a m i n u t e
out of some f i l e .

M y c o n c e r n is in p a r t

type of c e r t i f i c a t i o n that

it d o e s n ' t h a v e

entry
the

I w o u l d like to see it h a v e , b u t

thing that r e a l l y c o n c e r n s m e is if I f o l l o w e d this

the

document,

it's a d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n of the o t h e r d o c u m e n t t h a t

I'm

looking at u n l e s s e i t h e r of y o u c a n h e l p m e u n d e r s t a n d

how

these two a r e not

is

inconsistent.

I h a v e the v e r d i c t w h i c h s h o w s C o u n t s 1 t h r o u o h 3 8
b e i n g found g u i l t y , but I'm told that e v e n b e f o r e
at D e f e n d a n t ' s E x h i b i t N o . 2, I'm

--. if I l o o k

told that e v e n b e f o r e

the

closing a r g u m e n t s and b e f o r e it w a s g i v e n to the j u r y , a n u m b e r
of these w e r e d i s m i s s e d .

So I'm t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d w h y

w o u l d be g i v e n to m e -- I m e a n , h o w it c o u l d h a v e o c c u r r e d
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1

how I can try to understand these two interplay.

2

MR. BENNETT:

I don't know the answer, your Honor, so

3

I can just surmise here, but as this Court is well aware, often

4

times an Information filed at the state court will begin with

5 I Counts 1 through 5.

Via motions to suppress or some other

6

reason prior to trial the counts will be dismissed.

7

then refer to the counts at trial as Counts 1, 2 and 5 if 3 and

8

4 were dismissed.

9

don't know that's what happened, but that seems to be the

They renumber them Counts 1, 2, and 3.

10

reasonable response.

11

THE COURT:

12

They don't

I

Mr. Baer, would you like to be heard on

my question?

13

MR. BAER:. I wouldn't want to speculate at this

14

point, your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

Thank you.

As I look at this, Counsel, I

16

considered that same question, but I have in addition to the

17

verdict form, I have the indictment.

18

date and see if this is an amended indictment without saying

19 I it's amended.
n n

!

/ - ^ ^ ^ T - , f +-

<-. ^-<r

Maybe I better check the

The indictment I'm looking at has 3 8 counts.
-: f- f n

^wa-n^o.^

r-h « c-. A = +- ^^

Q / I Q O n. n a

21

that's when it was assigned to Judge Benson.

22

really can't read on it, March 16

23

that will remain a mystery to me for now.

24

this in.

25

MR. BAER:

= f-

"! <- = ~f-

The stamp date I

of something.

I guess

I'm going to allow

All right, your Honor.
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I will make one

22

point on this particular document.

I think the Court, as the

Court is well aware on an order to show cause, it's a noticed
Information and defendant is on notice.

The Court -- we are

not talking about an indictment situation where a date is off
by a day or off by a month or even off by six months or a year.
The Court can find of its own, and I think probably I'm wafting
into the argument for later on, but certainly the Court can
find of its own volition that this individual -- I mean, you
would have to suspend all consideration and conclude that this
defendant here sitting before you, in fact, has not been
convicted of any federal crimes even Sua sponte much less the
fact he's been put on notice that the State believes and Adult
Probation and Parole believes that there's a violation of the
conditions of his probation for his federal convictions.
The fact that it may be off by a day or month or even
a few months we believe is diminimus and it does not speak to
the sui generis or the gravamen of the offense.
MR. BENNETT:

If you look at the verdict form,

actually I think it is answered here.

Just as I glance at it,

it 3.0Dears as thouoh the verdict form returns guilty verdicts
in 1 through 38, but as you look closer, there is no Count 10
nor is there a 22.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

- MR. BENNETT:
THE COURT:

So I think that answers that.

They aren't sequential then as I assumed
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1

earlier they would be.

2

There is! no ten.

There is no three.

3

MR. BENNETT

4

THE COURT:

5

Anything further, Mr. Baer?

6

MR. BENNETT:

There is no eight.

Correct.
There is no 17, no 20, no 22.

We do.

Thank you.

I think we now have to respond

7

to allegations three, four and six.

8

your Honor, the State {sic} calls Jamis Johnson to the stand.
THE COURT:

9

So in order to do that,

Mr. Johnson, please come forward and be

10 1 sworn in.
JAMIS M. JOHNSON

11
12

Called by the Defendant, being first
duly sworn, testified as follows:

13

THE CLERK:

14

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony .

15.

you are about to give in this matter will be the truth, the

16

whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God!>

17

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

18
DIRECT EXAMINATION

19
M"D

20
21
22

TD T7VTNTI?TT .

Mr. Johnson, you're aware of why you're here today,

Q

correct?

'

23

A

I believe I am.

24

Q

You're aware of the allegations three, four and six

25

in the State's order to show cause, correct?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r*r\Trnm
n n r i T i T r i T r r i n T\/-N.Tm\/n-TNTrn

24

1
2
3
4

A

I read the order to show cause.

I'm not sure

specifically which they are, but I'm -Q

Well, even generally then.

What is it you've been --

I want to make sure that we're clear that you understand what

5 I it is -- because I want to limit our question and response here
6

to just the allegations that are left remaining.

7
8

So can you tell us the substance of allegations 3, 4,
and 6 even in general terms?

9

A

I can't from memory.

10

Q

Do you recall where you were on March 18

11

Jamis?

12

A

Yeah, because I was in trial.

13

Q

Okay.

, 2 011,

Jamis, is there a federal case pending --

Okay.

And you are aware of the allegations of

14

the State that you've been convicted of federal crimes,

15

correct?

16

A

Oh,: okay.

17

Q

Okay.

18

Yes, yes.

Now, the State has presented to the Court a

copy of a verdict form.

Are you denying that you were

19 I convicted on March 18 t x \ 2011 --•
20 !

A

No.

21

Q

- - o f federal crimes?

22

A

No.

23

Q

After a conviction on that date, where did you go?

24
25

Where were you housed?
A

Well, I was released -- well, I went back to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1
2
3
4

Davis County Jail that evening.
Q

Why were you in the Davis County Jail?

Do you

remember?
A

Well, I have to back up.

On December 7 I was

5 I detained as a flight risk on a motion by the U.S. Attorney and
6

1 was sent to jail.

7

Q

That was prior to your federal trial?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Okay.

You said you wanted to back up.

Was there

10 J anything else you wanted to state prior to -- because I just
11

want to fast forward to the date of the conviction and what's

12

happened since the entry of conviction.

13

A

14

December 7

15 |
16

Q

Okay.

Well, no, that's why I was detained

of -- or December 8

Okay.

, I'm sorry.

So you were detained prior to trial because

you were deemed a flight risk, correct?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Then you were convicted on March lBt

19

, 2011, of

various federal crimes, correct?

21

Q

Are you still in custody, federal custody?

22 I

A

No, in -- a motion was made -- well, there was some

23 | posttrial motions made.
24 I me, on April 15
25

Q

Okay.

There was a -- on March 15

a motion for new trial was made.
And who made that motion, Jamis?
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•1

A

It was filed by Rob Hunt.

2

Q

And Mr. Hunt is?

3

A

Mr. Hunt was my former federal prosecutor.

4

Q

He was your federal prosecutor?

5 I

A

I mean, my federal defender.

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

Former federal defender.

There was also a motion for

8

to release me from detention based on, I guess, prosecutorial

9

misconduct and that I was not actually a flight risk and that

10

the original findings were incorrect.

11

Q

Were findings or orders made pursuant to your motion?

12

A

Yeah, we had a hearing on April 20 t .

13

Waddups --

14
15
16

MR. BAER:

Judge

Judge, I'm going to object to this on both

hearsay grounds and relevance grounds.
MR. BENNETT:

We're in an evidentiary hearing

17

probation violation.

The Rules of Evidence are clearly lax in

18

these types of hearings.

19

hearsay would be.

He's not -- I don't know what the

He's saying these motions were filed.

I

20 I asked if -21

THE COURT:

Well, asked whether they are filed, I

22

don't think that's a hearsay question, but I believe he was

23

just telling us what Judge Waddups was saying at a hearing.

24
25

MR. BENNETT:

Well, if he was, I apologize.

BY MR. BENNETT:
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1
2

Q

The question is were there findings and order made

pursuant to your motion?

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

5|

BY MR. BENNETT:

6

Q

7

And that's either a yes or no.
Yes, there were.

And what was that order?
MR. BAER:

I'm going to object.

I know that lax

8

Rules of Evidence apply here, but Best Evidence Rule is if

9

we've got an order, we should at least look at the order, not

10

Mr. Johnson's --

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

13
14

Or least a minute entry of it.
I have the minute entry and the

transcript of that hearing.
THE COURT:

Counsel, spend a moment with your client

15

and see what documents he might have and then if he does have

16

documents, show it to Mr. Baer before it's discussed further.

17

(Counsel conferred with his client.)

18

(Counsel is not speaking directly into a microphone

19

a n d is d i f f i c u l t to u n d e r s t a n d . )

20

MR.. B E N N E T T :

Your H o n o r , I p r e s e n t e d M r , B a e r ,

21

Mr. Johnson has actually brought an entire transcript from

22

(inaudible) or certified copy of order or findings and .

23

conclusions.

24

actual transcript of the April 20

25

(inaudible).

That's not what we have available.
motion hearing
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. BAER:

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr. Baer.
IIm sorry?
He's just presented a document'to be

marked and he's asking that it be admitted into evidence.

I'm

5 I just wondering your response, if any. Any objection?
6

MR. BAER:

Well, it's the same objection as before.

7

It's not certified.

8

it's a relevance objection.

9

moments to review through that and wants to point out what's

We haven't had a chance to look at it and
If the Court wishes to take a few

10

relevant, I think the relevancy objection goes to this very

11

simple detail which I've alluded to before that this defendant

12

can make his arguments as much as he wishes.

13

He stands convicted of federal crimes including

14

aiding and a betting and conspiracy which covers all of the

15

dates and that's what's in the allegations, all of the dates.

16

And the Court is now on notice that he is, in fact, convicted

17

of those*

18
19

This may be better for argument from counsel that in
some ways he believes this Court should not take that into

20 I consideration, that's one thing, and he certainly has a right
21

to present his evidence, but we believe the Court can cut to

22

the chase by noting those violations and the fact that they

23

either are violations or they aren't.

24

an argument about why they should not be considered, that's

25

different.

And if he wants to make
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MR. BENNETT:

That argument, though, hinges of

evidence which is, as the Court indicated, not before the
Court.

So prior to me even making argument when I'm going to

reference evidence, the Court has indicated it needs evidence
before it.

We don't have certified copies.

THE COURT:

Tell me, if I can understand, just very

succinctly, Mr. Bennett, I'm assuming in this document you want
to present to me is something indicating the status of the
federal court on the motions that were made and that you want
to utilize that status as a basis for some type of argument.
Is that a fair statement?
MR. BENNETT:

That is exactly correct, your Honor,

(inaudible) motion to dismiss has been filed, that the kind of
ancillary motions, his motion for his own release which
obviously was granted because he's here, but there's also
evidence of that.

So the Court is correct I want to just

specify of the two or three things.

One, is that a motion to

dismiss actually has been filed in court.
MR. BAER:

For a new trial.

MP.. BENNETT:

And evidence of that is referenced and

noted in the transcript.

Also, his motion for his release and

motion for appointment of a new public defender, I believe
those are (inaudible,) but those would be the three pieces of
evidence which I'll need to allude to make the argument that
everyone - Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1
2

THE COURT:

those motions were made.

3
4

And I understand from his testimony that

MR. BENNETT:

It may also be -They were objected to as hearsay and

the Court, I believe, was going to sustain those'so.

5|

THE COURT:

Not that the motion was made.

I

6

understand.

7

were made.

8

judges.

9

transcript going to contain a ruling by the judge or is it

10

I've allowed him to testify as to the motions that
I have not allowed testimony as to rulings by

My question is are these transcripts -- is this

simply indicating that motions were made?

11

MR. BENNETT:

Well, with respect to the motion to

12

dismiss or, excuse me, the motion for a new trial, merely

13

reference that it has been made, that it has been filed.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. BENNETT:

With respect to the motion for release

16

pending hearing on the motion for new trial, that it was

17

granted.

18

THE COURT:

Okay. • ••

19 I

MR. BENNETT:

And with respect to motion for

2 0 I appointment of a new public defender, that it was granted.
21

I think there's a --

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

So

May I confer with counsel for a moment?

I feel like I'm losing control of everything.
Counsel, what you want me to understand from this
that you consider relevant then is that there's a motion for a
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1

new trial, whether he has a new attorney or not, whether he's

2

in custody or out.

3

conviction.

4

understand it, the district court has not yet ruled on that.

5 I
6

The relevant issue is they are alleging a

He's alleging he wants a new trial.

And as I

Is there more to this for relevancy purposes than I
understand?

7

MR. BENNETT:

It speaks to, and if we need to be a

8

little bit more formal about it, then we can withdraw Mr.

9

Johnson after he finishes this testimony, but it speaks to the

10

sanction that will sort of be the second part of this hearing.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

12

MR. BENNETT:

But if we want to take evidence from

13

Mr. Johnson on two separate occasions so that we're clear, then

14

that's fine.

15

THE COURT:

Counsel, I'm going to have my abilities

16

to sort through this.

17

and understanding,, but I'm going to overrule the objection.

18

I'm going to admit the transcript.

19

counsel's brief recitation as to what the rulings are as being

20

indicative of what that transcript will say, but I'll note for

21

the record I haven't read it and I probably w i l l - - at least

22

I'll read the ruling portion of it before I make a decision.

23

Mr. Baer, I hope you'll have patience

I'm going to accept

Go ahead, Counsel.

24

BY MR. BENNETT:

25

Q

So Jamis, then what was the -- what was the finding
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and order with respect to the motion for release and motion for
new public defender?
A

Well -MR. BAER:

I'll make it easy, not that it's my job to.

make the defendant's job easier,' but (inaudible) and the Court,
we'll stipulate he's been released.
stipulate he has a new counsel.

He's here.

We'll

He has new counsel and I don't

believe that that's particularly relevant to this -- I mean,
it's relevant probably to Mr. Bennett's argument, but we have
stipulated (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. BENNETT:

If it was then stipulated to and that

becomes evidence, then the following question is:
BY MR. BENNETT:
Q

Jamis, it's just been stipulated that, in fact, those

motions were granted.
MR. BAER:

You're out -Well, no,.no, the motions were made and

that he's out -(Counsel were talking on top of one another and could

BY MR. BENNETT: .
Q

So Jamis, are you still required -- are you under

some sort of restrictions in this federal jurisdiction or the
purview of the federal court?

Are you still under some

obligation?
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1

A

Yes, when I was released, I was released into custody

2

of a federal pretrial officer and I brought a letter from him.

3

I report daily and I am at my son's home.

4

the evening of April 20

I was released on

and that's where I am.

There are

5 I some things I think I need to correct.
6

THE COURT:

Mr. Jamis, I am not going to have you be

7

attorney from the chair.

8

understand you're a party.

9

far as time to consult with your attorney.

10 J

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

You're here as a witness today.

I'll give you any break you want as

Okay.

But I am not going to have him direct the

12

case from the table and have you direct your case from the

13

chair.

That won't happen.

14
15

MR. BENNETT:

If I may approach, I'm afraid he's

going to say that I've misrepresented the --

16
17

I

THE COURT: . If you two want to take a brief recess
and talk, you're welcome to, but when you come back, Counsel, I

18 I want to address you and I want him to answer questions.
19

MR. BENNETT:
. l i U

21

C V J U U i

.

Understood, your Honor.
111C

>.<=; a.

J_ _L v xz.

uuuuuc

recess.

22

(Recess taken by the Court.)

23

THE COURT:

Counsel, during the break I had an

24

opportunity to scan through what's been marked as Defendant's

25

Exhibit No. 3.

This is the transcript.

By no means have I
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1

made a thorough read of this document.

2

quite a bit of time, but trying to skip through and find items

3

that are pertinent and relevant to the case, it's clear to me

4

why it is the Court's don't accept matters that are not

5

relevant to the issues before them.

6

It would have taken

It makes for fascinating reading, but it also

7

clutters the mind with a lot of information and circumstances

8

that really are not relevant to the questions that I need to

9

answer.

What I'm going to do, I've already admitted this over

10 J the objection of counsel, but I'm going to indicate to both •
11

counsel that rather than read through Exhibit 3 to understand

12

its purpose, I'm going to accept the representations that have

13

been made that there's a motion pending for a new trial, that

14

there is a motion and request for a new public defender and •

15

that there was a request for release.

16

those were approved and that the first one has not been

17

approved.

And that's as far as my inquiry into this document

18 I is going to go.
19
2Q !
21

Otherwise, I'm concerned that I'm going to be

influenced or tainted by irrelevancies.
MR. BENNETT:

And that's the onl^ evidence we're

attempting to --

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BENNETT:

24

THE COURT:

25

And the last two of

Thank you.

Are we ready to proceed?

We are, your Honor.

Mr. Bennett, go ahead.

MR. BENNETT:

Your Honor, now that that's been .
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1

cleared u p , I just want to indicate to the Court that the

.2

following questions are n o w geared to -- n o t the response to

3

the allegations i.e., the evidentiary h e a r i n g / b u t rather speak

4

to sanctions o r the second part of this hearing.

5 I

T H E COURT:

6

B Y M R . BENNETT:

7

Q

.8

Okay.

S o , M r . Johnson, backing u p A u g u s t 30th, 2 0 1 0 , you're

convicted or, excuse m e , you're found in v i o l a t i o n of a term of

9

your p r o b a t i o n .

10

A

11

At that time what transpired?

Judge revoked m y probation and reinstated 36 months

of p r o b a t i o n and sent me to jail for 60 d a y s .

12

Q

D i d y o u serve those 60 days?

13

A

Yeah, it w a s put off for a week approximately and I

14

entered o n the - - o r started serving this n e w p r o b a t i o n term on

15 j the 7 t h of September.
16

Q

Okay.

W h y did y o u not complete the entire 60 days?

17

A

I made a motion for -- I filed a n appeal of this n e w

18

36-month p r o b a t i o n and made a m o t i o n also for a probable cause

19

application, for probable cause certificate and a m o t i o n to

20

stay the remainder of the sentence I w a s serving pending m y

21

appeal.

22

Q

23

understanding at the time of the outcome of those motions?
I

24
25

A n d what's your understanding o r what w a s your

A

fch
Well, the day that it was October 13 x w e argued it

and originally from the Bench it was granted and my
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understanding was that the - - i n the motions the old stay had
been -- the old probation had been revoked and I was serving a
new sentence and I didn't believe that I was serving the
parallel -- that they were both running parallel and then I was
released and I went home that evening.
Q

Okay.

Did you report -- well, we know you didn't

report to probation because that's what -- in our prior
evidentiary hearing in this Court you were found in violation
for a term of your probation for failing to report to
probati on, but now, and maybe it's been answered, but why
didn't you report on that day for probation?
A

Well, the next morning I got the call from Mr. Staker

saying I was to report and as you know, I called you and we
discussed it.

I thought that I was operating under a new

sentence and that it had been stayed, and I thought the old
sentence had been revoked and then we discussed it and you
advised me that I didn't want to acquiesce, or waive that stay
and that I shouldn't -- I shouldn't proceed to communicate
further.
Q

In any of those motions for stays or motions for

stays pending appeal and the application for certificate of
probable cause did you ask for any specific remedy from the
Court?
. MR. BAER:

Objection at this point, your Honor.

This

has been going on for a long time, but I think we are talking
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1

about things that we had already resolved at your last hearing.

2

This is what we're talking about the stay pending.

3

what Mr. Johnson knows or thinks or believes is not relevant

4

for purposes of the court determination of whether he has

5

violated what we're here to do.

6

sentencing issue, but still it certainly isn't relevant to the

7

violations that we're asking the Court to find here today nor

8

-- and in addition, rather, it has been discussed and reviewed

9

at the last hearing.

10

MR. BENNETT:

And also

I know he's speaking to the

Of course Mr. Baer is correct.

It

11

isn't relevant to the State's request that he be found in

12

violation.

It's not supposed to be.

13

sanctions.

The Court at the prior evidentiary hearing found

14

that Mr. Johnson's violation was willful.

15

we're not trying to argue with the Court about that, but there

16

are varying degrees of willfulness when we talk about a

17

violation.

18

(inaudible).

19

the Court needs to consider what goes on in the mind of a

20

probationer when they violate.

21

It just speaks to

Notwithstanding that

It's not.well it was willful and, therefore, it was
For this Court to impose an appropriate sanction

How willful is it?

Is it a blatant thumb of the nose

22

to the Court or is it he was legally erroneous, but was he

23

acting reasonably in acting the way he did.

24

separate sanctions from the Court.

25

understanding what was Mr. Johnson's mindset so the Court can

Those merit very

So it is relevant in
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1

then impose an appropriate sanction based on the level of

2

willfulness of the violation.

3

THE COURT:

4

overrule it.
I

BY MR. BENNETT:

6

J

Q

So Mr. Johnson, did you ask for any specific remedy

in those motions that we've just read?

8

A

9

I'm going to

Continue, Mr. Bennett.

5

7

I appreciate the objection.

I did.

I asked for the stay.

on court probation.

•'
I asked also to be put

And I decided that the prior sentence had

10 J been revoked and I asked that the current sentence, while we
11

explore this, that it be stayed.

12

primary -- and I also asked --

13

Q

14
15

With respect to probation, did you ask for any

specific remedy?
I

A

well, that it be stayed and that I be put on court

16

probation.

17

Q

18
19

So those are the two

Okay.

And, again, your understanding.of the outcome

I of those motions was what?
A

Well, I thought that it was stayed and that I would

2 0 I have to report to the Court and that I also woulu. have to
21

22
23
24
25

comply.

Q

Let me stop you there.

Did you ever report to the

Court?.
A

Yes, in -- in -- in -- well, in mid-October we spoke

and you first --
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1

Q

Mr. Johnson, did you ever report to the Courts?

2

A

Well, yes, pursuant to that I wrote a letter --

3

THE COURT:

4
5

not objecting.
I yes or no.

I'm sorry, Counsel.

y

I appreciate your

I want him to answer yes or no questions with

If you're going to follow up. on it, then ask him a

6

follow-up question.

I do not want him to be utilizing a single

7

question as the launching pad for a general discussion.

8

BY MR. BENNETT:

9

Q

Mr. Johnson, did you ever report to the Court?

10 J

A

Yes.

11

Q

When and how?

12

A

It was -- I think it was in, like, late October,

13

early November I wrote a letter.

I wasn't sure how to report,

14

but I wrote a.letter that conveyed the - - t h e r e was a motion --

15 | there was an order that was signed by the Court that was sent
16

in, that was prepared and sent in.

17

November, I think, 4th the-Court signed it.

18

I believe it was that cover letter.

19

letter at t h e e n d of the letter that I'm trying to b e in

20

c o m p l i a n c e and I indicated to the court that I w a s reportincr

21.

and I w a s n ' t

22

Q

When did you say that letter was sent to the Court?

23

A

I believe it went with the order that was signed

24

November 4

25

it would have been - - i t was intended to be for November.

sure b e y o n d that w h a t

I prepared it.

And on

The cover letter,

I also indicated in that

I should do b u t .

. And I can't recall the date specifically, but
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1

Q

And did you report to the Court in December?

2

A

No, I was detained in December.

3

Q

Okay.

4

And that detention was because of the federal

case, correct?

5 I

A

Yes, I was gone.

6

Q

Following -- and we started\this a little bit.

And,

7

your Honor, just so the Court is aware this is, again,

8

attempting to speak to Mr. Johnson's degree of willfulness of

9

that October 2 0 t h violation. .

10

You indicated previously, Mr. Johnson, that you are

11

subject to certain requirements or conditions in your federal

12

release.

";.

Is that correct?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And what are those conditions?

15 |

A

Well, I have a letter that outlines them, but I

16

report daily and I am to -- I have a curfew, ten in the evening

17

to six in the morning, and then I'm not to leave Salt Lake

18

County without prior permission.

19 ]

Q

Well, and I'm assuming there's a list of others, but

20 ! I think we get the point.
21
22
23
24
25

Are you in compliance with the terms

of your federal release?
A

Yes, I'm in compliance.
(Counsel is again not speaking in the microphone.)
MR. BENNETT:

Your Honor, and I've showed this to Mr.

Baer, I move for admission of the letter of Mr. Johnson's -- I
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1

don't know if the term is federal probation officer, but the

2

person with whom he reports pursuant to (inaudible)?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BAER:

5

THE COURT:. Thank you.

6

Mr. Baer.
Same objection as before, your Honor.
It will be admitted.

Thank

you.

7

(At which time an exhibit was admitted but no number

8

was referred to and cannot be entered in the index.)

9
10

BY MR. BENNETT:
Q

Mr. Johnson, you were, and we talked about this, but

11

since you were found in violation of the term of your probation

12

that you report to AP&P as directed to do so, that finding

13

being made by this Court April 27

14

weeks ago, since that time have you been in compliance with the

15

terms of your state probation?

16

A

of this year, just a few

I reported to Mr. Staker as requested, but I also

17

told him that I don't have a job.

I've been found to be

18

disabled by social security and I think that might -- I'm

19 I supposed to have full-time work under the terms of the old
20

probation and I just got out and I don't have a full-time job

21

and I have this disability determination, so that would not be

22

in compliance, I would imagine, but I'm trying to be and I've

23

reported.

24
25

Q

Okay.

Mr. Johnson, is there anything else -- with

respect to your desire to be in compliance, with respect to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 I willfulness of the violation of failing to report on
2

October 20

, 2010, to Mr. Staker, is there anything else

3

you f d like the Court to be aware of?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Please.

6

A

Further indication of not only did I write the Court

7

which I thought I was supposed to do, but we sent an email to

8

Mr. Staker, you sent an email to Mr. Staker in mid-October

9

informing him of the status, our understanding of the status.

10

And the (inaudible) I would like before the Court that I

11

certainly have every desire to be in compliance.

12

willfully try to avoid reporting.

13

. THE COURT:

14

Thank you.

I didn't

I'm glad to report.
Mr. Baer, do you have any

questions for Mr. Johnson?

15

MR. BAER:

16

Just a couple of questions for

clarification.

17
18

CROSS-EXAMINATION

19 |

BY MR. BAER:

20 I

Q

Mr. Johnson, it's true then, you have just admitted

21

with explanation, that you failed to report to the probation

22

officer on October 2 1 s t , 2010, on your release with

23

explanation; yes or no?
I

st

24

A

25

Q

Yeah, I didn't report to him on the 21
Okay.

And by not reporting you'd have to agree it
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1

would be impossible for you to establish with him any residency

2

that you may have had upon your release.

3

MR. BENNETT:

Isn't that true?

Objection, Judge.

I believe we've

4

resolved those in the prior evidentiary hearing.

5

found that he was in violation of the term of his probation for

6

failing to report on those days.

7

MR. BAER:

8

it's clarified his testimony.

9

direct.

The Court has

Yeah, but I just want to make sure that

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

I mean, it was brought up on

Could you ask me again.

Oh, it's overruled.

I have heard the

12

objection and it is overruled for the reason that it was

13

brought up and also for further clarification.

14

both sides in my mind I can differentiate between the findings

15

that have already been made by the Court and a determination of

16

what the sanctions should be and I anticipate that you brought

17

things up to help clarify what was in his mind, and I

18

anticipate that counsel is trying to establish that he knew

19

that he had not done certain things and I don't see a problem

2 0 j with than.
21

I will tell

Continue, Counsel.

MR. BAER:

22

BY MR. BAER:

23

Q

Thank you, your Honor.

So just a follow up, I think close facsimile at least

24

to the last question.

You have to agree then.by not reporting

25

when you were supposed to report, you could not have reported
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1

your establishment or your residence of establishment at that

2

time period, correct?

3.
. 4
5

A

I didn't have any notice I was to report.

get that notice.
Q

The question is by -- I'll let it sit.

6

. THE COURT:

7

MR. BAER:

8

THE COURT:

9

I didn't

question.

Sounds like a good argument.

Thank you, your Honor.
I'm sorry.

I don't mean to qualify your

I'm simply saying that's more of an argument than an

10 J evidentiary question.
11

MR. BAER:

12

BY MR. BAER:

13

Q

Thank you, your Honor.

Now, Mr. Johnson, it's true that with respect to your

14

federal convictions, that the time period of those convictions

15

started in 2005 and finished on or around August 6, 2007.

16

That's true, isn't it?

17

A

No.

18

Q

That's what the allegations were?

19 I

A

No.

20 !

n

That's not what it ss v s in the consulrac^r document?

21

A

No.

22

MR. BAER:

No other questions, your Honor.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

THE COURT:

I'll correct it.

Anything further?

25
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BENNETT:
3
4

Mr. Johnson, do you want to -- obviously on direct

Q

you z anL't -- you need to answer yes or no, but you appeared to

5 1 want tc correct something.
6

A

Yes

7

Q

Please.

8

A

There was one -- there were October -- there were

9

'

June 2007 transaction that was the basis for Counts 2 and 22,

10 1 not in August 2007.
11

,

And those are the two counts that were

dismissed

12

MR. BENNETT:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BAER:

15

THE COURT:

16

Thank you.

Anything further Mr. Baer?
No, your Honor.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Please step

Mr . Bennett, any further witnesses?

down •

MR. BENNETT:

17

No, your Honor.

When we come to --

18

obvi<DUS iy it1.3 the State's burden to argue, but we will then

19

move tc sanctioning and so I don't know who needs to go first

20 j or not.

:If we were juat doing sanctioning, I would ask to go

21

first, but I ijnderstand we're dealing with the burden which

22

lies wi th the State so I'll defer to the Court as to who speaks

23

first.

24
25

THE COURT:

If the parties will permit me, I'll tell

you " whe re I'm at and you can then decide what you need to do to
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1

persuade me which way you feel I need to go.

2

.

3

specifically Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, the verdict and the

4

attached indictment, after listening to argument that was

Based on the evidence that was presented,

5 I presented by defendant and reviewing these documents combined
6

with the affidavit of the probation officer, Mr. Staker, that

7

was signed March 22

8.

allegation is that he was convicted of aiding and a betting

9

willfully causing another to commit a crime.

, if we looked at Item No. 3, the

On No. 5 there's

10

an allegation that he was convicted of mail fraud, and on No, 6

11

excuse, me did I skip the wrong one?

12

MR. BAER:

13

THE COURT:

You skipped No. 4, your Honor.
No. 4, conviction of the offense of

14

conspiracy and on No. 6, wire fraud.

15

these various allegations during the break and what I find is

16

that on No. 5 by the federal court having dismissed or whoever

17

it was in the federal court that made the motion, the Court

18

dismissed the allegation on Count No. 10 in their action, and I

19

believe that was the only allegation that tied into" our current

20

probable cause statement and affidavit alleging mail fraud.

21

don't see that I have a lot of evidence on mail fraud.

22

want to address that if you feel I'm viewing that in error.

23

I've just gone through

You may

I do see by the convictions that there are

24

convictions on Counts 18 through 20 -- I'm sorry.

25

following convictions refer to incidents or counts that are
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The

1

alleged to have transpired after sentencing, and that would

2

include the Counts 18 through 22, 23 and 24 through 28, so

3

combining all of those it's 18 through 28.

4

Now, the concerning part to me in all of this is that

5 I the State is trying to prove that he has violated probation by
•6

committing these acts even though they weren't convictions

7

until later.

8

sentencing.

9

He committed these acts after the time of

It appears to me that viewing the verdict and also

10 j the attached indictment, that Mr. Johnson may have been
11

.involved in a series of conduct over a period of several years

12

interrupted by his conviction in this court, but in which he

13

continued to participate even following his conviction and that

14

that didn't result in a conviction on those following matters

15

until after it was addressed in the federal court recently.

16

So I'm telling both sides that I find in my mind

17

right now that I'm leaning towards, on the question of ;

18

violation, finding that he has committed certain acts which the

19

federal court now has entered convictions on that occurred

~ ~

j
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21

Counts 18 through 28.

I believe that those will substantiate .

22

several of the State's allegations, but not substantiate at

23

least one of the State's allegations.

24

a finding.

25

appreciate either side informing me if they believe I have

I'm not stating this as

I'm stating this as my understanding.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And I would

48

misinterpreted what I have read.
With regard to the arguments, I'm going to ask Mr.
Baer to proceed with any arguments that he feels needs to be
made with regard to the probation violation issue and then
after I rule on probation violation, we will address sentencing
on either the former or both of these violations.
Mr. Baer, proceed.
MR. BAER:

Thank.you, your Honor.

The State, without

it coming as a surprise, would subscribe to the comments of the
Court.

That is the focal point of the State's position that he

continued.to conduct these acts not only after the conviction
in the underlying state case, but I think the Court can also,
either by way of the allegations in the probation violation
report or Sua sponte, note that clearly these acts continued
after his conviction.
I respect the Court's comments before, but I think
that is too fine a distinction.
fine a distinction.

The State believes it's too

Certainly once this defendant was .

convicted on the State count, and that would be back in March,
to continue to sn^s^s in the criminal activity that led to the
federal convictions is thumbing-- in the. State's view is the
defendant thumbing his nose at this Court.
The fact that he may have been sentenced later, and
if you look at the docket, he was sentenced quite a bit later
based upon some continuations which I probably should have
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looked a little closer at that before I made the argument, the
State is usually prepared to go forward in these matters and
the continuations are filed by the defendant.

I don't know

that for fact, but I'll just represent that the State's
position, would clearly be that it was the defendant's thumbing
of this Court by•continuing in those criminal acts right after
the day of his conviction on until sentencing to say nothing of
the post-sentencing time.
So we believe he's in violation for those reasons of
the allegations now contained in the March allegations that
we're doing substantively here today.

And I can speak to the

sanctions if the Court finds for violations today or I can
speak just to the November findings or I can wait.

I don't

think the State, quite frankly the State's position is not
going to be any different.
before by this Court.
employment.

This defendant has been violated

He's been violated for not maintaining

He's been violated for not complying with other

conditions; not reporting to this probation officer.

He's now

being requested he be violated for federal convictions, also
for not reporting again to this officer in establishing his
place of residence.
The sum in this case is bigger than the parts.

I

mean, what we have is a sophisticated defendant who has played
this game for a very long time and parsed it extremely closely,
but even he can't pars it close enough to negate the findings
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1

that he has violated the orders of this Court.

2

has violated the spirit of the orders of this Court.

3

not - - h e seems to seek to be treated differently because he's

4

a' smart guy and because he's a sophisticated guy and because he

5

can pars words and say what his understanding is.

6 J

He certainly
He has

But the clear evidence is that he has violated the

7

spirit and the orders of this Court and the State maintains

8

that the Court should invoke the original sanction that was

9

available to this Court at sentencing and that would be on the

10 I underlying felony that he was convicted of in this case..
11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BENNETT:

Thank you, Mr. Baer.

Mr. Bennett.

Your Honor, as I read the indictment,

13

the date on or about is similar to filing of an Information in

14

the State court where it alleges that specific illegal conduct

15 | occurred on or about and then the date follows.

None of the

16

allegations except for Counts 10 and 22 even allege that the

17

criminal conduct occurred when the defendant was placed on

18

probation.

Those on or about dates all predate Mr. Johnson's

19

probation.

That is clear, unequivocal.

20

Counts 10 and 22, the on or about dates clearly show

21

that the alleged misconduct there did occur after Mr. Johnson

22

was placed on probation.

23

point that that somehow demonstrates that he continued to

24

persist in illegal conduct after he was placed on probation,

25

the Court can't make that leap because there is no conviction.

That's obvious.

But to the Court's
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1

Those were dismissed.

2

They were dismissed.

And while the Court may be tempted to say well the

3

fact that he was charged, you know, there can be inferences

4

drawn it's evidence that, but the bottom line is he wasn't

. 5 I convicted so how can this Court find that he violated a term of
6

probation based on allegations only two of which even

7

chronologically occurred or alleged to have occurred when he

8

was on probation when those very counts were dismissed?

9

think that's violative of a number of defendant's; rights;

10

notice, due process, but more specifically there's just no

11

conviction on which the Court can hang its hat.

12

response to allegation No. 5 of the order to show cause.

13

I .

That's my

In response to allegations three, four and six, the

14

only reason that the State didn't have to put on much evidence

15 j is because it doesn't take much to show that he was, in fact,
16

convicted on March 18

17

that.

18

to refrain from making findings or conclusions, much less

19

sanctions, when there are potentially dispositive motions filed

O n
«£. \J

!
j
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Xii

4-1-..—.
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of this year.

We can't even dispute

What we're asking the Court to do, though, however, is
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21

be overturned and then we would have a situation where the

22

State court has sanctioned Mr. Johnson for being convicted of a

23

federal crime which conviction no longer stands.

24
25

That certainly wouldn't be in the interest of
justice, so while there's no getting around the fact that he
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1

was convicted on March 1 8 t h , there are motions that could

2

overturn that conviction.

3

justice for this Court then to hold off in making findings,

4

conclusions, much less any sanction until those are determined.

5

And it's my understanding that sentencing is still set for July

6

in this case.

7

to be heard and would have to take place prior to sentencing.

8

Sentencing hadn't been moved out.

9

It makes sense in the interest of

Therefore, any motion for a new trial would have

It's still existed July.

So it's not like we're asking the Court to hold off

10 J for a year or two to see if his conviction is overturned.
11
12

can't see how the federal courts can make its decision after
' sentencing.

It would have to do so prior to sentencing even

13

considering its motion for a new trial.

14

the Court to hold off making any findings for any lengthy

15

period of time.

16

I

So we're not asking

I'm not going to pretend like things don't get

17

continued in federal court too.

18

do in state court, but, again, with respect to allegation five,

19

in summation the allegations that fit that could have even

20

occurred when he was on probation were dismissed.

21

convictions that now exist could be overturned.

22

Thank you, your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

I'm sure they do just as they

Thank you, Mr. Bennett.

The

Before Mr. Baer

24

responds, I got the impression that Mr. Baer combined both his

25

a r g u m e n t r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r or not a v i o l a t i o n e x i s t e d w i t h
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his

1

' argument for sanctions.

2

MR. BENNETT:

3

THE COURT:

4

Okay.

And I don't want you to be confused

because I think when you finish, I'm going to hear from Mr.

5 I Baer regarding his final argument and I will allow you one last
6

argument, but that's all.

7
8

MR. BENNETT:

And just so we're clear I have not

spoken to an appropriate sanction.

9

THE COURT:

And that's why I'm saying you could

10

either do it now or you could wait until after Mr. Baer

11

concludes his presentation.

12

MR. BENNETT:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BENNETT:

15 I violation.

I'll do so now if the Court --

Very well.
On August 3 0th Mr. Johnson was found in

That's pending appeal.

A brief has been filed.

16

The State has -- actually it was a non-complying brief.

-17

original is fine, but Fedex or Kinkos hadn't made it double

18

sided so that's only recently been remedied.

19

was w h e n it w a s r e m e d i e d .

20

21
22

The

In fact, Monday

The S t a t e h a s n ' t r e s p o n d e d , but

i any event the r e v o c a t i o n and r e i n s t a t e m e n t

of the s a n c t i o n

in
was

stayed.
At that time Mr. Johnson began to serve the sanction

23

of 60 days.

Prior to the 60 days, he filed a motion to stay

24

and a probable cause certificate.

25

specifically asked the Court to place him on court probation

In those documents he
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1

pending the outcome of the appeal.

2

probable cause certificate -- and I understand this is the

3

identical argument we made at the evidentiary hearing, but it

4

just speaks to the degree of willfulness, but the probable

5

cause certificate signed and issued by this Court states that

6

he is to report to the Court.

.7

That was granted.

The

And the other terms for that matter sound very much

8

like court probation, so I don't think it's -- and I'm in part

9

defending my own legal analysis of the situation, much less Mr.

10

Johnson's or including Mr. Johnson's, but that when you ask for

11

specific relief and your motion is granted, the probable cause

12

certificate -- well, it didn't specifically say you no longer

13

have to report to AP&P, but it did say you are to report to the

14

Court on a monthly basis.

15

it's reasonable for Mr. Johnson to think that the relief he

16

sought was granted and that his probation was then converted to

17

court probation pending the outcome of the appeal.

18

When you combine those two, I think

Additionally, the other evidence that was introduced

19

I hope tends to show that when he, Mr. Johnson, is made clear

20

of his duties, such as the requirements or the terms oi nis

21

federal release, he's compliant.

22

last evidentiary hearing as far as compliance with Mr. Staker

23

and the Adult Probation and Parole.

24

were —

25

orders to show causes filed throughout, but that evidence I

He's been compliant since the

And.prior to that there

I'm not going to hyphen the fact that there were other
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1

think tends to show two things.

One, he's reasonable in his

2

analysis as I was reasonable in mine when I gave him counsel

3

that he had been granted the relief he sought, he was on court

4

probation, he was to report to the Court.

5

in November.

He said he did that

He failed to do that December through April

.6 J because he was incarcerated apparently.
7

So what degree of willfulness of the violation is

8

there?

And I think the Court has found that it was willful,

9

but I think it has to be a minimal amount of willfulness

10

because he's reasonable in relying on —

11

reasonable in relying on the Court's probable cause

12

certificate, then I don't know what you are reasonable relying

13

on.

14

minimal amount of willfulness that is.

So is the violation willful?

if you're not

I think it was minimal,

15 I can impose the sanction it wants to.

So, you know, the Court

Obviously it merits

16

something far less than what the State is asking for which is

17

the original sentence of prison, a term in prison be imposed.

18

Lastly, your Honor, Mr. Johnson, when it has been

19

clear to him,

I k n o w the State is g o i n g to a d a m a n t l y object

to

20

t h i s , but w h e n it's b e e n c l e a r to J a m i s , h e d o e s m o r e or

21

what it is he's been told.

22

disabilities and prior orders to show causes having to do with

23

restitution amount, he's, you know, been found to be disabled

24

by the federal government so, you know, there's always --. but

25

that's really not before the Court, but I recognize the Court

less

Now, he has some certain
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1

is going to say well he hasn't always been compliant, that's a

2

stretch to say just because he complies with the federal terms

3

of his release, that he's supervisable or amenable to .

4

supervision.

5

So I just want to address what I anticipate, and

6

that's what it comes to restitution, he has some disabilities.

7

In fact, he's talked to me numerous times about asking the

8

Court to modify his probation.

9

either, but in general when Jamis is aware what he's required

That isn't before the Court

10 I to do, at least since August 30th of 2010, he's done so.

I

11

can't speak to prior to that, but since August 30th, 2010, when

12

it's been clear and he's not relying on something -- reasonably

13

relying on something else, he's been complying.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BENNETT:

16

Thank you, Mr. Bennett.
And in light of that, your Honor, I ask

for a minimal sanction on Mr. Johnson.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BAER:

Thank .you, Mr. Bennett.
Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Baer.
I'll start right

19

at the end, y o u r H o n o r .

20

restitution.

21

docket or it can review the State's note in the Information

22

from the probation officer, the restitution is not to be

23

considered obviously for a violation here today, but it

24

certainly can be considered for sanctions.

25

Counsel b r o u g h t u p the c o n c e p t

A n d as the Court

is a w a r e , it c a n c h e c k

What you have here is an individual who was
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of

its

own

1

originally ordered to pay $120,000 to his victim.

He has been

2

found guilty of securities fraud for defrauding these victims

3

in real time.

4

2 000.

This is all the way back in the early part of

So here we are seven or eight years later.

Not only

5 I does he owe the $120,000, he owes $136,000 because he hasn't
6

found the time or the ability in his own mind, because he is

7 J the one who brought up that he is disabled, to get any kind of
a reasonable job and make reasonable payments on that
9 I restitution.

I'm sure that carries a lot of weight and a lot

10 I of water with the victims who are sitting out there out
11

$120,000.

12

here.

13
14

No, $136,000 plus as of the day that we were sitting

With respect to his representation that he can't get
a job, let's look a little bit historically at that.

You were

15 ] not the trial court here, your Honor, but at the trial this
16

individual indicated that he was so blind that he couldn't

17

proceed in this case and that he required a motion to consider

18

striking of the trial and to set it off in the distance because

19

he couldn't see.

21

and this is not a complaint, just an observation from the

22

historical perspective, to get a machine that this individual

23

could read when he put a piece of paper in and blew it up nice

24

and large in front of him.

25

today.

Notice there's no such machine here

What does that go to?

That goes to the credibility of
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1

this defendant.

What else goes to the credibility of this

2

defendant?

•3

upon his release whether he has to report a probation officer

4

or not, but he can't remember that in the indictment for which

This defendant can talk about his understanding

5 I he stood trial in federal court for a week or so in front of a
6

jury, he can't recall that the conspiracy in the aiding and

7

abetting periods and certainly the conspiracy periods goes up

8

until August 2007.

9

intended to comply with his officer.

10 J

He can only remember the point that he's

With respect to whether or not he's complying with .

11

his federal officer, that information comes from one source and

12

one source only.

13

whose credibility is suspect, if not entirely debunk at this

14

time.

15

completely complying or being cooperative with that probation

16

officer.

17

of violations both today and historically in this particular

18

case.

It comes from the defendant who' - - again,

There is no independent finding that he is complying or

19

And even if he were, it does not speak to the myriad

T h e S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n is p r e t t y c l e a r or s h o u l d be

by

20

n o w that this c a s e for w h i c h there h a s b e e n a c o n v i c t i o n

for

21

nearly four years, into in excess of four years, there has been

22

no attempt by this defendant, reasonable attempt, keeping it to

23

a reasonable person's standard of what you would expect of any

24

probationer, to comply with the conditions of probation.

25

systemic.

It is

Whether or not you find a violation on.the federal
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1

convictions, it is already established as systemic.

A quick

2

look at the docket will show that this is hardly the first

3,

rodeo for all of us in this regard.

4

again.

He does it time and time

•

5 I

Now, with respect to those federal convictions.

6

While counsel was speaking I did have a chance to look at the

7

docket.

8

case was going to be earlier than June.

9

James Barber, this defendant's attorney at the time, did file

And as I suspected, the original sentencing in this

10 J the motion to continue sentencing.

However, on 5/2 '07

So the State would ask that

11

the Court even back up its analysis at least until that point

12

with respect to the timing of the federal convictions.

13
14

But that also raises an important question.

One that

obviously none of us have briefed, but, you know, what is the

15 I responsibility of a defendant in between the time he's
16

convicted and the time that he's sentenced?

Does he get to go

17

out and rape, and maim?

18

Does he get to go out and -- and that has no reflection on the

19

sentencing or the consideration of this Court when it's brought

21

to a conviction on those additional charges, the State would

22

submit that it is relevant just on a totality of the

23

circumstances consideration, but it certainly is a particularly

24

relevant matter when you look at the docket and you note that

25

this d e f e n d a n t w a s the one w h o d e l a y e d h i s s e n t e n c i n g .

Does he get to go out and commit arson?
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1

least a reasonable portion or some portion of the federal

2

convictions occurred post sentencing or post at least the

3

motion to continue the sentencing and certainly post the

4

conviction.

5

Now, as for the motion to stay, that is a

6

post-conviction motion which is filed, as the Court knows, in

7

most, if not all, jury convictions.

8

what is the likelihood that the defendant would prevail on

9

appeal.

And the question becomes

We've had no evidence here today that he would likely

10 j prevail on appeal.

And we would submit that that is a motion

.11

which is something that the federal government has to consider.

12

And if or when they consider it in any way, fashion or form

13

favorable to this defendant, they can bring, the defendant that

14

is can bring this back to the Court's review.

15 I

However, at this point he stands convicted of a

16

plethora of federal crimes and he has not shown -- there has

17

been no showing rather that there's a likelihood that he would

18

prevail on appeal.' Even putting that aside for a moment and

19

considering in all views favorable to the defendant that maybe

20 j he wouiu D6 iiKeiy to prevail on appea±, ne stiix remains in
21

violation of the conditions of this Court both historically and

22

on those November allegations and by Reincorporations .1 and 2

23

of the March allegations which are consistent with the November

24

ones.

25

I don't know how the Court wishes to address that.
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1

It probably is a distinction without much of a difference.

2

Because of that it is the State's view that this manipulative

3

process has been going on for a very very long time indeed.

4

is time to bring it to an end.

It

And the actual actions of this

5 I defendant vis-a-vis his lack of restitution, lack of
6

employment, when you look around the world, your Honor, you see

7

an awful lot of people who work sitting in wheelchairs, working

8

without a leg, working without appendages, it's a thin read,

9

indeed, for which the defendant to rest his laurels in this

10

court to say that he has some problems getting employment.

11

not only is it a thin read, I think it's an insult not only to

12

this Court, but to all those individuals who do go out there

13

and do work under some very very trying circumstances.

14

And

I know I've mixed and matched a little bit what we

15 I believe the sanctions s are and findings should be of this
16

Court, but I think the Court can pars out the parts of the

17

arguments of each and we'd ask that you impose the original

18

finding of a further violation here today and the imposing of

19

the sanctions as previously noted.
I/^T

21 |

T-n m

MR. BENNETT:

m'

Thank "ou.
Your Honor, at this time I would just

22

impose an objection even if it's ultimately for the sake of

23

preservation, and that's an objection to relevance to the

24

State's argument with respect to restitution, well, excuse me,

25

relevance as well as kind of an objection of proper notice as
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1

well as the fact that there's no evidence before the Court of

2

those numbers that were thrown out.

3

just skimmed through the State's hearing and sentencing

4

memorandum, what is set forth there.

That's precisely, having

At the outset of this

5 I hearing we indicated we objected to the Court's considering of
6

that memorandum.

7 J

With respect to the comments made to Mr. Johnson at

8

the time of trial, object as to relevance.

Argument made with

9

respect to employment, again, objection as to relevance.

I

10 J trust and hope that the Court can compartmentalize the parts of
11

the State's argument that were relevant and set those aside in

12

determining an appropriate sanction from those that actually

13

were relevant, but specific objections to arguments set forth

14

on those three issues; restitution, defendant's behavior at

15 1 trial, employment, actually as well as prior alleged probation
16

violations which are not properly before the Court at this time

17

either.

18

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Bennett.

19

want to address his objections?
uu.

\jiis.y

jjcL-auoc

xii

L.wO

Mr. Baer, do you

way D .

m e

21

first one is that if you take a look at those marked

22

allegations, it's under page 3, so they are on notice of this

23

issue, the defendant has a severe employment problem.

24

defendant has never held employment during the last three years

25

of probation.

The

That's part of the March allegation packet
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1

before the Court, but secondly, and perhaps more dispositively

2

to this Court, this defendant sat up in that very chair right

3

there and talked about his inability to be employed.

4

Now, why else would that be relevant to this Court

5 I except for the payment of restitution to victims who were
6

defrauded originally so many years ago in this case?

7

brought it up himself.

8

part of the PV report and packet that we're addressing today.

9

And also in the event that the Court feels otherwise, we also

He's opened up that door.

So he has

It's also

10

have full confidence the Court can compartmentalize that

11

information.

12

purposes, but for purposes of sanctions. .

13
14

Again, it was introduced not for violative

THE COURT:

Thank you.

let me just make a finding.

With regard to the objection,

For better or for worse this is a

15 [ case in which a fresh set of eyes has come on the scene after
16

many years of a prior court dealing with this case and prior

17

probation violation.allegations.

18

favor of one side or the other, but at one point I wondered

19

myself h o w m u c h I should try to i m m e r s e m y s e l f

20

of the case so I c o u l d have a sense and feeling of h o w the

21

developed and got to the point it is.

22

.

I don't know if that cuts in

in t h e

history
case

And the truth is I'm looking only at a probation

23

violation.

I do compartmentalize.

I'm looking specifically at

24

a probation violation.

25

find that both the issues regarding restitution payment and

With regard to the objections, I do
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1

employment are really to what we're doing.

And I do that

2

specifically because the allegation has been made that

3

whenever -- whenever the defendant clearly understands what's

4

expected of him he complies.. Now, that was a statement that I

5

recall being made, the argument that was made.

6

countervailing argument is not with regard to some aspects, not

7

with regard to employment and restitution.

8

purpose I think those are relevant.

9

after the fact, I want you to know I will be sustaining or

And I think the

And for that

And although it comes

10

overruling the objection as to those two and I do rely on those

11

as part of my thought process.

12

As to the accommodations at the time of trial, again,

13

that's probably something that came about before my time and

14

before anything that I have observed in court.

I don't know

15 ] that it's directly relevant at all to the issues that are
16

before me, so as to your concerns, Mr. Bennett, I will not

17

consider behaviors, requests, those kinds of issues as they

18

come up at the time of trial.

19

understand these are arguments of counsel.

Beyond that, I think all of us
I wasn't here.

2 0 • There's no evidence as to those accommodations, why they were
21

brought or how they were used or not used.

22

part of the expression of emotion that comes at the time of

23

argument and I will not be relying on those.

24

evidence..

25

I consider it to be

They are not

Counsel, I appreciate your arguments and I'm going to
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1

take the matter under advisement.

If you'll wait a few

2

moments, I'm going to organize my thoughts and I'll be back

3

out.

' •<

4

MR. BAER:

Thank you, your Honor.

5 I

(Recess taken by the Court.)

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Please be seated.

I've had a

7

chance to'consider the evidence that's been presented, the

8

argument, the exhibits.

9

violations alleged in the probation officer's March 2 2 n ,

With regard to the findings of

10 J 2011, affidavit, I find on the first allegation contained in
11

Paragraph No. 1 that the evidence has failed to establish a

12

violation that he failed to establish or that he changed his
I

13
14

st
residence without permission on.October 21

, 2010.

I do find that he knowingly violated Paragraph No. 2

15 I by failing to report as directed on October 2 1 s u , 2010, and
16

my finding is based on a combination of the prior finding of

17

the Court that whether he relies on his own understanding or

18

relies on counsel's representations isn't relevant to me.

19

was under probation.

20 I matter of record.

He knew he was under probation.

He

It was a

I don't believe his probation was stayed for

21

the reasons stated in my subsequent ruling.

22

failure to respond and report as directed by probation, you do

23

that at your own risk.

24

law, that's a risk you take.

25

And I think a

If you misunderstand or misinterpret

No. 3, I do find a violation of probation for his
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1

conviction of aiding and abetting or willfully causing another

2

to commit a crime.

3

of guilt on Counts 18, 19, 21, 23, 27 and 2 8 of the federal

4

jury verdict form.

5 I

I'm referring specifically to the findings

Item No. 4, I do find that he's in violation of

6

probation by having a conviction of conspiracy which, again, is

7

Count 23, could be interrupted for either three or four, No. 3

8

or 4 allegation of violation.

9

As to Paragraph No. 5, I find no violation.

The

10 J evidence does not support a finding of violation on No. 5.
11

On No. 6 I find that the evidence does support a

12

finding of violation for the conviction of wire fraud.

13

specifically refer to Counts 27 and 28.

14

You

* There are allegations of other violations and, excuse

15 I me, there are convictions of other counts through the federal
16

document.

I'm only referring to those counts that I find the

17

evidence supports because they occurred after the date of •

18

sentencing in this case, not the ones that occurred before.

19

It's been suggested that I don't have to rely on the conviction

2 0 j stancarc oecause ne was toio. not to commit crimes eitrier.

21

The argument is that clearly he committed these

22

crimes even if there's not a finding or a conviction of these

23

crimes.

24

independently find -- I do believe you can, but I don't have

25

evidence of those crimes independently.

And

I do not accept that a p p r o a c h that y o u

can

There's been no
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1

s h o w i n g of a n y one specific c r i m e that o c c u r r e d .

2

v e r y s e r i o u s l y the p r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e and the

3

that e v i d e n c e b e p r e s e n t e d .

4

I take

requirement

In o t h e r settings I h a v e h a d o t h e r h e a r i n g s

5
• 6

And

where

p e o p l e a c t u a l l y do come in and h a v e a trial w i t h i n a p r o b a t i o n
I violation allegation.

That d i d n ' t h a p p e n h e r e

so

I'm

7

specifically

8

are c o n v i c t i o n s of record, not b e c a u s e of the a c t u a l

9

of the c r i m e s .

10

finding that the v i o l a t i o n d i d o c c u r b e c a u s e

Having

there

commission

found that he h a s v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n

both

11

in the O c t o b e r and -- excuse m e , the N o v e m b e r 2 010 and

12

M a r c h 2011 o r d e r to show c a u s e m a t t e r s , I'm n o w g o i n g to t u r n

13

to s a n c t i o n s and I'm going to look first at the

14

understanding

15. I

the

general

I h a v e of p r o b a t i o n .

First of a l l , p r o b a t i o n , as w e ' v e h e a r d m a n y

16

repeated,

17

o p p o r t u n i t y to keep yourself

18

s t a t u t o r y p r i s o n sentence o n this case is at l e a s t , not

19

t h a n , one y e a r and not m o r e t h a n 15 y e a r s in p r i s o n .

And

20

p r o b a t i o n is a l l o w e d to i n d i v i d u a l s w h o are of slight

risk or

21

m i n i m a l r i s k , and it's g i v e n for the o p p o r t u n i t y of the. p e r s o n

22

to meet certain goals with the assistance of their probation

23

officer.

24
25

is a p r i v i l e g e .

It's not a s a n c t i o n .

It's

times

from g o i n g to p r i s o n .

However, probation is not for everybody.
require compliance.

It requires strict adherence.
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1

lend itself well to people who fail to comply, who interpret

2

things differently than they are told or who choose not to

3

follow certain aspects of probation because it's difficult or

4

uncomfortable or they don't want to do it.

5

1

In this case the defendant has previously been

6

J convicted, excuse me, has been found to have violated probation

7

on numerous occasions.

I will be remiss because I don't .

8

remember the numbers, but I do recall that there have been

9

several.

Prior to my taking the Bench, he had been found in

10

violation in an August hearing and shortly thereafter I was

11

asked to review the sanction that was issued.

12

period of 6 0 days incarceration.

13
14
15

He was given a

That was stayed primarily because there was no
opposition to the motion to stay.

And as I indicated in my

I findings in our earlier hearing, I think to some extent the

16

State shares some of the responsibility for the Court's

17

confusion or reasons for entering that stay and creating the

18

circumstance that may have caused some confusion.

19

If he had been sanctioned to serve first to the

2 0 j revocation an& reinstatement or nis proDation nor 3 6 montns ano.
21'

then to serve 60 days in jail and still violated, I would

22

normally increase the amount of jail time or I would find some

23

other sanction that would be appropriate.

24

surprise me if I had considered 75 or 90 days or community

25

service or something along those lines as an appropriate

And it would not
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1

sanction for his violation for the matter that we discussed

2

from the November allegations.

3

I want to make sure that it's clear in everybody's

4

mind, but specifically in the defendant's mind, that I don't

5

I consider a violation of probation to be a contempt of court

6

I question.

I'm not offended by a violation of probation.

I

7

simply note that the person does not comply with the terms and

8

conditions of the probation that were set.

9

probation is a privilege.

10

As I indicated,

It's an opportunity.

If it doesn't

j work for them, I note that and we move on to the next step.

11

This is not a contempt hearing.

12

It's different sanctions.

13

simply am focusing on his compliance or non-compliance and what

14

it would take to persuade him to comply.

15

I

It's different standards.

We approach it differently.

I

With regard to the violations that we have heard

16

today and that I have found today, I'm considering sanctions

17

I more severe than what I had indicated would be a step up from

18

the 60 or so days that he had been ordered prior.

19

said that when he clearly understands his probation, he

2 0 [ complies.

I don't find that.

I'm not persuaded.

It's been

I'm

21

persuaded that even though he clearly understands his

22

probation, he tries to find ways to avoid his obligations.

23

He claims that he reported to the Court on a monthly

24

basis.

And I appreciate the argument, but it's not persuasive.

25

I don't believe I ever met with Mr. Johnson.
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he's ever provided me any information regarding his housing,
his employment, his income, his opportunities or his efforts to
make restitution.

If he submits a motion to the Court, I don't

consider that a report to the Court for probation purposes.

I

also don't believe that he was on court probation, but if he
understood it that way, he didn't comply.

He didn't comply

with AP&P probation either.
So the question comes to me do I delay any sanctions
because we have some factual question as to whether or not his
convictions are truly convictions.

And if I carry that

argument out, then I would say no, we need to sentence him now
because we have a conviction on the one hand.

On the other

hand I would say well is that conviction secure?

And if it's

not secure, then perhaps we ought to hold off until his motion
is ruled on.
If I take that to the next logical step, well, what
if he appeals it and it could be overturned on appeal.
I hold off then too?

Should

And if it's not overturned on appeal,

should I then hold off because he's filed a post-conviction
I C i i C l

o_ w ' ^ L t t r KD i- .

-L

vJ-wii

L.

JLJ-iiCL

LiivJuC

p C i o u a o i V C .

ourselves a disservice by going down that road.

JL

UilXilA.

w-^

UU

It presumes

that he has some invested right to probation which he doesn't.
When he violates probation, it has multiple
repercussions.

It has taken the time, energy, concern,

efforts, money of the State, of the probation department,
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1

probably more the probation department than anybody, but the

2

probation department, the State, his own defense attorney,

3

himself, the Court, court staff, and if that happens once or

4

that happens twice and he learns from it and he changes his

5 I behavior and we can see progress, then perhaps he's a candidate
6

for continued reinstatement of probation.

7

In this case I don't find those to be present.

8

What's really concerning to me is what I indicated just prior

9

to argument and that is it appears the defendant was involved

10

in a continuing, ongoing criminal process that took a number of

11

years to commit various frauds.

12

convicted in state court for the crime that he was convicted

13

of.

14

though it wasn't brought to light and hasn't been brought to

In the middle of which he was

And yet that didn't have an impact on his behavior.

Even

15 | this Court's attention until just now, it's apparent now that
16

he continued for at least one year, if not beyond, in his

17

criminal activities as has been established by his convictions

18 I in the federal court.
19
20

He didn't cease.
I undue.

He didn't s t o p .

H e d i d n ' t try

H e t o o k the b e n e f i t of and c o n t i n u e d to

to

encourage

21 I others to take the benefit of his criminal activities.

Some of

22

those activities occurred before he was sentenced, some

23

occurred before he was on probation, some after, but it's clear

24

that the Court's efforts at this point, at least in

25

establishing the original probation, did not alter his behavior
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.1
2

or did not stop his criminal behavior.
• My decision is that I'm revoking his probation.

I'm

3

reinstating the statutory sentence.

He is ordered to report to

4

the prison.' I will allow him 30 days to report to prison.

5

Those 3 0 days before he reports to prison I want him held in

6 j Millard County in jail, and that's only to allow him time to
7

put his affairs, including any motions that he wants the Court

8

to consider or appeals if he wants to take them, to be filed,

9

and he will need access to his attorney for that purpose and I

10

don't believe it's appropriate for our public defender to have

11

to travel up to the prison to address those issues with him.

12

So I'm going to allow him 3 0 days in the Millard

13

County Jail unless he waives that and requests that he be

14

ordered and transported up to jail in which .-- or to prison in

15 I which case I will accommodate that.

Otherwise, he will be in

16

custody as of today and he will remain in Millard County Jail

17

for 30 days and then after transported to prison.

18
19
20 j

Mr. Baer, do you have any questions or are there any
issues that I have not addressed?
MR. BAER:

Only one small matter and this is based

21

upon experience.

In this case with this defendant now ordered

22

to Utah State Prison, if the Court's record could reflect the

23

seriousness, I guess, and I want to word this correctly, but

24

the seriousness of the restitution obligation because the

25

concernDigitized
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and in white collar fraud cases for better, for worse, it's
usually on a low end.

And even then there can be good

behavior.
And I'm not reflecting upon that.

The prison has its

own jurisdiction obviously and its own considerations as to
what it may or may not do.

However, I want to make it clear

that hopefully it can be clear in any sentencing order that
it's a deep concern of this Court that that restitution be an
obligation of any parole because what historically has happened
is sometimes notices don't go out, the victims don't hear about
it, parole doesn't properly consider that obligation and it's
an important obligation and one that the State believes he
needs to address when he gets out.

I mean, this is an order of

this Court and these people are left wanting financially so if
and when he gets out or when he gets out, that that be
addressed in a proper content.
THE COURT:

Anything further that you'd like me to

address, Mr. Bennett?
MR. BENNETT:
^3_
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upon his release and obviously this Court isn't in the position
to indicate what the terms of parole will be.
We do, however, and I would call it to the Court's
attention, the fact that in previous instances where Mr.
Johnson has been incarcerated he has filed motions to be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

74

1

allowed to use certain visual aids during his incarceration.

2

believe that's been on more than one occasion that he's

3

requested that and it's always been granted.

.4

I

I don't know if the Court is comfortable ruling on a

5

motion if I were to make it orally at this point or if the

6

Court would just indicate that that should be made during his .

7

3 0 day intern, but we would motion the Court to allow Mr.

8

Johnson visual aids, exactly.what those visual aids are I'm not

9

fully aware, but identical motions have been made in previous

10

instances with this Court and they have always been granted.

11

It's my understanding that Mr. Johnson has been

12

afforded those visual aids here in Millard County Jail,

13

requests have been made to Lieutenant (inaudible) and he'd

14

approved those as well, that's my understanding, so at this

15 I time I motion the Court for an order granting him the use of
16
17

his visual aids as the Court has done on prior occasions.
.. THE COURT:

Mr. Bennett, I have not reviewed those

18

prior motions and so I can't be specific enough in my order to

19

simply give a blanket that the Court will do what Mr. Johnson

20 j asks, iDUt i wiii iDe giao. co review tnose [notions or ii you • a
21

like, you're welcome to file your own motion and I'll respond

22

to it as quickly as I can.

For the benefit of both counsel, I

23 I am available until the 10th of June.

Should any motions be

24

filed that I need to consider, I can consider them prior to

25

that date.

After the 10th of June, I will be gone until the
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of June and, therefore, any motions that are received on

the 10th or not fully briefed by the 10th I cannot consider and
will not address until I.return in July.
With regard to a motion for accommodations in jail,
I'm glad to consider that, Mr. Bennett.

As you know, my

calendar takes me to several different cities this week.

If

you would like, you can contact me by FAX with your motions
and, Mr. Baer, I'm going to ask you to promptly respond to
those motions.
timeframes.

I know that we have rules and you have

I'm just going to ask you to do your best to

respond as quickly as you can.
If I don't find anything objectionable to a motion
and it seems pretty straight forward, I don't mean to cut you
off from your opportunity to respond, but I may rule on them if
they are pretty proforma.
MR. BAER:

And not only does the State have no

objection to that, but to the extent that he requires any sorts
of aids, there'd be no objection.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The other issue that I wanted

to address iDiisiiy is cnac cnere was a request DY tne otaus in
its briefing at one point that I not make this a concurrent
sentence with anything that might come out of the federal
court, but that I make it consecutive and I don't believe my
rules allow me to do that.
MR. BENNETT:

Yeah, I believe whoever sentences the
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1

second half is going to make decision.

2

THE COURT:

So he is sentenced.

Whatever it is

3

consecutive t'o or concurrent with was determined at the time of

4

his sentencing and we will leave that as it is.

5
6

MR. BENNETT:

Your Honor, Mr. Johnson is indicating

J that the visual aids doesn't actually require a motion in order

7

to (inaudible).

Would the Court entertain him --

8

THE COURT:

Tell me what the visual aids are. .

9

MR. BENNETT:

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

MR. BENNETT:

I don't know.
Your Honor -Well, hold on.

12

Johnson to address the Court. .

13

THE COURT:

14
15

Permission for Mr.

I'd like Mr. Johnson to address me.

Mr.

Johnson, what visual aids do you feel you need?
I

THE DEFENDANT:

They were actually -- when I came

16

with Judge Eyre, they were already reviewed by the judge '-- by

17

the sheriff and by the judge.

18

THE COURT:

Can you tell me what they are?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

They consist of a camera, a computer

2 0 j and an XY table, a little printer device that enlarges and just
21
22
23
24
25

their relative cables.
THE COURT:

Are these devices that you provide or are

these devices that you're asking the jail to -THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah, these are the ones that the

state has given me that I have.
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THE COURT:

Then you can have -- I will allow that

material to be used by you as long as the jail does not have an
objection to it.

And if they do, I would like to hear that

before the end of the week.
THE DEFENDANT:

The other thing is I wonder if I can

have some time to collect this stuff.

Before I was given a few

days to report to jail so I can go get this stuff and I've •
proven very willing to report.

I've just got to get some stuff

and I've got to bring it down with me.

Otherwise, I'm without

the ability to.
MR. BENNETT:

Your Honor, what he's referring to is

the August 30th revocation reinstatement of probation with a 60
sanction that at that time Mr. Johnson asked for three or four
days prior to reporting to Millard County Jail and that was
granted.

He's now indicating to the Court that there should be

no fear of a flight risk if the Court would entertain and grant
said motion.

On behalf of Mr. Johnson, I motion the Court that

he be given three or four days to report to Millard County
Jail.

from Judge Eyre to report the first time and I faithfully
reported and I was just found by a federal judge not to be a
flight risk.
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:

Thank you.
All right.

Mr. Baer.
Judge, I'm not sure exactly
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1

how to frame this except I think we'd have to enter a general

2

objection to that.

3

think that the County has some concerns and certainly the State

.4

has some concerns.

5 I matter.

It's just time.

It's just time.

It's just time.

And I

It's time to finish the

This individual; if the Court needs a factual basis,

6 J certainly has more flight risk justifications at this point
7

both in facing federal sentencing as well as the sanctions here

8

today and so we just don't think it's appropriate.

9

It's been given in the past and we find ourselves

10 J back here on violations and now find him in violations again,
11

so I think it's time for him to report and I think the jail has

12

some concerns with that as well given the far flung

13

jurisdictions that we're talking about here between Salt Lake

14

and Millard County.

.15

MR. BENNETT:

Well, it speaks for the fact that he

16

requested the exact same consideration in August and he

17

reported promptly. ,

18

THE COURT:

19

Mr. Bennett, my concern as I think it's

not b e e n d i r e c t l y addressed, but m y concern is that h e n o w

2 0 j faces a n indeterminate term in prison.
21

before that I know of.

22

MR. BENNETT:

H e ! s never faced that

Well, in the federal court he obviously

23

did, and these convictions, at least what the Court is relying

24

at least in part on for this sanction, he faced it at that

25

time.

He's been released since mid-April (inaudible) on two
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separate occasions.
THE COURT:

Yes, but he has not yet been sentenced in

federal court and he has not yet been told by a judge that he's
going to prison.

So I'm weighing that on one side..

To the

benefit that the federal court did find that he was not a
flight risk and has in place a number of sanctions and
provisions, not the least of which I understand would involve
the forfeiture of his Visa as well as an obligation to report
to his probation officer on a daily basis.
Mr. Staker, are you available to speak with Mr.
Johnson on a daily basis if you were to initiate the call?
MR. STAKER:

Basically what we'd have to do --well,

except for Friday Saturday and Sunday because we're not open.
THE COURT:

My question more specifically is if I

allow him to return to his home tonight and order that he
report here first thing Friday morning, would you be able to
receive PHONE calls from him at a predetermined time?
MR. STAKER:

Yeah, or we could have him meet any

morning at 8:00, just what I've always told Mr. Johnson that I
ivaxiaDie.
THE COURT:

Let's do this then.

Johnson to return to his home tonight.

I will allow Mr.. .

He's ordered to report

to the jail not later than 10:00 a.m. Friday morning.

He is to

report to Mr. Staker in person each morning beginning tomorrow,
Wednesday and Thursday also, 8:00 a.m?
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1

MR. STAKER:

2

THE COURT:

Yes.
He's to be there by 8:00.

If it becomes

3

8:15 and Mr. Johnson is not there, I will immediately

4

authorized a warrant for his arrest.

5

MR, BENNETT:

6 J

THE COURT:

Understood.

And that is to allow him those two or

7

three days necessary to do what he needs to do for his

.8

equipment and any other affairs he has to deal with.

9

that, he's to be held in jail for 3 0 days to make him available

After

10 I to his attorney and thereafter transferred to the prison.
11

MR. BENNETT:

12

MR. BAER:

Thank you, your Honor.

Judge, if I could address one more issue.

13

You just mentioned his equipment.

I think there's some concern

14

from the sheriff's office about that equipment, what sorts of

15 I things are going to be brought into the jail certainly within
16

his computer.

17

know how to address that-quite honestly except to bring it to

18

the Court.

19

p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s t o r i c a l l y h i s o r i g i n a l v i o l a t i o n in this

20

j was

They don't have computer experts here.

I don't

And it doesn't sound like an unreasonable concern,
case

-- in e s s e n c e he w a s d o i n g the s o r t s o f , we b e l i e v e ,

21

financial activities that he was proscribed from and Judge Eyre

22

found that in the original order to show cause..

23

I think it's not unreasonable to be concerned that

24

that sort of activity might go on given if he's allowed to

25

bring in
his
own
or without
some
of expert to be
Digitized
by the
Howardcomputer
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1

able to make sure what's on there is clean and addresses --

2

THE COURT:

I am anticipating that what he's told me

3

is computer equipment and some enlargement and printing

4

equipment.

5

And I think I made my order subject to the approval

I of the jail of the equipment as it comes in.

I guess I could

6

clarify my order that he's not to have internet access on his

7

computer, no wires or cables that would connect him to a

8

telephone.

9
10

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
I internet.

As you know, there is wireless

All computers, his laptop.

What I would only like,

11

he has an attorney, if he needs things enlarged, he can bring

12

his enlarging machine, but he does not need a computer.

13

bring what he needs to see to enlarge things, that's fine, but

14

I don't see a reason for a computer when he has an attorney.

15
16
17
18
19

( H e ' s getting 30 days to be here.

He can

We don't give all our clients

computers back there, but if he needs to see something -THE COURT:

Mr. Bennett, help me understand why a

computer is necessary for the next 30 days?
MR. BENNETT:

Well, Mr. Johnson will have to explain,

20

but I will indicate that according to Mr. Johnson, this was

21

ordered previously and

22

(inaudible).

THE DEFENDANT:

It's the same equipment that was

23

approved last time and it was used successfully.

It's also

24

equipment that was provided by the State Vocational

25

Rehabilitation Services.

The enlarging equipment can't be run
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1

without the computer.

It enlarges and helps me see.

2

(Inaudible) under the American Disabilities Act and I believe

3

(inaudible) as that (inaudible) institution that includes that.

4

Otherwise, I'm without the ability to see and to use my

5 I equipment, but, again, it was the same equipment that was
6

J s u c c e s s f u l l y u s e d last t i m e .

•7 I

THE COURT:

Okay.

My order is as I've stated it and

8

my order will be enforced the way I stated it.

If the jail

9

objects to any piece of equipment that you are bringing in, you

10 I have access to an attorney, who can file a motion who can get it
11

to me.

If there have been prior orders, and I'll tell you I'm

12

not aware of them, if there have been -- hold on.

13

have been prior orders and they specifically provide for

14

equipment or other items, I'm speaking now to Mr. Bennett, you

If there

15 I may want to include those in any motion, but at this point I
16

have insufficient information for me to feel comfortable to

17

order that he can have or can't have anything except what the

18

jail is comfortable that he has.

19

then the jail will control and he will file an appropriate

Z\J

j pleading.

21

MR. BENNETT:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

If the jail and he disagree,

Thank you, your Honor.
Anything

f u r t h e r , M r . B e n n e t t , w e need

address today?
MR. BENNETT:
MR. BAER:

No.

Nothing

Thank you, your Honor.
from the S t a t e .
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1

Honor.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BAER:

4
5 1

We're keeping the exhibits,
I just wanted to ask to withdraw the

exhibits,
THE COURT:

Oh, I'm sorry.

I didn't have that

6 J motion, but I don't mind if you want to withdraw the exhibit.
7

Counsel, these are exhibits and it may be something

8

where somebody may choose to appeal my decision.

9

need copies of the exhibits.

10 I
11

MR. BAER:

If they do, I

Actually why don't we just leave

(inaudible).

12

THE COURT:

Take copies that you need from the file,

13

I'd like to keep the exhibits.

14

gentlemen, for being here today.

We're adjourned.

15 I

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

16 I

MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

17
IS
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2 I

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

3 I STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS

4 I County of Utah
5 I

I, Colleen C. Southwick, Registered Professional

6 J Reporter for the State of Utah, do certify that the foregoing
7

transcript was taken down by me stenographically from an

8

electronic recording and thereafter transcribed;

9

That the same constitutes a true and correct

10 j transcription.of the said proceedings;
11
12

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any
of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not

13 I interested in the events thereof.
14
15 |

WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 8th day of

16 I August, 2 011.
17
18

Colleen/C. Sou\hwick, RPR, CSR
21
22
23
24
25
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - MILLARD
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
\
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.
JAMIS M JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No: 051700056 'FS
Judge:
JAMES BRADY
Date:
May 17, 2011

^P

PRESENT
Clerk:
sheris
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): TATE W BENNETT
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 14, 1952
Audio
Tape Count: 2:09:31
CHARGES
1. SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/07/2007 Guilty
HEARING
COUNT: 2:09:31
AP&P Agent Troy Staker is also present.
The Court indicated that this case has been set for hearing for an
Evidentiary Hearing on the denials entered on 4/27/11 in regards to
the Progress Violation Report dated 11/15/10.
Sanctions from previous OSC hearing regarding Progress Violation
Report of 10/25/10 and also hearing on Progress Violation Report
filed on 3/22/11.
Attorney Bennett entered denials on behalf of the defendant on the
Progress Violation Report dated 4/27/Al-r--r-•-•-— ~
Attorney Bennett addressed the Court and indicated that he only
received the Statefs sentencing memorandum yesterday and would
request time to respond.
The Court has reviewed the file and will proceed with the
Evidentiary Hearing on Progress Violation Report dated 11/15/10 and
3/22/11.
Attorney Baer offered to the Court Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 Certified copy of Verdict Form from the Federal Court. Court
received. State rests.
Attorney Bennett argued and motioned the Court to dismiss
allegation #5 from Order to Show Cause Affidavit. State responded.
Court denies the Motion.
Attorney Bennett offered Defendant's Exhibit 2 - copy of docket in
Federal Case. State objects. Court received.
Attorney Bennett called defendant Jamis Johnson to testify.
COUNT: 2:55
Court takes a brief recess to allow Attorney Bennett to confer
Page 1
^^^ <
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Case N o : 051700056 D a t e :

M a y 1 7 , 2011

with h i s client.
T I M E : 3:01 PM Court resumes. Court reviewed Exhibit 3 w h i l e in
recess.
The Court will accept the argument of counsel in regards
to the transcript admitted.
T I M E : 3:02 PM Testimony proceeds. Attorney Bennett w i l l examine
the defendant i n regards to the sanctions. Defendant's Exhibit 4 Proof of compliance w/Federal probation.
Offered and received.
T I M E : 3:14 PM A t t o r n e y Baer cross examined.
T I M E : 3:18 PM The Court addressed the parties w i t h his
interpretation of w h a t issues to have been put before him today.
T I M E : 3:22 PM A t t o r n e y Baer gave argument.
T I M E : 3:25 PM A t t o r n e y Bennett gave closing argument.
Attorney
Baer responded.
Court finds that unpaid restitution and employment
is relevant to the issues the Court will be addressing today.
T I M E : 3:47 PM Court w i l l take the matter u n d e r advisement.
Court takes a b r i e f recess and return w i t h a decision.
T I M E : 4:10 PM Court resumes and enters sanctions. Court revoked
probation and imposed the original sentence of an indeterminate
term of not less t h a n o n e year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
Defendant is to report to the Millard County Jail no later than
Friday, May 20 at 10:00 a.m.
Defendant to r e m a i n in the jail for
transportation to the U t a h State Prison after 30 days.
The defendant is to report to M r . Staker, A P & P the next two
mornings at 8:00 am.
T h e Court indicated to M r . Staker that if Mr.
Johnson does n o t appear b y 8:15 the Court will issue an immediate
warrant for h i s arrest.
The Court indicated that for the 30 days M r . Johnson is awaiting
transportation to the p r i s o n counsel would b e m o r e available for
the p r e p a r a t i o n of any motions the parties feel the Court m a y need
to address.
The d e f e n d a n t f s p r o b a t i o n is revoked.
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment.
COMMITMENT is to b e g i n immediately.
The d e f e n d a n t s p r o b a t i o n is terminated unsuccessfully.
The defendant m a y b r i n g visual aids equipment w h e n reporting to the
jail if approved b y jail personnel. If there is any objection of
any type of equipment b y jail personnel M r . J o h n s o n may file a
motion w i t h the Court.
• ,.A,
>
^
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 051700056 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: MARK W BAER 160 E 300 S 5TH FLR POB 140814 SALT LAKE CITY,
UT 84114-0814
MAIL: TATE W BENNETT PO BOX 272 FILLMORE DT 846M
Date

• Ww \%

toft

^kpp^rvrMm

>

Deputy Court Clerk
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COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK
OF THE DISTRICT COURT
i

" i

"••'

JUN 1 7 2011
MILLARD COUNTY
^>

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
MILLARD COUNTY DEPARTMENT
ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 051700056

JAMIS J . JOHNSON,

Date: June 17,2011
Judge: James Brady
Defendant.

Having reviewed Defendants pro se expedited motion to amend and extend jail
term 30 days to allow for stay and probable cause process, and Plaintiffs response
thereto, the court reviewed the records and recordings of the May 17, 2011 hearing.
Based on that review the court enters the following findings:
The May 17, 2001 hearing was to consider allegation of probation violations by
Defendant as a result of criminal convictions in a separate federal case. It was also to
determine appropriate sanctions for findings of probation violations determined on April
21, 2011 as well as sanctions, if any arising out of the alleged violations based on the
federal convictions.
With regards to only the violations related to the federal violations, after review
the court now makes the following findings:
1. The court made a clear and unambiguous determination that Defendant could not
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CLERK
DFPIITY

be found in violation of probation for actions he took prior to being placed on
probation.
2. Although two of the counts in the Federal trial were alleged to have occurred on
dates following Defendant being placed on probation by this court, upon
further argument and examination of the document, at the May 7, 2001
hearing, the court concluded that counts 10 and 22 of the federal indictment
were dismissed by the United States Attorney, and did not result in a
conviction. This court ruled that these two counts would not be considered a
violation of Defendants probation.
3. This court explicitly ruled that it would not consider as evidence of a violation of
probation, any convictions in the federal case for actions taken before the
date of sentencing in this case.
4. On May 17, 2011, when considering the States allegations of convictions on
counts 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 28 and others, contained in the federal indictment,
this court came to the conclusion that Defendant was engaged in wrong
doings including conspiracy and aiding and abetting others to commit mail
fraud and wire fraud after being placed on probation. This conclusion was
made in error. Upon review it is clear that the dates of these offenses predate
Defendants sentencing in the present case.
5. At the time of determining an appropriate sanction for defendants violation of his
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probation, this court considered defendants perceived continuing criminal
activities a significant violation, sufficient to justify the revocation of probation,
and the imposition of the statutory sentence.
In that the court erred in believing that defendants criminal conduct continued
after being placed on probation, it is appropriate for the court to review and
correct the sanction it issued at the hearing on May 17, 2011.
The evidence at the hearing was clear and convincing that defendant violated
probation when he failed to report to his probation officer.
a. Defendant does not dispute that he failed to report to his probation officer,
despite knowledge that the probation officer attempted to contact him
several times. Defendant claims he was relieved from his obligations to
contact his probation officer either because of an implication contained in
an order of this court, or because his probation period had lapsed.
b. This court did not order the termination of Defendants probation, nor his
obligation to report to his probation officer.
c. Although Defendant claims his obligation was changed from reporting to
his probation officer to an obligation to report to the court on a monthly
basis, this interpretation is only partially correct. The order did not
terminate Defendants probation, but did order him to report monthly to the
court.
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d. As to his argument that reporting to the court supplanted his obligations to
1

the probation officer, it did not. It should also be noted that even if it did
Defendant also did not report to the court.
e. As previously determined by this court, Defendants probation period did
not lapse before the order to show cause was issued in October 2011 for
Defendants various probation violations.

8. This court previously found that Defendant violated his probation by failing to
inform the probation department of his then current residence, or by changing
his residence without notification to his probation officer, and for his failure to
report to his probation officer on October 21, 2011.
9. Previously Defendant had been found in violation of his probation agreement and
was sentenced to 60 days in jail. That matter is on appeal at this time.
10. Based on the courts review of its findings and the order issued May 17, 2011, the
court finds it is appropriate to amend its order.
11. Defendants probation is revoked and reinstated for 36 months. Defendant is
ordered to serve 120 days in the Millard County jail. Defendant shall come
ueiore tt i« court ior review ue»ore MES reiesse irorn jail.
///
///
///
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Dated this jj_ day of June, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

JAMES BRADY
fK
DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^
By JtAJtrx p ^ o t j ?
STAMP USED AT DISCRETION OF JUDGE
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No.

Plaintiff,

INDICTMENT

RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and
JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON,

Vio. 18 U.S.C. §1341 (Mail Fraud);
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud); 18
U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(l)(A)(i) (Money
Laundering); 18 U.S.C. §1349
(Conspiracy); 38 U.S.C. §§ 2(a) and
2(b)(Aiding and Abetting; Willfully
Causing Another to Commit a Crime)

Defendants.
Case:2:09-cr-00133
Assigned T o : Benson, Dee
Assign. Date; 3/18/2009
Description: USA v

The Grand Jury Charges:

BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to this Indictment:
Scheme Participants
1.

Defendant RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR. was a resident of Davis

County, Utah. Defendant HAYCOCK formed and controlled the following four business entities
(collectively, the "Haycock Entities"):

2858
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2.

a.

Lawrence Skinner and Associates ("Lawrence Skinner") - Defendant
HAYCOCK was a managerial accountant doing accounting work for
Lawrence Skinner;

b.

Paramount Strategies f"Paramount") - Paramount a subsidiary company
of Lawrence Skinner, conducted real estate transactions and handled real
estate investments;

c.

Lavton Davis Financial ("Layton Davis") - Lavton Davis managed
mortgages and properties on behalf of Paramount; and

d.

Ireland West LLC ("Ireland West") • Ireland West was a joint venture that
conducted real estate transactions and handled the proceeds of those
transactions.

Defendant LYLE CLAY SMITH was a resident of Davis County, Utah.

Defendant SMITH was vice president of Lawrence Skinner, identified properties to be purchased
through Lawrence Skinner, and processed and completed loan transactions on behalf of
Lawrence Skinner. Defendant SMITH also managed Layton Davis.
3.

Defendant JAMIS MELWOOD JOHNSON was a resident of Salt Lake County,

Utah, Defendant JOHNSON engaged in activities related to Lawrence Skinner, Paramount, and
Layton Davis real estate transactions, including issuing verifications of deposit ("VODs") and
verifications of assets ("VOAs") to facilitate the closing of some of the loan transactions
identified in this Indictment. Defendant JOHNSON did not have a license to practice law in
Utah but was licensed to practice in New York.
4.

Various "straw buyers" participated in the loan transactions identified in this

Indictment. Tnese straw buyers were recruited to sign and submit real estate purchase
agreements and loan documentation (collectively, "purchase and loan documents*') to lenders
using their favorable personal credit rating. At times, and as described below, the purchase and
loan documents contained false and misleading financial information about the straw buyers and

2

. 2853
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case 2:09-cr-0u , 33-CW Document 1 Filed 03/18/0b Page 3 of 20

concealed from the lender material information concerning the funding of the transaction and use
of loan proceeds.
Scheme Victims: The Mortgage Lenders
5.

America's Wholesale Lender ("AWL"), Countiywide Home Loans ("CHL"),

Countrywide Bank ("CWB"), Argent Mortgage ("AM"), Paragon Home Lending ("PHL"),
Shoreline Lending ("SL"), and Mountain States Mortgage ("MSM"), were mortgage lenders
with national business operations that included offices or lending functions in Utah. As
described in detail below, these mortgage lenders approved and funded loans primarily based
upon borrowers providing true and accurate information, along with adequate documentation,
which met their respective mortgage underwriting standards.
The Mortgage Loan Application, Approval, and Funding Process
6.

As part of the mortgage application process, mortgage lenders AWL, CHL, CWB

AM, PHL, SL, and MSM (collectively, the "Mortgage Lenders") required a loan application,
along with supporting documentation, which accurately reflected a borrower's financial
condition, assets, income, liabilities, and ability to repay and retire the mortgage, as well as
information concerning the condition of the property serving as security for the loan. The loan
application was required to be signed by the borrower under oath. The Mortgage Lenders
required the foregoing information, attested to under oath, in order to make knowledgeable and
informed lending decisions. This phase of loan verification during which an assessment of the
risk of granting a loan against the possibility of a borrower default is called "underwriting."
7.

Prior to closing the transaction, the Mortgage Lenders also required submission of

an appraisal report accurately reflecting the fair market value of the property and market
conditions surrounding the property. The Mortgage Lenders used the appraisal report in their
underwriting and lending decisions.
3
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At the loan closing, the closing agent was required to prepare a Settlement

Statement ("Form HUD 1") which accurately reflected the receipt and disbursement of
transaction frmds. The Form HUD lalso showed, among other things, the down payment paid
by the borrower and funds due to the seller. Based on the closing instructions, the closing agent
was charged with verifying the legitimate source of the down payment, collecting the indicated
funds from the borrower and, following execution by the borrower and seller of appropriate legal
documents, disbursing the loan proceeds for the benefit of the seller.
THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD
9.

Beginning sometime prior to mid-2005 to around August 2007, in the Central

Division of the District of Utah, and elsewhere,
RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and
JAMIS MELWOOD JOHNSON,
defendants herein, devised and intended to devise, and did aid and abet each other therein, a
scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of false and
fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises and omissions of material facts by obtaining
real estate loans from one or more of the Mortgage Lenders, as detailed below. In executing and
attempting to execute the scheme and artifice to defraud, the defendants:
a.

knowingly transmitted and caused to be transmitted, by means of
wire communications in interstate commerce, writings, signs,
signals, pictures, and sounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(Wire Fraud);

b.

knowingly deposited and caused to be deposited in an authorized
depository for mail a matter or thing to be sent and delivered by
the United States Postal Service or by any private or commercial
interstate carrier, according to the directions thereon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Mail Fraud); and

c.

caused financial transactions to be conducted with proceeds of the
specified unlawful activities (i.e., mail fraud and wire fraud) with
4
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the intent to promote the carrying on of such activities, in violation
ofl8U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i).
OBJECT OF THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD
10.

It was the object of the scheme and artifice to defraud for the defendants to obtain

money fraudulently by inducing the Mortgage Lenders, through false statements,
misrepresentations, deception, and omissions of material facts, to loan money to straw
borrowers.
MANNER AND MEANS OF THE OF THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD
11.

It was a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendant HAYCOCK

caused defendant SMITH and others associated with the Haycock Entities to search for and
identify residences that could be placed under contract for purchase in Davis, Salt Lake, and
Utah Counties. These residential properties often were in financial distress that had either
remained unsold for an extended period of time on the market or for which the owner or builder
had a need to sell.
12.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendant

HAYCOCK caused purchases and sales of residential properties including, among others, the
following properties in Davis County, Salt Lake County and Utah County, Utah (collectively, the
"Haycock Properties"):
a.

II897 Harvest Moon Lane, Highland, Utah;

b.

354 East Pheasant View Drive, Draper, Utah;

c.

1408 Military Way, Salt Lake City, Utah;

d.

15023 South Pastoral Way, Salt Lake City, Utah;

e.

14788 South Shadow Grove Court, Draper, Utah;

f.

10094 South Wasatch Boulevard, Sandy, Utah;

•5
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.13.

g.

19 East Windsong Drive, Pleasant Grove, Utah;

h.

891 East Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah;

i.

533 East Mountainville, Alpine, Utah;

j.

13595 Royal Chase Circle, Draper, Utah;

k.

62 West Roberts Circle, Farmington, Utah; and

1.

214 North Morningside Drive, Farmington, Utah.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendant

HAYCOCK:

14.

a.

induced the owners/sellers of the Haycock Properties to sell their homes at
a fixed price to an entity or a straw buyer controlled by defendants
HAYCOCK and SMITH;

b.

required each owner/seller of the Haycock Properties to enter into a joint
venture agreement with Paramount or Ireland West (the "Joint Venture'');
and

c.

promised owners/sellers, under the Joint Venture agreement, a portion of
the profits stemming from the sale of their residence.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants

HAYCOCK and SMITH:
a.

recruited straw buyers to participate in the purchases of the Haycock
Properties. These straw buyers were often referred to by the defendants as
"FICO buyers;"

b.

induced straw buyers to participate in the purchases of the Haycock
Properties by making, or causing to be made, one or more of the following
false and fraudulent representations:
(1)

the straw buyer would not have to make a down payment or invest
any money of their own to buy the home;

(2)

the straw buyer would be paid a substantial fee for signing the loan
papers;

(3)

the straw buyer would have no financial risk and would have no
obligation to make loan payments on the home;
6
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15.

(4)

one of the Haycock Entities would make the loan payments for the
Haycock Properties;

(5)

the straw buyer need not occupy the home; and

(6)

the home would be resold in short order, thus relieving the straw
buyer of any liability for the loan;

c.

required and instructed straw buyers to form a limited liability company,
or "LLC," to qualify for the loan and to receive a portion of the
transaction proceeds as a fee for their participation;

d.

concealed from the Mortgage Lenders, as summarized in paragraphs 14.b.
and 14.c. above, material information concerning the funding of the
transaction and use of loan proceeds;

e.

caused material false statements to be made in purchase and loan
documents submitted to the Mortgage Lenders concerning the straw
buyer's income, assets, plans to occupy the residence, down payment, and
plans to make loan payments; and

f.

caused the straw buyers to sign purchase and loan documents to purchase
one or more of the Haycock Properties.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants

HAYCOCK and SMITH caused the creation and submission to the Mortgage Lenders appraisals
supporting straw buyer purchase and loan documents on the Haycock Properties, These
appraisals reflected a value equivalent to a sales price established by the defendants rather than
the price agreed to by the owner/seller. To obtain the inflated appraisals necessary to approval
of the loans, the defendants supplied the appraisers with the straw buyer sales contract price, and
rejected appraisals that failed to reflect that inflated value.
16.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants

HAYCOCK, SMITH, and JOHNSON caused the straw buyer loans to be closed under false and
fraudulent pretenses by concealing from the Mortgage Lenders one or more of the following
deceptive aspects of the loan transactions:
a.

that the buyer was a "straw buyer;"
7
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17.

b.

that the straw buyer had neither made a down payment nor invested any of
his own funds, resulting in virtually all of the financial risk in the purchase
and loan transaction being transferred to the Mortgage Lender;

c.

that the straw buyer was being paid a kickback or fee from the loan
proceeds as an inducement to apply for the loan from the Mortgage
Lender;

d.

that the straw buyer had no intention to occupy the home or to make
payments on the loan;

e.

that the straw buyer had a materially smaller income stream and materially
fewer assets than represented on his loan application, thereby lacking the
financial wherewithal to qualify for the loan or to make the monthly
payments on the loan after closing;

h,

that the loan closing documentation created the false appearance that the
straw buyer had made a down payment to purchase the property;

i.

that material portions of the loan proceeds were not being paid to the
seller, but to entities controlled by the defendants pursuant to false second
mortgages or other fictitious liens or obligations against the property that
appeared at the closing; and

j.

that loan funds paid out to the joint venture entities controlled by the
defendants were being deposited into a general account and were used to
make loan payments and related payments for the Haycock Properties in
the place of the straw buyers and used to pay the costs related to planning
and funding future straw purchase transactions,

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants

HAYCOCK and SMITH, for a period of time, caused one of the Haycock Entities, instead of the
straw buyers, to make payments on the straw purchase loans for the Haycock Properties in order
to give the Mortgage Lenders the false impression that the loans were normal transactions and
were performing appropriately. The defendants often referred to the account from which excess
loan funds were drawn as the "slush fund."
18.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that defendants

HAYCOCK, JOHNSON and SMITH causedftindsfromthe "slush fund" to be diverted to make
8
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down payments, earnest money payments, or monthly loan payments on other straw purchase
loans and other transactions related to the Haycock Properties.
19.

It was further a part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that after defendants

HAYCOCK and SMITH created the false appearance that the loans were performing, they
caused one of the Haycock Entities to cease making payments on the loans, leaving the straw
buyers with mortgages that they had no ability to repay, and Mortgage Lenders with nonperforming loans secured by the properties worth far less than the outstanding loan balances.
COUNTS 1 through 10
18 U.S.G § 1341
(Mail Fraud) r
18.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Indictment are

incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein.
19.

On or about the dates enumerated in each count below, in the Central Division of

the District of Utah, and elsewhere, for the purpose of executing and in furtherance of the
scheme and artifice to defraud more particularly described in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this
Indictment, and for obtaining money and property of the Mortgage Lenders by means of false
and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and omissions of material facts, and
attempting to do so, the defendants named below did knowingly deposit and cause to be
deposited in any post office or authorized depository for mail the matter or thing listed below to
be sent and delivered by the United States Postal Service or any private or commercial interstate
carrier, and did cause such matter or thing to be delivered according to the directions thereon as
more particularly described for each count below, and did aid and abet, counsel, command,
induce, procure, and cause said mailing:

9
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COUNT

1

DATE
(On or
1 About)

DEFENDANTS

3/24/06

| RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

PROPERTY
ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION OF
MAILING

11897 Harvest
Moon Lane,
Highland, Utah

Transfer of V.P. signed loan
closing document package
from Westland Title office
(Salt Lake City, Utah) to the
office of Shoreline Lending
(Mission Viejo, California)
via overnight common
courier

354 East Pheasant
View Drive, Draper,
Utah

Transfer of S.P. signed loan
closing document package
from Westland Title office
(Salt Lake City, Utah) to the
office of Argent Mortgage
(Irvine, California) via
overnight common courier
(FedEx)

1408 Military Way,
Salt Lake City, Utah

Transfer of R.F. signed loan
closing document package
from Deer Creek Title office
(Park City, Utah) to the
office of Countrywide Bank
(Jacksonville, Florida) via
overnight common courier

1 LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
4/12/06
RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

2

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,
3

4/21/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

4

5/9/06

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,
RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

15023 South
Pastoral Way, Salt
Lake City, Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

Transfer of R.F. signed loan 1
closing document package
|
j from Westland Title office
(Salt Lake City, Utah) to the
office of Shoreline Lending
(Laguna Hills, California) via
overnight common courier
(FedEx)

JAMIS
MELWOOD
10
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COUNT

DATE
(On or
About)

DEFENDANTS

PROPERTY
ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION OF
MAILING

JOHNSON,
5

6/8/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

1

6

7/26/06

14788 South
1 Shadow Grove
Court, Draper, Utah

Transfer of CM. signed loan
closing document package
from Brighton Title office
(Midvale, Utah) to the office ;
of Shoreline Lending
(Laguna Hills, California) via 1
overnight common courier
(FedEx)
1

891 East Osmond
Lane, Provo, Utah

Transfer of G.S. signed loan I
closing document package
from Surety Title office
(Midvale, Utah) to the office
of America's Wholesale
Lender (Jacksonville,
Florida) via overnight
common courier (FedEx)
j

533 East
Mountainville,
Alpine, Utah

Transfer of R.S. signed loan
closing document package
from Surety Title office
(Midvale, Utah) to the office
of Contrywide Bank
(Jacksonville, Florida) via
overnight common courier
(FedEx)

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,
RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

10/6/06

7

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,
RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

I8

i

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,
10/20/06 ; RONALD
WILLIAM

13595 Royal Chase
Circle, Draper, Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

___J_ J

JAMIS
MELWOOD

i
;
!
j
|

Transfer of J.N. signed loan
closing document package
from Surety Title office
(Midvale, Utah) to the office
of America's Wholesale
Lender (Jacksonville,
Florida) via overnight
j
common courier (FedEx)
j

j
li
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COUNT

DATE
(On or
1 About)

DEFENDANTS

JOHNSON,
| 10/27/06 1 RONALD
! WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

9

LYLECTAY
SMITH, and

10

6/22/07

JAMIS
MEL WOOD
JOHNSON,
RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

PROPERTY
ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION OF
! MAILING

62 West Roberts
! Transfer of S.P. signed loan
closing document package
Circle, Farmington,
from Surety Title office
Utah
(Midvale, Utah) to the office
of America's Wholesale
Lender (Anaheim,
California) via overnight
common courier (FedEx)
i

Transfer of T.R. signed loan 1
214 North
Morningside Drive, \ closing document package
from Surety Title office
Farmington, Utah
(Midvale, Utah) to the office
of Paragon Home Lending
(Brookfield, Wisconsin) via
overnight common courier
(FedEx)

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,

all in violation of Title 18,United States Code, Sections 1341, 2(a), and 2(b).

COUNTS 11 through 22
18U.S.C§1343
(Wire Fraud)
20.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Indictment are

incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein.
21.

On or about the dates enumerated as to each count, in the Central Division of the

District of Utah, and elsewhere, for the purpose of executing and in furtherance of the scheme
and artifice to defraud more particularly described in paragraphs 1 through 17 of this
12
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Indictment, and for obtaining money and property of the Mortgage Lenders as described below
by means of false andfraudulentpretenses, representations, and promises, and omissions of
material facts, and attempting to do so, the defendants named below did knowingly transmit and
cause to be transmitted, by means of wire communications in interstate commerce, the writings,
signs, signals, pictures, and sounds as more particularly described for each count below, and did
aid and abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, and cause said wire transmission:

COUNT

11

DATE
(On or
About)

DEFENDANTS

PROPERTY
ADDRESS

3/29/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

11897 Harvest
Moon Lane,
Highland, Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.
12

1/18/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

Wiring of approximately
$389,468.93 in Shoreline
Lending loan proceeds
related to mortgage loan
number 2006-198093 from a
bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Shoreline
Lending (Mission Viejo,
California) to the account of
Westiand Title at Zions Bank
(Salt Lake City, Utah)
Wiring of approximately
$541,500.64 in Argent
Mortgage loan proceeds
related to mortgage loan
number 0096464474 from a
bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Argent
Mortgage (Irvine, California)
to the account of Westiand
Title at Zions Bank (Salt
Lake Citv, Utah)

1408 Military Way,
Salt Lake City, Utah

Wiring of approximately
$1,680,807.68 in
Countrywide Bank loan
proceeds related to mortgage
loan number 134995050
from a bank outside the State

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.
: 4/25/06

1

354 East Pheasant
View Drive, Draper,
Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

13

DESCRIPTION OF WIRE
COMMUNICATION

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
13
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About)
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DEFENDANTS

1 PROPERTY
ADDRESS

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.

14

5/15/06

of Utah on behalf of CWB
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the
account of Deer Creek Title
j at Zions Bank (Salt Lake
1 Citv. Utah)

1 RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

15023 South
1 Pastoral Way, Salt
Lake City, Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
j JOHNSON.
6/12/06

15

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

1

7/10/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

10094 South
Wasatch Boulevard,
Sandy Utah

Wiring of approximately
$615,101.29 in Mountain
States Mortgage loan
proceeds related to mortgage
loan number 06060127 from
a bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Mountain |
States Mortgage (Salt Lake
City, Utah) to the account of
Brighton Title at Zions Bank
(Salt Lake Citv, Utah)

19 East Windsong
Drive, Pleasant
Grove, Utah

Wiring of approximately
$155,505.46 in Mountain
States Mortgage loan
proceeds related to mortgage |

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.
17

7/21/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

Wiring of approximately
$549,592.22 in Shoreline
Lending loan proceeds
i
related to mortgage loan
number 2006-198327 from a
bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Shoreline
Lending (Laguna Hills,
California) to the account of
Westland Title at Zions
Bank (Salt Lake City, Utah)
Wiring of approximately
$528,751.4.3 in Shoreline
Lending loan proceeds
related to mortgage loan
number 2006-198420 from a
bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Shoreline
Lending (Laguna Hills,
California) to the account of
Brighton Title at Zions Bank
(Salt Lake Citv. Utah)

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.

1

1

14788 South
Shadow Grove
Court, Draper, Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

16

DESCRIPTION OF WIRE
COMMUNICATION

|

14
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COUNT

DATE
(On or
About)

!

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MEL WOOD
JOHNSON.

18

7/25/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

Wiring of approximately
$1,011,118.59 in America's
Wholesale Lender loan
j
proceeds related to mortgage
loan number 139219829 from
a bank outside the State of
;
Utah on behalf of America' s
Wholesale Lender
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the
account of Surety Title at
Bank of Utah (Ogden, Utah) j

533 East
Mountainville,
Alpine, Utah

Wiring of approximately
$642,692.92 in Countrywide .;
Bank loan proceeds related to
mortgage loan number
151040337 from a bank
outside the State of Utah on
behalf of Countrywide Bank

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.

10/11/06 : RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.

20

10/20/06

RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

loan file number 94607 from
a bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Mountain
States Mortgage (Salt Lake
City, Utah) to the account of
Surety Title at Bank of Utah
(Sandy, Utah)
;

891 East Osmond
Lane, Provo, Utah

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

19

DESCRIPTION OF WIRE
COMMUNICATION

PROPERTY
ADDRESS

DEFENDANTS

{jQr\r<zrin\n\\f*

Flnrirjc*} try t k g

account of Surety Title at
Bank of Utah (Ogden, Utah)

j
13595 Royal Chase
Circle, Draper, Utah

Wiring of approximately
$1,101,802.27 in America's
Wholesale Lender loan
proceeds related to mortgage

15
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COUNT 1 DATE
(On or
About)

DEFENDANTS

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.
21

1 10/30/06 1 RONALD
[ WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and

22

JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON.
RONALD
WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR.,

6/25/07

LYLE CLAY
SMITH, and
JAMIS
MELWOOD
JOHNSON,
'

PROPERTY
ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION OF WIRE
1 COMMUNICATION

1 loan number 151644724 from
a bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of America's
Wholesale Lender
j
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the
account of Surety Title at
Bank of Utah (Osden, Utah)
Wiring of approximately
|
| 62 West Roberts
Circle, Farmington, $327,964.34 in Countrywide
Home Loans loan proceeds
Utah
related to mortgage loan
number 153051527 from a
bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of
| Countrywide Home Loans
(Jacksonville, Florida) to the
account of Surety Title at
Bank of Utah (Oeden, Utah)
214 North
Wiring of approximately
1
Mornings ide Drive, $302,495.34 in Paragon
Home Lending loan proceeds
Farmington, Utah
related to mortgage loan
number 119149PE from a
bank outside the State of
Utah on behalf of Paragon
Home Lending (Brookfield,
Wisconsin) to the account of
Surety Title at Bank of Utah
(Ogden, Utah)

1

all in violation of Title 18,United States Code, Sections, 1343, 2(a) and 2(b).

COUNT 23
18 U.S.C. § 1349
(Conspiracy)
16
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Beginning in or about mid 2005 to around August 2007, in the Central Division of the

District of Utah, and elsewhere,
RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and
JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON,

defendants herein, and others known and unknown to the Grand wTury, did knowingly and willfully
combine, conspire, confederate, and agree to commit offenses against the United States of America,
that is; mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 1341; and wire fraud, in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, §1343.
23.

The object and the manner and means used to further the conspiracy are set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 17 of this Indictment, and by this reference are fully incorporated in this Count of
the Indictment.
24.

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, at least one of the

conspirators committed at least one overt act in the District of Utah. The events set forth in each Count
of Counts 1 through 17 each and individually constitute an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
and each overt act is incorporated in this Count of the Indictment as if fully set forth herein;
all in violation of Title 18,United States Code, Section 1349.

COUNTS 24 THROUGH 37
(Money Laundering, §18 U.S.C. I956(a)(i)(A)(i), and §2)

25.

Between on or about January 2006 and January 2007, the defendants did unlawfully

and knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct approximately sixty-five (65) financial transactions
totaling more than approximately Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000) in excess loan proceeds
17
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generated by the mail fraud and wire fraud described in Counts 1 through 22 above.
26.

On or about the dates set forth below, in the Central Division of the District of Utah and

elsewhere, the defendants,

RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR.,
LYLE CLAY SMITH, and
JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON,
did unlawfully and knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate
commerce, that is, causing excess loan proceeds generated by the mail fraud and wire fraud described
in paragraphs 1 through 23 above, and Counts 1 through 22 above, to be placed in the "slush fund" and
from there used to make down payments, earnest money payments or monthly loan payments in order
to promote other unrelated fraudulent loan transactions for the benefit of the defendants, knowing that
the property involved in these transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
and which transactions in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, mail fraud
and wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1343 as described above,
with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, to-wit:
Count

j Date

Loan Generated Proceeds

Amount

Description of Financial Transaction

13595 South Royal Chase
24 10/27/2006
Circle
13595 South Royal Chase
25 10/27/2006
Circle
13595 South Royal Chase
26 10/27/2006
Circle

Monthly payment on 850 W 600 N, West Bountiful,
$2,543.68
UT 84087
Monthly payment on 12091 S Draper Farm Cove,
$20,278.33
Draper, UT* 84020
Transfer of funds to nominee buyer's account for a
$25,000.00
Verification of Deposit fVOD).

27 10/02/2006 533 E. Mountainville

$4,557.05 Monthly payment on 19 East Windsong, Pleasant
Grove, UT 84062
Monthly payment on 10094 Wasatch Blvd., Sandy,
$4,688.41
UT, 84092"
Monthly payment on 14728 S. Pristine Way, Draper,
$57522.68
UT 84020 *
1
Monthly payment on 1767 East Springdale Way,
$5,676.24
Draper, UT, 84020
Transfer of funds to nominee buyer's account for a
$35,015.00
Verification of Deposit (VOD).
\

28 10/02/2006 533 E. Mountainville
29 05/18/2006 15023 Pastoral Way
30 05/18/2006 15023 Pastoral Way
31 06/19/2006 14788 S. Shadow Grove Court

18
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32 1 06/19/2006 14788 S. Shadow Grove Court
33 08/10/2006 19 E. Windsong Drive
34 08/14/2006 19 E, Windsong Drive
35

I

36

!

3?

04/19/2006 354 E. Pheasant View Drive
04/19/2006 354 E. Pheasant View Drive
04/03/2006 11897 Harvest Moon Lane

38 04/03/2006 11897 Harvest Moon Lane

vfonthly payment on 14728 S. Pristine Way,
Draper.UT 84020
Monthly payment on 1408 E Military Way, Salt
$14,407.45
Lake City. UT 84103
$5,522.68.

$11,655.11

Monthly payment on 1334 N Canyon Oaks
Way, Salt Lake City, UT 8410

vfonthly payment on 1767 E. Springdale Way,
Draper. UT 84020
CM iftA« Monthly payment on 1334 N Canyon Oaks Way,
5 1 Um 5
' * bait Lake City. UT 84109
£4 061 40 Montkty payment on 1769 E Burning Oak Dr.,
Draper. UT 84020
£. n/.n q< Monthly payment on 14702 S. Pristine Way, Draper,
•'•""—''lUT 84020 *
$5,676.24

All in violation of TitJe 18, United States Code, §1956(a)(l)(A)(i), and §2.
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SEEK CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
(18U.S.C. Section 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. Section 2461)
As a result of committing the felony offenses alleged in Counts 1 through 15 of the Indictment,
each of which is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, defendants RONALD WILLIAM
HAYCOCK, SR., LYLE CLAY SMITH, JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, shall forfeit to the United
States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. Section 2461 any and all property
constituting or derived from any proceeds said defendants obtained directly or indirectly as a result of
the said felony charges alleged in the Counts listed in this Notice, and any property traceable thereto,
including but not limited to the following:
PROCEEDS (MONEY JUDGMENT)
As to RONALD WILLIAM HAYCOCK, SR., LYLE CLAY SMITH, JAMIS MEL WOOD
JOHNSON: The approximate aggregate sum of Two Million Eight-Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand
Dollars ($2,865,000) in United States currency received and diverted by RONALD W. HAYCOCK,
SR., LYLE SMITH, JAMIS MEL WOOD JOHNSON, in connection with the above-referenced
offenses.
If more than one defendant is convicted of an offense, the defendants so convicted are jointly
19
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and severally liable for the amount involved in such offense.
SUBSTITUTE ASSETS
If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the
defendants,
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third person;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2461(c) and 21 U.S.C. Section
853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any property of said defendants up to the value of the above-forfeitable
property,
*

A TRUE BILL:

FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY

BRETT L. TOLMAN
United States Attorney

/•

IL

.! .\

.

S£6TT J. THORLEY
Assistant United States Attorney
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FILED IN UNITED STW€& DISTRICT
COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAR 18 2011
p . MARK J O ^ C L E R K

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

|

Plaintiff,

:

v.

»
;

JAMIS MELWOOD JOHNSON,

\

VERDICT

2:09-CR-OO133 CW

Defendant.
We, the jury duly impaneled in the above-entitled case, find the defendant JAMIS
MELWOOD JOHNSON:
Si GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 1 of the Indictment.
H GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 2 of the Indictment.
$

GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 4 of the Indictment

IS GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 5 of the Indictment
S

GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 6 of the Indictment.

a

GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 7 of the Indictment

B GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 9 of the Indictment.
$

GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 11 of the Indictment.

3

GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 12 of the Indictment.

PL GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 13 of the Indictment.
tf GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 14 of the Indictment.
•fa GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 15 of the Indictment
feu? t *
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GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 16 of the Indictment.

JSL GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 18 of the Indictment
0

GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 19 of the Indictment.

)B GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 21 of the Indictment.
& GUILTY 3 NOT GUILTY as to Count 23 of the Indictment.
l^t GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 27 of the Indictment.
P

GUILTY G NOT GUILTY as to Count 28 of the Indictment

»

GUILTY 3 NOT GUILTY as to Count 29 of the Indictment,

yj GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 30 of the Indictment
Q GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 31 of the Indictment
3 GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 32 of the Indictment.
P GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 33 of the Indictment.
IS GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 35 of the Indictment
^

GUILTY • NOT GUILTY as to Count 37 of the Indictment.

^

GUILTY Q NOT GUILTY as to Count 38 of the Indictment

DATED this Q

day of fYWm ,2011.

K) 5*.e

FOREPERSON
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